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I. INTRODUCTION
Because the federal income tax is levied on net income, no business is re-
quired to include the cost of goods sold in its tax base. Most businesses,
through inventory accounting, exclude the cost of goods sold from gross in-
come, including in gross income only the excess of receipts over the cost of
goods sold.' However, the extractive industries, including coal mining, are
treated somewhat differently. The concept of cost of goods sold is not applied
to the operator of a coal mine. Instead, an analogous concept, the depletion
allowance deduction under Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § 611 and I.R.C. §
613 is available to reflect the cost to the coal mine operators of the coal that
has been extracted and sold.2
Rather than excluding the cost of the coal from gross income, a taxpayer
receiving income from the extraction and sale of coal includes in gross income
an amount generally equal to the market price of his share of the extracted
coal. In computing taxable income the taxpayer deducts the depletion allow-
ance, which is an amount representing the cost of that coal. Unlike the cost of
goods sold concept, however, the depeletion allowance deduction allowed to the
taxpayer to reflect the cost of the coal is not necessarily the actual cost of the
coal. Frequently, if not usually, the depletion allowance deduction is computed
under the percentage depletion method, which allows a deduction in excess of
the actual cost of the coal because it is computed with reference to the tax-
payer's income from the extraction and sale of the coal.3
I Treas. Reg. §§ 1.61-3(a) (1973), 1.471-1 (1960); see 4 B. BrrTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF IN-
coME ESTATES AND GiFTs 105.4.1 (1981).
2 See infra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 85
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 4 [1983], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol85/iss4/5
COAL DEPLETION ALLOWANCE
The depletion allowance deduction is one of the more complex mysteries
of mineral taxation. This article will explain in detail the rules governing the
depletion allowance deduction as applied to coal mining. The prime focus of
this article is the coal operator's depletion allowance deduction. However, the
rules governing depletable coal royalties, will be examined where relevant. Af-
ter a brief exposition of the general principles of entitlement to the depletion
allowance deduction, the first substantive issue to be considered will be the
identification of persons involved in the extraction of coal who are entitled to
claim the depletion allowance deduction. Because lessors of coal property are
not generally entitled to depletion allowance deductions, but treat royalties as
proceeds from the sale of a section 1231 asset," very little consideration will be
given to the tax treatment of lessors. Next will follow detailed discussions of
the rules governing the computation of both cost and percentage depletion de-
ductions. The final section of this article will briefly discuss the issue of identi-
fication of separate coal properties for the purpose of computing the depletion
allowance deduction.
A. Methods of Depletion
Section 611 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that, "[i]n the case of
mines... [and] other natural deposits,... there shall be allowed as a deduc-
tion in computing taxable income a reasonable allowance for depletion ...
according to the peculiar conditions in each case; such reasonable allowance in
all cases to be made under regulations prescribed by the Secretary. . . ." 5Two
methods of computing the depletion allowance deduction are permitted. Under
the regulations the depletion allowance is to be computed either on the ad-
justed depletion basis of the property determined under I.R.C. § 612 or upon a
percentage of gross income from the property, as provided in I.R.C. § 613.6 The
former method is commonly called cost depletion and the latter method is
termed percentage depletion. A separate computation is required for each
"property" as defined in I.R.C. § 614. For any given taxable year the allowable
depletion deduction for the property depends whether cost depletion or per-
centage depletion is greater. If percentage depletion is greater than cost deple-
tion, a depletion deduction based on percentage depletion is mandatory, not
elective."
Cost depletion is computed by deducting an appropriate portion of the
basis of the mineral property for each unit extracted and sold.8 Percentage
depletion is computed with reference to the gross income from the mineral
property, without regard to either basis or the number of units extracted. With
coal, the applicable percentage of gross income from the property that is de-
ductible is ten percent." The maximum deduction allowable under percentage
4 I.R.C. § 631(c) (1976).
5 I.R.C. § 611(a) (1976).
o Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(a) (1960).
7 I.R.C. § 613(a) (1982) (last sentence); Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(a) (1960).
8 Tress. Reg. § 1.611-2(a)(1) (1972).
9 I.R.C. § 613(b)(4) (1976).
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depletion, however, is limited to fifty percent of the taxpayer's taxable income
from the property, computed without regard to the depletion allowance. 10 Cost
depletion, however, although restricted to the amount of the taxpayer's basis
in the property, may exceed fifty percent of the taxpayer's taxable income from
the property.
B. Purpose of the Depletion Allowance
The original purpose of the depletion allowance was to recognize that min-
eral deposits are wasting assets and that a mine owner should be entitled to
recoup his capital investment free of tax. In United States v. Ludey,11 the Su-
preme Court, in 1927, analogized mineral deposits to the raw material used by
a manufacturing company. Thus, the depletion allowance was similar to the
allowance for cost of goods sold, which is deducted from gross receipts in com-
puting gross income. 12 This was true under both the Tariff Act of 1913 and the
Revenue Act of 1916, which limited aggregate depletion deductions to the tax-
payer's basis in the mineral property.13 Accordingly, in Ludey the Supreme
Court stated, "[tihe proviso limiting the amount of the deduction for depletion
to the amount of the capital invested shows that the deduction is to be re-
garded as a return of capital, not as a special bonus for enterprise and willing-
ness to assume risks.1
1 4
In 1918, however, Congress enacted discovery value depletion, under which
the fair market value of the mineral deposit in the ground at the date of dis-
covery was substituted for cost in computing both the annual allowance and
the aggregate depletion allowable.' 5 The purpose of discovery value depletion
was to encourage prospecting and exploration for minerals.' 6 Discovery value
depletion was replaced with percentage depletion for oil in 1927 and for coal in
1932. 7 In enacting percentage depletion Congress lifted the limitation of ag-
gregate depletion to the cost or discovery value of the deposit, limiting it to not
more than fifty percent of the taxable income from the property annually. At
this time, the metamorphosis of the depletion allowance from a capital recov-
ery mechanism to a tax incentive device was completed.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, and other courts following its lead, con-
tinued to refer to the depletion allowance-both cost and percentage deple-
10 I.R.C. § 613(a) (1976).
11 274 U.S. 295, 302-03 (1927).
11 Trees. Reg. § 1.61-3(a) (1972).
13 Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, §§ IEB, G(b), 38 Stat. 114, 167, 172-73; Revenue Act of 1916, ch.
463 §§ 5(a) Eighth, 12(a) Second, 39 Stat. 756, 759, 767-68.
14 274 U.S. at 303.
15 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, §§ 214(a)(10), 234(a)(9), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066-68, 1077-78.
'6 See S. REP. No. 617, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 6 (1918), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 117, 120-
21; see also Austin, Percentage Depletion: Its Background and Legislative History, 21 U. KAN.
Crry L. REv. 22 (1952).
17 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, §§ 204(b)(2), 214(a)(9), 234(a)(8), 44 Stat. 9, 16, 26-27, 41-43;
Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 114(b)(4), 47 Stat. 169, 202-03. Discovery value depletion was
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tion-as a capital recovery provision.18 In Paragon Jewel Coal Co. v. Commis-
sioner, a case involving percentage depletion, the Court stated, "[t]his court
has often said that the purpose of the allowance for depletion is to compensate
the owner of wasting material assets for the part exhausted in production, so
that when the minerals are gone the owner's capital and his capital assets re-
main unimpaired."1 9 Although this statement is true regarding cost depletion,
it is entirely erroneous regarding percentage depletion. The reverence with
which courts have prefaced most cases dealing with entitlement to percentage
depletion deductions with a similar statement has resulted in considerable con-
fusion in determining whether taxpayers who actually extract the mineral from
the ground, but never make any cash investment, should be entitled to the
depletion allowance.2 0
On occasion, however, the Court has recognized that the percentage deple-
tion allowance is not merely a capital recovery provision. In Commission v.
Southwest Exploration Co.,21 the Court recognized that, "[t]he present allow-
ance, however, bears little relationship to the capital investment, and the tax-
payer is not limited to a recoupment on his original investment. The allowance
continues so long as minerals are extracted, and even though no money was
actually invested in the deposit."22 More recently, in United States v. Swank,23
the Court noted:
Because the deduction is computed as a percentage of his gross income from
the mining operation and is not computed with reference to the operator's in-
vestment, it provides a special incentive for engaging in this line of business
that goes well beyond a purpose of merely allowing the owner of a wasting
asset to recoup the capital invested in that asset.
2'
With the decision in Swank, the shibboleth of Ludey has, it is hoped, been laid
to rest.
C. Relationship of Depletion Deductions to Basis in the Mineral Deposit
The taxpayer's basis in the mineral property is reduced by the greater of
the amount of depletion which was actually claimed as a deduction in comput-
ing taxable income or that which was properly allowable in each taxable year.
25
Both cost and percentage depletion require an adjustment to basis. If the tax-
payer claims less than the allowable deduction, his basis is nevertheless re-
'6 See, e.g., Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S. 362, 367 (1938); Kirby Petroleum Co. v.
Commissioner, 326 U.S. 599, 602-03 (1946); Usibelli v. Commissioners, 229 F.2d 539, 542 (9th Cir.
1955).
1 380 U.S. 624, 631 (1965).
20 For a more detailed discussion of the development of the depletion allowance see McMa-
hon, Defining the "Economic Interest" in Minerals After United States v. Swank, 70 Ky. L.J. 23
(1982).
21 350 U.S. 308 (1956).
2 Id. at 312.
23 451 U.S. 571 (1981).
24 Id. at 576; see also O'Conner v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 1, 7 (1982).
25 I.R.C. § 1016(a)(2) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.1016-3(b) (1957).
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duced by the full allowable amount, even if no reduction in tax results.2 How-
ever, if the taxpayer claimed and was allowed more than the properly allowable
amount of depletion, his basis will not be reduced by the excess amount
claimed if the excessive deduction allowed did not result in any reduction in
tax liability for the year.
2 7
Cost depletion, unlike percentage depletion, is restricted by I.R.C. § 612 to
the taxpayer's basis in the mineral property. Once his basis has been ex-
hausted, cost depletion ceases and the taxpayer will be entitled only to per-
centage depletion.28 Percentage depletion deductions in excess of basis do not
reduce the taxpayer's basis in the property below zero.
II. ENTITLEMENT TO DEPLETION: THE CONCEPT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST IN
MINERALS
A. Generally
1. Development of the Concept of Etconomic Interest
Entitlement to either a cost or percentage depletion allowance deduction
hinges on whether the taxpayer has an economic interest in the minerals in
place; only a taxpayer with an economic interest is entitled to claim a depletion
deduction.2
The Regulations define the term "economic interest" as follows:
An economic interest is possessed in every case in which the taxpayer has ac-
quired by investment any interest in mineral in place... and secures, by any
form of legal relationship, income derived from the extraction of the mineral
... , to which he must look for a return of his capital.... A person who has
no capital investment in the mineral deposit ... does not possess an economic
interest merely because through a contractual relation he possesses a mere eco-
nomic or pecuniary advantage derived from production. For example, an agree-
ment between the owner of an economic interest and another entitling the lat-
ter to purchase or process the product upon production or entitling the latter
to compensation for extraction . . . does not convey a depletable economic
interest8 0
Ownership of the mineral deposit is not a prerequisite for finding an economic
interest. In Lynch v. Alworth Stephens Co.,31 the Supreme Court held that a
lessee of a mineral deposit was entitled to deplete his income from extraction,
prior to the enactment of I.R.C. § 611(b)(1) specifically allowing apportion-
ment between the lessee and lessor.
:' Treas. Reg. § 1.1016-3(b) (1957).
7 Treas. Reg. § 1.1016-3(b)(1) (1957). Detailed rules for computing the tax benefit allowed
and the resulting reduction in basis are provided in Tress. Reg. § 1.1016-3(e) (1957).
" Tress. Reg. § 1.611-2(b)(2) (1972).
Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(b)(1) (1973); Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S.
308 (1956); Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S. 362 (1938); Thomas v. Perkins, 301 U.S. 655
(1937); Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933).
80 Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(b)(1) (1973).
81 267 U.S. 364 (1925).
[Vol. 85
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Six years later in Palmer v. Bender,3 2 the Court formulated its now classic
test for determining entitlement to depletion:
The language of the statute is broad enough to provide, at least, for every case
in which the taxpayer has acquired, by investment, any interest in the oil in
place, and secures, by any form of legal relationship, income derived from the
extraction of the oil, to which he must look for a return of his capital.3
Accordingly, the Court permitted the taxpayers, who were lessees of oil leases,
to deplete income received pursuant to an agreement transferring all of their
rights to the property in exchange for future payments out of one-half of the
first oil produced up to $1,000,000 and an additional royalty of one-eighth of
all oil produced.
Significantly, the taxpayers in Palmer v. Bender had no cash investment
in the oil; they merely had an obligation to pay royalties to the prime lessor
upon production. In furtherance of the policy of discovery valuation depletion,
the Court treated the value of the oil at the date of discovery as the requisite
investment. Since at time of discovery the taxpayers had "complete legal con-
trol of the oil in place," they had "acquired an economic interest in it which
represented their capital investment and was subject to depletion under the
statute. '34 Thus, there is no substance to the requirement of the regulations,
which are derived from Palmer v. Bender, that the interest in the minerals in
place be derived "by investment." It is sufficient if the taxpayer has merely
acquired an interest in the mineral in place. Nevertheless, courts, particularly
the Tax Court, frequently search for and imply the need for either a direct
invdstment or a "significant related investment," which is a "practical prereq-
uisite to successful exploitation of rights to mine the minerals in place." 5
In Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Commisioner,3 6 the Supreme Court extended
the economic interest concept to include a net profits interest coupled with a
royalty. It stated, "[e]conomic interest does not mean title to the oil in place
but the possibility of profit from the economic interest dependent solely upon
the extraction and sale of the oil."'37 Subsequently, however, in Burton-Sutton
Oil Co. v. Commissioner,"8 the Court declined to rely on source of return as the
sole test for an economic interest. Holding a net profits interest standing alone
was an economic interest, the Court stated:
Since lessors as well as lessees and other transferees of the right to exploit the
land for oil may retain for themselves through their control over the exploita-
tion of the land valuable benefits arising from and dependent upon the extrac-
tion of the oil, Congress provided as early as the Revenue Act of 1918 for equi-
table apportionment of the depletion allowance between them ....
32 287 U.S. 551 (1933).
s3 Id. at 557.
34 Id. at 558.
35 Weaver v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 594, 602 (1979).
36 326 U.S. 599 (1946).
7 Id. at 604 (footnote omitted).
38 328 U.S. 25 (1946).
39 Id. at 33 (footnotes omitted).
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The key to the economic interest was the right to royalties, measured by and
out of production, which was received in exchange for the prior surrender of
control over the extraction, which was, evidently, the requisite capital interest.
Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co.40 provides some guidance in determining
when a taxpayer does not have an economic interest. The taxpayer in Bankline
Oil contracted to process wet gas to extract the oil. It paid the producer less
than the prevailing market price and attempted to claim depletion on the dif-
ference between its cost and the market price. Although that portion of the
processor's income was dependent on future production, the Court held the
taxpayer did not have an economic interest, but rather a "mere economic ad-
vantage derived from production through a contractual relation to the own-
er."' The taxpayer was found to have neither an investment nor an interest in
the well other than the contractual right to purchase output. A feature which
distinguishes Bankline Oil from cases where taxpayers have been found to
have had an economic interest, is that the taxpayer in Bankline Oil never had
any control over the deposit.
The significance of control over the deposit came to the foreground in
Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co. 42 The taxpayer was a littoral
landowner who received an oil royalty in consideration for rights to whipstock
drill for offshore oil deposits from its land. Under California law, the tax-
payer's property was the only place where wells could be drilled to extract the
offshore oil, even though the oil leases were owned by another party and the
taxpayer had no interest in them. Finding that the taxpayer made an "indis-
pensable contribution ... in return for a share of the net profits . . .- , the
court held that the taxpayer had an economic interest entitling it to depletion.
The unique control which the taxpayer had over extraction was sufficient to
constitute an interest in the minerals in place. Southwest Exploration Co. is
one of the few cases finding an economic interest in a taxpayer who did not
make a cash investment in the mineral in place entitling the taxpayer to a
share of production through royalties or production payments and never had a
fee ownership or a leasehold in the mineral.
44
More recently, however, in United States v. Swank, the Court emphasized
freedom to sell the extracted mineral at the market price as a key factor in
determining whether the taxpayer had an economic interest.45 The taxpayer,
who was found to have an economic interest in minerals in place, was a lessee
under a lease which was terminable by the lessor, without cause, on thirty
days' prior notice. In Swank the Court eschewed reliance on the technical legal
right of control in favor of an examination of whether the taxpayer actually
4o 303 U.S. 362 (1938).
41 Id. at 367.
42 350 U.S. 308 (1951).
43 Id. at 317.
44 For an extensive discussion of the development of the early cases regarding the concept of
economic interest see Sneed, The Economic Interest-An Expanding Concept, 35 Tax. L. REv.
307 (1957).
45 451 U.S. 571 (1981).
[Vol. 85
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enjoyed a share of the sales proceeds from the extracted mineral. Swank may
signal a new emphasis in the determination of the existence of an economic
interest, reviving the Kirby Petroleum Company analysis. The Court's opinion
in Swank is heavily laden with policy analysis indicating that percentage de-
pletion should be allowed to any person who extracts and sells minerals on the
open market.46
2. Interests in Coal Deposits
In addition to fee ownership of coal, which entitles the owner to depletion
with respect to his income derived from the extraction and sale of the coal,
there are numerous other interests which must be considered. The following
paragraphs briefly summarize the treatment accorded various parties claiming
to have an economic interest in a coal deposit. With the exception of lessors,
each of these interests is analyzed in greater detail in the following sections.
The lessor of a coal deposit receives royalties under the lease agreement.
Under Burnet v. Harmel,47 a lessor of a mineral deposit has an economic inter-
est. The lessor of coal will not be entitled to depletion with respect to these
royalties, except on coal extracted within one year of the acquisition of the
lessor's interest. He will, however, be entitled to the more advantageous capital
gains treatment under I.R.C. § 631(c) on royalties received. The allowance of
his basis in computing gains results in the lessor receiving the equivalent of
cost depletion in addition to the conversion of the income to capital gains.
Section 631(c) will not be discussed in any detail in this article."
Occasionally a taxpayer acquires a royalty interest in a coal deposit pursu-
ant to an agreement other than a lease of the deposit itself. For example, the
owner of surface rights overlying a coal deposit owned by another might con-
vey an easement to permit strip mining in exchange for a royalty interest. Gen-
erally, the holder of such an interest has an economic interest in the minerals
in place and the royalties received under such an agreement are subject to the
depletion allowance.49
Lessees who operate the deposit have an economic interest in the minerals
in place and are entitled to the depletion allowance with respect to their min-
ing income from the property.50 Lessees typically claim percentage depletion
rather than cost depletion. A lessee who subleases the coal deposit to another
taxpayer is subject to I.R.C. § 631(c) and does not, therefore, claim the deple-
tion allowance for royalties received.
521
Two or more taxpayers often enter into a joint venture agreement for the
46 See infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
47 287 U.S. 103 (1932).
4' For detailed discussion of I.R.C. § 631(c), see Coggin, Disposition of Coal Interests: Section
631(c), 29 TAx LAw. 95 (1975); Coggin, Federal Income Tax Treatment of the Acquisition and
Disposition of Coal Interests: An Examination of I.R.C. § 631(c), 82 W. VA. L. REv. 1139 (1980).
4 See infra Section II.C.
50 I.R.C. § 611(b)(1) (1976); United States v. Swank, 451 U.S. 571 (1981); Lynch v. Alworth-
Stephens Co., 267 U.S. 364 (1925).
5, Treas. Reg. § 1.631-3(b)(3)(ii)(a) (1980).
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purpose of mining a particular coal deposit. Each joint venturer should be enti-
tled to deduct depletion with respect to his mining income from the property.5 2
It is irrelevant that the lease or ownership of the mineral deposit is held by
only one of the joint venturers. 3
A contract miner who is paid a fixed fee per ton does not have an eco-
nomic interest in the mineral in place and is not entitled to claim either cost or
percentage depletion with respect to the income he derives from extracting
coal.54 If, however, the contract miner's fee is determined with reference to the
sales proceeds from the extracted coal, then he will have an economic interest
and should generally be entitled to depletion. 5
Except in limited circumstances, licensees do not have an economic inter-
est in the minerals in place, and they are not entitled to depletion with respect
to their income from mining.56
B. Lessees
Since the Ludey decision in 1927, a lessee has held an economic interest in
the leased mineral deposit, but for many years certain lease termination
clauses presented problems. In Parsons v. Smith,5 7 the Supreme Court held
that contract miners did not have an economic interest in coal in place because
"the contracts were completely terminable without cause on short notice."5 8
Following Parsons, the Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter "IRS") vigor-
ously litigated cases asserting that a lessee, under a lease terminable on short
notice without cause, did not have an economic interest. For this purpose the
IRS considered one year the dividing line.59
The Commissioner's argument in the terminable lease cases was that the
taxpayer had only a mere "economic advantage." He contended that a requi-
site of an economic interest was the right to extract the coal to exhaustion or
at least to extract a significant amount. If the lessee's right to extract the min-
eral was subject to termination with cause on short notice, his right was illu-
sory. This reflected an analysis of the formal rights of the parties, not the ac-
tual conduct, because in virtually all of the litigated cases, the lease was not
cancelled, and in some cases the coal deposit was mined to exhaustion.
The Tax Court uniformly accepted the Commissioner's logic in terminable
52 Rev. Rul. 73-32, 1973-1 C.B. 301.
Rev. Rul. 74-469, 1974-2 C.B. 178.
Paragon Jewel Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 380 U.S. 624 (1965); Parsons v. Smith, 359 U.S.
215 (1959).
" Ruston v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 284 (1952); see infra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
" Holbrook v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 415 (1975) (licensee did not have economic interest);
but see Oil City Sand & Gravel Co. v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 31 (1959) (licensee did have economic
interest); see infra Section IV.
5 359 U.S. 215 (1959).
5 Id. at 225.
1: See Rev. Rul. 74-507, 1974-2 C.B. 179 (holding lessee under successive one year leases, re-
newed automatically unless terminated, had an economic interest); G.C.M. 26290, 1950-1 C.B. 42,
declared obsolete, Rev. Rul. 70-277, 1970-1 C.B. 280.
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lease cases.60 In essence, the Tax Court applied an ex ante test to determine
whether an economic interest existed by considering only the minimum rights
of the taxpayer. By contrast, the Court of Claims concluded that a short notice
termination clause did not preclude an economic interest in the lessee. In
Bakertown Coal Co. v. United States 1 the court applied an ex post test and
examined what rights had actually been exercised by the taxpayer in question.
Under this view the termination clause was irrelevant if not exercised. Signifi-
cantly, the court noted that if the taxpayer were not allowed a depletion allow-
ance, no one would be allowed a depletion deduction with respect to the in-
come. This logic was followed again in Swank v. United States.
6 2
The Third Circuit also upheld the Commissioner's argument in Whitmer
v. Commissioner.6 The Fifth Circuit, however, in Winters Coal Co. v. Commis-
sioner held that a thirty day termination clause in a lease did not deprive the
lessee of an economic interest.64 But two of the three judges on the panel relied
not on the lease standing alone, but considered the fact that the lessee pur-
chased the surface rights necessary to operate the strip mine. Because the
lessee became an indispensible party to the removal of the coal through his
control of the surface, they thought that Southwest Exploration Co. was di-
rectly applicable.
Finally, in United States v. Swank, the Supreme Court held that a lessee
under a lease terminable on thirty days notice without cause, had an economic
interest in the coal in place which entitled him to claim percentage depletion. 5
Policy considerations predominated in the Court's logic:
Because the deduction is computed as a percentage of his gross income from
the mining operation and is not computed with reference to the operator's in-
vestment, it provides a special incentive for engaging in this line of business
that goes well beyond a purpose of merely allowing an owner of a wasting asset
to recoup his investment .... Hence eligibility for the deduction is deter-
mined not by the amount of the capital investment but by the mine operator's
"economic interest" in the coal.
A recognition that the percentage depletion allowance is more than merely
a recovery of cost of the unmined coal is especially significant in this case. The
question here is whether a deduction for the asset depleted by respondents will
be received by anyone .... 66
The Court rejected the government's arguments that the lessee held a "mere
economic advantage" and that the lessor's right to terminate the lease gave it
60 E.g., Winters Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 249 (1971), rev'd, 496 F.2d 995 (5th Cir.
1974); Whitmer v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 1480 (1969), aff'd 443 F.2d 170 (3d Cir. 1971);
Mullins v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 571 (1967). See also Weaver v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 594 (1979)
(gravel lease terminable at will distinguished from one terminable on 120 days notice).
61 485 F.2d 633 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
62 602 F.2d 348 (Ct. Cl. 1979), aff'd, 451 U.S. 571 (1981).
63 443 F.2d 170 (3d Cir. 1971), aff'g 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 1480 (1969).
64 496 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'g 47 T.C. 249 (1971).
65 451 U.S. 571 (1981), af'g 602 F.2d 348 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
66 Id. at 576 (citation omitted).
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the only economic interest as a matter of "practical economics."6 7
Parsons v. Smith and Paragon Jewel Coal Co. v. Commissioner (both of
which held that contract miners operating under contracts terminable on short
notice without cause, who received a fixed fee per ton of coal extracted, did not
have an economic interest) were distinguished on several grounds. First, the
Court said that short notice terminability was not determinative in those cases.
The key factor in those cases was the fixed price received by the miners; they
lacked a legally enforceable right to share in the value of the mineral deposit.
In contrast, the lessees in Swank "had a legal interest in the mineral both
before and after it was mined and were free to sell the coal at whatever price
the market could bear."6s
Three reasons were given for rejecting the government's argument that as
a matter of practical economics only the lessor held an economic interest be-
cause of his right to terminate the lease. First, the Court was not convinced
that an increase in the market price of coal would guarantee that the lessor
could negotiate a higher royalty if he cancelled the lease. The Court found
support for this in the lessor's failure to cancel the leases in question despite
increased market prices. Second, the Court believed that it would be unfair to
deny depletion to a taxpayer who incurred the risk of cancellation while ac-
cording it to taxpayers who assumed no risk. Finally, the Court concluded that
there was no rational basis in linking the right to a depletion deduction to the
period of time that the taxpayer operates a mine.
A crucial continuing issue for lessees is whether Swank merely establishes
a factual safe harbor, that a lessee will have an economic interest under a lease
terminable without cause on not less than thirty days notice, provided he has
mined coal under the lease for the entire year in question (or the portion of the
year following the execution of the lease). Presumably this would also cover the
year of termination provided the lessee had operated for a substantial portion
of the prior year, or had exhausted the deposit in the year of termination. This
is the minimum impact of Swank; thirty day or longer termination clauses are
irrelevant to the determination of an economic interest if unexercised6
Swank does not expressly provide any rule regarding the requisite mini-
mum term for a lease to convey an economic interest. In Revenue Ruling 74-
507, the IRS ruled that a lease for one year, renewable as of January 1st unless
terminated by notice given ten days prior to the preceding November 1st, was
sufficient to convey an economic interest to the lessee.10 At the other end of the
spectrum, in Revenue Ruling 77-341 the IRS ruled that an oral lease under
Kentucky law did not convey an economic interest because the lease was not
enforceable.7 1 Between these two positions, the IRS has also ruled that a six-
month lease is sufficient to convey an economic interest if six months is a suffi-
67 Id. at 580.
:8 Id. at 583.
9, See McMahon, Defining the "Economic Interest" in Minerals After United States v.
Swank, 70 Ky. L.J. 23, 25-30 (1982).
70 1974-2 C.B. 179.
71 1977-2 C.B. 204.
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cient period to exhaust the mineral deposit.72
If the fact that the leases were not terminated is crucial, then a short term
lease, e.g., month to month, may not be sufficient to constitute an economic
interest, unless it is continuously renewed. If continuously renewed, it would
be the equivalent of an indefinite lease with a thirty day termination clause.
Language in the Court's opinion in Swank, however, indicates that actual con-
tinued operation is not necessary:
If the authorization of a special tax benefit for mining a seam of coal to ex-
haustion is sound policy, that policy would seem equally sound whether the
entire operation is conducted by one taxpayer over a prolonged period or by a
series of taxpayers operating for successive shorter periods. The Government
has suggested no reason why the efficient removal of a great quantity of coal in
less than 30 days should have different tax consequences than the slower re-
moval of the same quantity over the prolonged period.73
In a footnote to the above quoted passage, the Court stated:
As we have indicated, the depletion deduction is geared to the depletion of the
mineral in place, and not to the taxpayer's capital investment. Therefore, we
can perceive no reason to impose duration requirements on the availability of
the deduction for taxpayers who admittedly otherwise have an "economic in-
terest" in the coal, are dependent on the market to recover their costs, and are
actually depleting the mineral in place.7 '
This language indicates the complete abandonment of any requisite period for
the lease, notwithstanding an assertion in the dissenting opinion that a one day
lease would clearly be insufficient to confer an economic interest on the lessee.
C. Contract Miners
1. Generally
In 1950, the IRS ruled that the right to receive "a specified amount per
ton of mineral produced may constitute a right to share in production which
marks ownership of a depletable economic interest in the mineral in place."
The IRS concluded that the contract miner did "look for his compensation
solely to the extraction and sale of mineral" and therefore satisfied the first
half of the test for an economic interest. The first half of the test, requiring an
interest in the mineral in place, was satisfied only if the contract could not be
terminated at will or upon relatively nominal notice. As a result, the lessee or
owner excluded from gross income from the property amounts paid to contract
miners and contract miners were entitled to percentage depletion with respect
to the income. In litigation, primarily involving lessees and owners claiming
depletion on the amounts paid to contract miners, the Tax Court has consist-
72 Rev. Rul. 72-506, 1972-4 C.B. 178.
7- 451 U.S. 571, 585.
7' Id. at 585 n.25.
75G.C.M. 26290, 1950-1 C.B. 42, citing Eastern Coal Corp. v. Yoke, 67 F. Supp. 166 (N.D. W.
Va. 1946), declared obsolete, Rev. Rul. 70-277, 1970-1 C.B. 280. Relatively nominal notice was
defined as less than one year. G.C.H. 26290 supra.
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ently rejected the position of the IRS.78 Conversely, the Courts of Appeals gen-
erally held that contract miners that met the test set forth in the IRS's ruling
had an economic interest in the minerals in place and were entitled to the
depletion deduction.
7 7
Even the Tax Court has held that contract miners have an economic inter-
est where the miners are entitled to fees that varied with the market price at
which the extracted coal was sold. In Ruston v. Commissioner the lessee en-
tered into an agreement with a contract miner under which the contractor was
granted the sole and exclusive right to strip mine the leased coal, but the lease
was not assigned and the parties did not enter into a sublease.78 The contract
specifically stated that the lessee retained title to the coal both before and
after extraction and retained the sole right to market the coal. The contractor
was entitled to receive eighty-three percent of the net profits, however, and the
agreement was not terminable without cause. Because the contractor looked
only to the sale of coal for its income, and the contractor was not entitled to
any payment on unsold coal 7 9 the Tax Court held that the lessee had trans-
ferred an economic interest to the contractor.
Soon after Ruston, the Tax Court held in Brown v. Commissioner, that a
coal mining company had acquired an economic interest under a one-year con-
tract which.was renewable annually at the mining company's option. Under the
agreement the mining company was to receive seventy-five percent of the
amount realized on sale by the lessee with whom it had contracted, less royal-
ties due to the lessor, siding rentals and sales and broker's commissions which
constituted roughly 75% of net profits. Significantly, the court's opinion em-
phasized that under the agreement the contract miner had the exclusive right
to mine the coal subject to the lease.8 0
In 1959, the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Parsons v.
Smith, holding that a contract miner did not have an economic interest. The
contract miners involved in one of the consolidated cases had oral contracts for
no definite term, subject to cancellation on ten days notice by either party, but
operated the deposit for eight years. They received a fixed sum per ton for
extracting the coal, subject to adjustment for increased costs. The other case
involved a written contract terminable on thirty days notice, under which the
contract miner received a fixed sum per ton of coal extracted, subject to ad-
76 E.g., Mammoth Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 571 (1954), rev'd, 229 F.2d 535 (3d Cir.
1956); Vincent v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 501 (1952), vacated and remanded sub nom., Commis-
sioner v. Gregory Run Coal Co., 212 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1954); Hamill Coal Corp. v. Commissioner,
14 T.C.M. (CCH) 218 (1955), rev'd, 239 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1956); Morrisdale Coal Mining Co. v.
Commissioner, 19 T.C. 208 (1952).
7 E.g., Stilwell v. United States, 250 F.2d 736 (4th Cir. 1957); Usibelli v. Commissioner, 229
F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1955).
78 19 T.C. 284 (1952).
70 See also Findley v. Commissioner, 1951 T.C.M. (P-H) 51,110.
so 22 T.C. 58 (1954); see also Clifton v. Commissioner, 1958 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 58,065 (fee bore
"some relationship" to market, even though did not reflect every change and oral contract was not
in fact terminated despite power to do so); Paul E. Barry, Inc. v. Commissioner, 1955 T.C.M. (P-
H) T 55,012 (similar facts); Virginia B. Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 899 (1956).
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justment for costs. Mining continued under the contract until all of the coal in
the specified area had been extracted. Neither taxpayer had an actual invest-
ment in the coal, but both had substantial investment in movable equipment.
The Court rejected the taxpayers' argument that through their contracts
to mine the coal and their contribution of the use of their equipment, organiza-
tion and skills, they made a capital investment in the coal giving rise to an
economic interest. Seven factors distinguishing their "economic advantage"
from an economic interest were cited:
To recapitulate, the asserted fiction is opposed to the facts (1) that petitioners'
investments were in their equipment, all of which was movable-not in the
coal in place; (2) that their investments in equipment were recoverable through
depreciation-not depletion; (3) that the contracts were completely terminable
without cause on short notice; (4) that the landowners did not agree to surren-
der and did not actually surrender to petitioners any capital interest in the
coal in place; (5) that the coal at all times, even after it was mined, belonged
entirely to the landowners, and that petitioners could not sell or keep any of it
but were required to deliver all that they mined to the landowners; (6) that
petitioners were not to have any part of the proceeds of the sale of the coal,
but, on the contrary, they were to be paid a fixed sum for each ton mined and
delivered, which was. . . agreed to be in "full compensation for the full per-
formance of all work and for the furnishings of all [labor] and equipment re-
quired for the work"; and (7) that petitioners, thus, agreed to look only to the
landowners for all sums to become due them under their contracts. The agree-
ment of the landowners to pay a fixed sum per ton for mining and delivering
the coal "was a personal covenant and did not purport to grant [petitioners] an
interest in the [coal in place]." 81
Five years later in Paragon Jewel Coal Co., the Supreme Court issued its
second pronouncement on contract miners 2 and added some clarification to
the relative significance of the seven factors in Parsons v. Smith. In Paragon
Jewel Coal Co., the Court held that contract miners using the drift method,
who were to receive price per ton that varied with but was not directly related
to the market price at which the owner sold the coal, did not have an economic
interest. The contracts were for an indefinite period and were completely silent
regarding termination. The court of appeals held that the contract miners had
an economic interest, finding that the contractors were not terminable and the
price to be received was "closely related" to the market price. The Supreme
Court, in reversing the court of appeals, implied that the decision regarding
terminability was in error. It found the contracts were terminable, but it ex-
pressly stated this factor was not important. The Court held, "the right to
mine even to exhaustion without more, does not constitute an economic inter-
est."8 3 The determinative fact was that the contract miners' fee was not di-
rectly related to the market price of coal. The owner was free to sell at any
price and retain the entire proceeds in excess of the agreed upon fee. Appar-
ently, this indicated no capital interest in the coal to be returned to the con-
8, Parsons v. Smith, 359 U.S. 215, 225 (1959).
82 380 U.S. 624 (1964).
83 Id. at 634.
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tract miner upon sale. The Court noted:
Here, Paragon was bound to pay the posted fee regardless of the condition of
the market at the time of the particular delivery and thus the contract miners
did not look to the sale of the coal for a return of their investment but looked
solely to Paragon to abide by its covenant..4
Following Paragon Jewel Coal Co., some courts have continued to cite ter-
minability of the contract on short notice as a factor in denying contract min-
ers a depletion deduction.s5 Even in situations where the contract was clearly
not terminable on short notice, contract miners have been held not to have an
economic interest if they were to receive only a stated amount per ton of coal
extracted. 6 A fixed price, adjusted periodically to reflect general trends in the
market, is not sufficient to overcome the sixth factor of Parsons v. Smith and
give the contract miner an economic interest.8 7
However, Ruston and Brown, which held that a contract miner entitled to
receive a percentage of the sales proceeds of the extracted coal did have an
economic interest, should still be a good law despite the seventh factor cited by
the Court in Parsons. That criterion was that the contractors "look[ed] only to
the landowner for all sums to become due them" and the agreement of the
landowners "was a personal covenant and did not purport to grant [the con-
tractors] an interest in [the coal in place]." 88 Taken literally, only a person
acquiring title to an undivided share of the extracted mineral can have an eco-
nomic interest. Such is not the case. In Burnel v. Harmel, a 1932 case of con-
tinued vitality, the Court held that cash bonus payments under an oil lease
were ordinary income notwithstanding that under state law the lease operated
to effect a sale of the oil in the ground.' Subsequently, in Burton-Sutton Oil
Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, the Court held that a retained net profits royalty
payable in cash constituted an economic interest. In so doing, the Court explic-
itly stated, "the payment of proceeds in cash, the form of the instrument of
" Id. at 635.
"8 E.g., Constantino v. Commissioner, 445 F.2d 405 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Wade, 381
F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1967); United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Patterson, 203 F. Supp. 335 (N.D.
Ala. 1962); Ramey v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 363 (1967), afl'd, 398 F.2d 478 (6th Cir. 1968); Wash-
burn v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 217 (1965).
88 Adkins v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 957 (1969); Brown v. Commissioner, 1965 T.C.M. (P-H)
65,321 (court did not need to reach issue of whether miner had right to exhaust deposit because
fixed fee precludes economic interest).
87 See Paragon Jewel Coal Co., 380 U.S. 624 (1965) (fixed contract price varied "depending
somewhat on the general trend of the market price for the coal over extended periods and to some
extent on labor costs."); Constantino v. Commissioner, 445 F.2d 405 (3d Cir. 1971) (contract miner
was frequently paid more than contract price); McCall v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 699 (4th Cir.
1963) (fixed contract price subject to change as market price fluctuated); United States v. Stallard,
273 F.2d 847 (4th Cir. 1959) (same); Adkins v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 957 (1969) (contract price to
be adjusted in comparable ratio to substantial change in general price level); Denise Coal Co. v.
Commissioner, 29 T.C. 528 (1957), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 271 F.2d 930 (3d Cir. 1959) (fixed
contract price subject to change if market price of lawful maximum price increased); see generally
McMahon, Defining the "Economic Interest" in Minerals After United States v. Swank, 70 Ky.
L.J. 23, 44-52, 72-80 (1982).
359 U.S. 215, 225 (1959).
89 287 U.S. 103 (1932).
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transfer and its effect on the title to the oil under local law are not deci-
sive. .. ."o These principles have never been questioned.
More recently, Revenue Ruling 73-470 emphasized the importance of shar-
ing in the profits of sale at the market price as opposed to requiring acquisition
of title to the mineral.9 1 In Revenue Ruling 73-470, the IRS held that an oil
company had an economic interest under the following circumstances. The
company provided all funds necessary to develop oil and gas production in a
designated area of a foreign country. Under the law of the foreign country, the
oil company could not obtain legal title to the land or hydrocarbons, and the
oil company was required to "sell" all output to the foreign country at the
prevailing world market price. The agreement was subject to summary termi-
nation by the foreign country, but if terminated, it was required to pay the oil
company the estimated value of its share of the estimated reserves.
Further support for the continued vitality of Ruston and Brown is found
in Revenue Rulings 73-80 and 77-84. The IRS held in Revenue Ruling 73-80
that a "stated royalty payment for coal . . . mined from the coal land" re-
ceived in exchange for transfer of an option to purchase the land constituted
an economic interest.9 2 Significantly, the Revenue Ruling held that I.R.C. §
631(c) was inapplicable because as an option holder, the taxpayer did not have
an economic interest, his economic interest arose only upon the transferee's
subsequent exercise of the option. Thus an economic interest existed in a tax-
payer who never had title to the coal at any point in time. Revenue Ruling 77-
84 held that an economic interest existed where a taxpayer received a royalty
interest on a lease acquired for another through the taxpayer's efforts.93 The
Ruling does not discuss whether the royalty was payable with respect to ex-
traction or sales.
The above Rulings, which were issued after the decisions in both Parsons
and Paragon Jewel Coal Co., indicate that Ruston and Brown are still good
law, and a contract miner has an economic interest if he is entitled to a per-
centage of net sales of the coal he has extracted. Furthermore, the percentage
share allocated to the contract miner apparently can be on a "net profits" basis
and not solely on a "gross sales" basis. This should be so, despite, following
Parsons v. Smith, the seeming abandonment by the Tax Court of the method
of compensation as a test for an economic interest in Legg v. Commissioner."
In Legg, the taxpayer mined coal under an agreement terminable on will by
the owner which expressly provided that title to the mined coal would at all
times remain in the owner. The agreement originally required a payment to
the contractor of three dollars for every ton of merchantable coal extracted.
Subsequently, an amendment was executed increasing the contractor's com-
pensation by three-fifths of any increase in the market price of coal, and de-
creasing it by three-fifths of any fall in the market price. The fee was, accord-
90 328 U.S. 25, 35 (1946).
91 1973-2 C.B. 88.
92 1973-1 C.B. 308.
93 1977-1 C.B. 173.
94 39 T.C. 30 (1962).
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ingly, retroactively increased to reflect a prior market change. The contract
specifically provided, "[t]he parties hereto expressly recognize that the [con-
tractors] always have had a continous economic interest in said strip and auger
job operation . . . ever since its inception" and described the agreement as a
"joint adventure. ' 95
The Tax Court disagreed with the parties' characterization of the effect of
the agreement, finding the facts analogous to, and the case controlled by Par-
sons. The court concluded as a matter of fact that the fee received by the
contract miner was a fixed fee rather than one that varied with the market
price, because despite contract provisions to the contrary, the price adjust-
ments made in the course of performance did not correlate with fluctuations in
market price. More significantly, however, the court stated:
The provisions in the agreement ... permitting variance in the prices paid
petitioners, even if they had been observed, are considered of minor conse-
quence, considering the similarities of other essentials deemed important in
Parsons. . ., and are not sufficient in and of themselves, to give the petitioners
an "economic interest" in the coal deposits here involved. 8
The reasoning of Paragon Jewel Coal Co. raises doubts about the contin-
ued vitality of the Tax Court's position in Legg, and the interpretation ac-
corded Parsons and Paragon Jewel Coal Co. by the Supreme Court in Swank
to distinguish those cases from Swank supports the view that a contract miner
sharing in a percentage of the proceeds has an economic interest.
This is reinforced by Private Letter Ruling 8216007 in which the IRS
ruled that a taxpayer having the right to extract a coal seam to exhaustion, but
under an obligation to deliver all coal to the owner in exchange for a specified
percentage of the "net proceeds" upon sale, has an economic interest, even
though the taxpayer has no right to sell any portion of the extracted coal. The
amount was not payable until sale, so the taxpayer looked solely to extraction
and sale of coal for the investment. It was irrelevant the taxpayer was guaran-
teed a minimum payment per ton of coal extracted and delivered to the owner
for a limited amount of the coal. The ruling's only reference to title to the coal
is a statement that the owner had title prior to extraction.
Considering the irrelevancy of absence of title to the determination of eco-
nomic interest, the seventh factor in Parsons is probably a restatement of the
sixth factor, which intended to state that because the fixed sum was payable
regardless of market price, the contractors would be paid even if it resulted in
a loss to the owner. However, Private Letter Ruling 8216007 indicates that, at
least under some circumstances, this is not controlling. The ruling implies that
the core of the factor is whether payment is due upon extraction or upon sale.
If payment is due only for coal that has been sold, the seventh criterion has
presumably been satisfied.
In summary, it would appear that a contract miner has an economic inter-
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est if he is entitled to receive a fee determined under a formula, whether or not
the fee is a simple percentage, that varies the fee with the market price at
which the extracted coal is sold. Presumably, the fee must be payable only
with respect to coal actually sold.
Following the Supreme Court decision in Swank, the terminability of a
contract miner's contract on short notice without cause, the third factor in
Parsons, may no longer be relevant. Although Paragon Jewel Coal Co. held
that the right to extract minerals to exhaustion alone did not constitute an
economic interest if the contract miner could not share in the market proceeds,
it in no way inferred that the presence of a short notice termination clause did
not preclude the existence of an economic interest. Swank did so hold, at least
in the context of a lease. However, in footnote 21 of Swank, the Court stated a
factor that distinguished Swank from Paragon Jewel Coal Co. was that in
Swank, if the lessee was denied depletion, nobody would be entitled to deple-
tion on the income in question.9 7 However, in Paragon Jewel Coal Co., the
issue presented was merely which taxpayer should be entitled to the allowance.
Although the Court may have noted this distinction, it is a distinction
without any significant merit. If terminability is irrelevant for leases, there is
no rational basis to say that it remains relevant for contract miners. Short no-
tice termination clauses should, therefore, be irrelevant in determining whether
a contract miner has an economic interest.
2. Distinguishing Contract Miners From Lessees
Occasionally, an owner or lessee who desires to market or use coal for its
own purposes, but does not want to conduct the extraction, leases the coal to
an operator and simultaneously executes a contract requiring either the lessee
to deliver to the lessor (or a party related to the lessor) all or some portion of
the output, or all of the lessor's requirements at a given price per ton. Regard-
less of whether the lease requires a royalty to be paid on coal delivered to the
lessor, a question arises whether the purported lessee is a contract miner.
In Adkins v. Commissioner, the taxpayer leased coal property under re-
newable one year leases, under which no royalties were payable on coal deliv-
ered to the lessor.9 8 Simultaneously, he executed an output contract to sell all
of the extracted coal to the lessor's parent corporation at a fixed sum per ton,
subject to an adjustment if substantial changes occurred in the general market
price of coal in a comparable ratio as fixed by agreement between the parties.
The contract permitted either party to terminate the contract in the event of a
failure to agree on price. The taxpayer's lessor paid real estate taxes, royalties
and provided mine engineering. The Tax Court held that the taxpayer did not
acquire an economic interest because the facts were not substantially different
from Paragon Jewel Coal Co. Significantly, the lessor had included the amount
paid to the sublessee-taxpayer in gross income from the property in computing
percentage depletion, thereby asserting that it was not a lessor subject to
- 451 U.S. 571, 583.
98 51 T.C. 957 (1969).
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I.R.C. § 631(c), but rather an operator.
A similar result was reached in Boiling v. Commissioner." The taxpayer
entered into a lease for an indefinite term, subject to cancellation on thirty
days prior notice, at a fixed royalty of 27 cents per ton. Simultaneously, he
granted the lessor an option to purchase the output "at a price or prices to be
agreed upon between lessor and lessee."'100 The price actually paid by the lessor
was not related to market price on resale, but rather to estimated production
costs if the lessor had operated the property. Applying Parsons, the court
found that the taxpayer was essentially a contract miner, emphasizing that the
agreement was terminable on thirty days notice and the taxpayer received
merely a fixed amount per ton that was unrelated to the market price. The
court was not persuaded that Southwest Exploration Co. should be applied by
analogy because the contract miner purchased the surface rights and was
therefore an indispensible party to the extraction of the coal. Instead, the ex-
pense of acquiring the surface rights could be deducted.1 1
A contrary result was reached on slightly different facts in Thornberry
Construction Co., Inc. v. United States.'0 2 The lessor, an operator, offered to
lease to the taxpayer certain coal property, that it did not want to operate
directly, if the taxpayer would sell the output to a valued, but unrelated, cus-
tomer. The taxlayer independently negotiated an output contract with the
customer, at a fixed price and with a cost adjustment clause, but with no other
price adjustments. The lessor then leased the property to the taxpayer for two
years for a fixed sum per ton royalty, subject to termination if the lessee did
not sell the output to the named customer. The taxpayer purchased certain
necessary surface rights, prepared the site, and constructed roads. On these
facts the court held that the taxpayer had an economic interest. Thornberry
Construction Co. was distinguished from the other cases because "the lease
and assignment conferred upon plaintiff the right to mine the coal and to sell
that coal, at whatever price it could obtain therefor, to an independent, unre-
lated, third party (albeit a valued customer of [the lessor]) and not to [the
lessor] itself.'1
0 3
The distinction in Thornberry Construction Co. is valid and it illustrates
the type of situation in which a lessee may be insulated from both market risks
and market benefits.'04 Boiling and Adkins are not substantially different from
Paragon Jewel Coal Co., however, and because terminability, which existed in
Boiling and Adkins (to a more limited extent) was not a key factor under Par-
agon Jewel Coal Co., the vitality of both of these cases survives Swank.
:9 37 T.C. 754 (1962).
*0 Id. at 757.
101 Even if the surface rights were analogous to Southwest Exploration Co., they should sup-
port an economic interest only for an amount of income attributable to them (i.e., an amount equal
to the royalty necessary to acquire the surface rights from a third party). See Omer v. United
States, 339 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1964); Private Letter Ruling 7945006 (royalties for surface rights
subject to depletion, not section 631(c)).
1.2 576 F.2d 346 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
103 Id. at 353.
101 See Rev. Rul. 73-470, 1973-2 C.B. 58.
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A lessee who merely grants the lessor an option to purchase the output at
the lessee's price, presumably the market price, is in a position similar to that
of the lessee in Thornberry Construction Co. The lessee in such a case clearly
has an economic interest and is entitled to depletion, even if the lease is termi-
nable on thirty days' notice.0 5 This reinforces the view that the only signifi-
cant and relevant difference between a contract miner and a lessee is the
method of compensation or marketing scheme. The facts in Bolling, in which
the operator was held to be a contract miner, are not significantly different
from Thornberry Construction Co., except with regard to compensation. Both
taxpayers were, in form, lessees operating under a lease terminable on thirty
days' notice. In Boiling, however, the operator was found not to have the free-
dom to realize the market price of the coal, and he was, therefore, a contract
miner.'06
It is not absolutely necessary, however, to leave the future price of coal
indeterminate for a lease coupled with a contract to supply the lessor's coal
requirements to confer an economic interest on the lessee. Revenue Ruling 72-
477 describes a lease and requirements contract that conferred an economic
interest on the lessee.107 A utility company leased a coal deposit to an unre-
lated mining company for a term of twenty-one years or until the coal was
worked out, subject to a right of extension by the mining company for an addi-
tional ten years if the coal had not been worked out in twenty-one years.
Under the lease, title to the coal passed to the lessee upon severance. A spaci-
fied royalty per ton of extracted coal, subject to adjustment based on changes
in the Wholesale Price Index, was payable by the lessee to the lessor. (The
royalty was specifically stated to be reasonable.)
Under the 'coal sales agreement, the mining company agreed to sell, and
the utility company-lessor agreed to buy, a specified amount of coal annually,
subject to the right of the utility to increase the required amount. Any coal
extracted in excess of the amount required under the sales contract could be
sold to other parties. The price to be paid by the utility for coal was not fixed
but was determinable under a formula. The formula price was the sum of the
mining company's actual per ton production and delivery costs, a per ton ad-
ministrative charge, and a per ton profit subject to adjustment based on
changes in the Wholesale Price Index. Royalty payments due to the lessor were
not treated as a cost under the formula, but the formula resulted in a price
"substantially equivalent to the open market price of coal." This was presuma-
bly determined at the time the parties entered into the contract. The supply
agreement was for a term of twenty-one years, subject to extension for ten
years by the utility company, but the IRS concluded that the agreements were
not coterminous because even if the sales agreement were terminated, the
lessee could continue to mine under the lease.
The conclusion in this ruling is somewhat questionable. The IRS con-
'o' United States v. Swank, 451 U.S. 571 (1981).
104 See 37 T.C. 754, 762 (1962). See also Calvert & Youngblood Coal Co. v. United States, 6
A.F.T.R. 2d 5746 (N.D. Ala. 1960).
107 1972-2 C.B. 310.
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cluded that the mining company had acquired "a share of the coal or the pro-
ceeds of its sale." Presumably this was based on the variable price. However,
the formula price bore no relationship to the market price of coal other than
the initial equivalency. If the Wholesale Price Index rose but the market price
of coal fell, the price under this contract increased. Thus, the agreement fails
the test of Paragon Jewel Coal Co. Furthermore, the mining company's right
to sell excess production on the open market might have been illusory as in
Bolling. Reliance on the mere form of the agreement in lease-sales contract
combinations should be insufficient; cases in which the entire output is in fact
sold to the lessor should be scrupulously examined.
Further confusion in determining the dividing line between leases coupled
with contracts to sell extracted coal back to the lessor that provide an eco-
nomic interest and those that do not is added by Revenue Ruling 73-32.108 The
ruling involved a sixteen-year mineral lease from a power company to a joint
venture between its wholly-owned subsidiary and an unrelated mining com-
pany. Under the lease, the joint venture could exhaust the deposit and was
required to pay a royalty for each ton of coal mined and sold. Simultaneously
with the execution of the lease, the joint venture agreed to dedicate the
reserves to a requirements supply contract with the power company for a pe-
riod coterminus with the lease. However, the joint venture was permitted to
sell a specified amount of coal from the dedicated reserves on the open market
each year. The Ruling failed to consider whether such sales were prohibited if
they would impair the joint venture's ability to meet the supply contract. "The
price paid by the power company for coal supplied by the joint venture was
stated in the coal supply agreement."'10 9 (Presumably this meant a fixed price.)
The subsidiary of the power company supplied all of the necessary equip-
ment; the unrelated mining company provided management; and each venturer
supplied one-half of the working capital. A portion of the funds required by
the subsidiary was advanced by the parent power company. Out of the joint
venture's receipts the subsidiary of the power company was to receive a fixed
fee per ton for the use of the mining equipment and the mining company was
to receive a fixed fee per ton for its management services, both of which were
charged to operating costs. The remaining profit was to be split equally by the
venturers. The extracted coal was transported by the joint venture to the
power company's processing plant in the state in which it was extracted.
The IRS ruled the joint venture had an economic interest in the coal de-
posit because the lease was not terminable on short notice and the joint ven-
ture looked "for its compensation solely to the extraction and sale of coal."
The correctness of this ruling is debatable. 10 It fails to consider the logic em-
'08 1973-1 C.B. 301.
09 Id.
10 The ruling is arguably inconsistent with other rulings in which the IRS has looked at the
substance and not the form of the transaction. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 68-430, 1968-2 C.B. 44, refusing
to recognize a sale of mineral property to a subsidiary followed by a lease-back by the parent
corporation designed to permit the parent to claim percentage depletion on income from opera-
tions while the subsidiary claimed cost depletion on the royalties. Under this arrangement, the IRS
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ployed in Boiling and Adkins that would render the mining company largely
indistinguishable from the contract miners in Paragon Jewel Coal Co. The
mining company was to receive only a percentage of a fixed sum in exchange
for extracting the coal subject to the supply contract. The supply contract in
the ruling is clearly analogous to the option to purchase the output held by the
lessor in Bolling. Furthermore, in Bolling there was, theoretically, an even
greater likelihood that the lessee "could turn to the open market for sales."
It is not possible to completely analogize the facts of the Ruling to
Thornberry Construction Co. because the supply contract was with the lessor
and not with an independent party. The facts are somewhat analogus, however,
if the fixed price negotiated between the parties was based on the market value
of extracted coal. However, sixteen years is a long period for an operator to
obligate himself to sell coal at a fixed price. A price adjustment clause, which
bears a direct relationship to fluctuations in the market price of coal, seem-
ingly makes Ruston applicable to justify ruling that the mining company had
an economic interest. This would probably be justified even if the adjustments
were made only at reasonable intervals. If, however, there were an adjustment
based on costs, the contract miner cases seem so analogous that the only rea-
sonable conclusion is that this is a contract mining arrangement for a fixed fee.
No such distinction, however, was made in the Ruling, which did not consider
either situation.
With the similarity of this arrangement to contract mining, there is some
doubt whether the IRS would issue the same ruling if the lease to the joint
venture were terminable by the lessor on thirty days' notice. Swank, however,
holds that such terminability is irrelevant, so the result should be the same
even if the facts were so changed.
3. Treatment of Lessor as Contract Miner for Lessee
Dealing with a somewhat different type of arrangement, in Revenue Rul-
ing 82-180, the IRS held that the lessee of a mineral deposit, who concurrently
hired the owner as a contract miner, had an economic interest.'11 The lessor-
contract miner was to receive a fixed fee, reasonably calculated to compensate
it for the cost of extraction, and to provide a reasonable profit "that [was] not
affected by the risks of the market." No open market sales by the lessor-con-
tract miner were permitted; it was required to deliver all of the minerals ex-
tracted to the lessee. Accordingly, the owner's economic interest extended only
to the royalty received under the lease. Payments for the extraction were not
depletable by the owner-contract miner, but were included in the lessee's gross
ruled that the parent remained the true owner of the property. The Revenue Ruling 73-32 situa-
tion is, in a sense, a mirror image of the above transaction, a lease followed by a purchase, in this
case of the extracted minerals. By analogy, the power company remained the owner of the coal and
was obligated only to pay a contractually determined sum upon extraction and delivery.
"' Rev. Rul. 82-180, 1982-43 I.R.B. 7. See also Private Letter Ruling 8038161. This ruling
reached a similar result but specifically involved a ten-year lease of a mineral deposit usable to the
lessee (but not the owner) overlying the mineral deposit which the owner used in its business and
did not lease to the lessee of the overlying deposits.
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income from the property and are depletable by him.
The fact pattern in the ruling is similar to the fact pattern in the Food
Machinery and Chemical Corp. v. United States cases. 12 Those cases involved
a lessee, rather than an owner, who did not sublease the overlying deposit to
the processor who wanted the overlying mineral deposit, but executed a re-
quirements contract under which it agreed to deliver all the mineral extracted
for a fixed fee per ton. The purchaser of the extracted mineral expended mil-
lions of dollars for processing plants and agreed to pay the royalties due to the
lessor. The agreement was coterminous with the lease and the "purchaser"
could cure any default in the lease and take over operation of the mine at its
own expense if the lessee-seller could not meet the terms of the supply con-
tract. A sublease was not originally used because it was considered impractical,
but ten years later the parties cancelled the original agreement and executed a
sublease and a contract mining agreement. Even for years in which the original
contract was in force, the court of claims held that the "purchaser" had an
economic interest and that the lessee-seller had surrendered its economic in-
terest in the underlying deposit. The court concluded the sublease-contract
miner arrangement was reflective of the true intent of the earlier arrangements
and that in reality the "purchaser" had the economic interest.
This result is in contrast with Weirton Ice & Coal Supply Co. v. Commis-
sioner,n s in which the owner sold certain coal property at a cost to a customer
to whom it had been selling the output from the property. Simultaneously, the
customer hired the original owner to mine and deliver the coal at a fixed price
per ton, subject to adjustment for labor costs. The agreement was terminable
by either party on ninety days notice. Both parties contemplated that the land
would eventually be reconveyed to Weirton, and it was eventually reconveyed.
The Tax Court held that Weirton Ice and Coal Supply Co., the original
owner, did not have an economic interest as a contract miner because it was
paid a fixed price and the contract was terminable on short notice. Citing its
earlier decision in Commissioner v. Gregory Run Coal Co. allowing depletion to
a contract miner, the Fourth Circuit reversed. However, the court found the
parties contemplated that Weirton would have the continuing exclusive privi-
lege to mine the coal. More importantly, however, the court concluded:
The purpose of National to secure a supply of coal for its steel plant was car-
ried out by the acquisition of title to the several tracts of land at cost, and by
the execution of the agreement with Weirton for the extraction of the mineral
at a reasonable price. The purpose of Weirton to find a profitable market for
the coal in place on the lands which it owned was likewise served, and hence it
was willing to transfer the lands to National at cost and to look for the return
of its investment in the land and in the operating equipment from the profits
of the mining operations, and from the reconveyance of the lands after the
extraction of the mineral.1 '
112 348 F.2d 921 (Ct. Cl. 1965); 366 F.2d 1007 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
113 231 F.2d 531 (4th Cir. 1956), rev'g 24 T.C. 374 (1955).
114 Id. at 535.
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Thus, the court of appeals analogized the arrangement to a long-term output
contract at a fixed price. This may be a valid analogy when the seller-contract
miner is initially entitled to a fee that when combined with the discounted
value of the sales price allocable to the minerals in the ground, approximates
the price that the market would then attach to a similar output contract. But,
a recent Private Letter Ruling indicates that the IRS places great weight on
form.
1'5
If Weirton Ice & Coal Supply Co. has survived Paragon Jewel Coal Co.
because it looks through the form to find in substance a long-term contract for
the sale of coal and not a contract to provide extraction services, Swank vindi-
cates the conclusion of the court of appeals that, "[i]t is of no moment that the
owner of the mineral .. .had the option to terminate the agreement at any




In Revenue Ruling 74-469, the IRS held that both X and Y Corporation
held an economic interest under the following facts.1" 7 X Corporation was the
lessee under various mineral leases terminable only for cause. By an agreement
terminable only for cause, X granted Y Corporation the right to mine to ex-
haustion all minerals to which it was entitled under the leases. Y obtained all
permits in X's name. X extracted all minerals, using its own equipment and
labor, and delivered the minerals to X's stockpile for processing by X's equip-
ment and labor. X was obligated to pay all royalties on the minerals extracted
and sold. Pursuant to the agreement, immediately upon extraction all minerals
became the property of X and Y individually in specified shares. Both X and Y
had the right to sell their respective shares to whomever they wished at
whatever price they obtained. An independent agent sold the minerals on the
open market for the respective accounts of X and Y.
The IRS also considered economic interest issues in a joint venture in
Revenue Ruling 73-32, which is discussed in detail in the preceding section." 8
There has been uncertainty regarding the identity of the proper party to
claim depletion in the captive mine arrangement operated as a joint venture in
corporate form by two or more taxpayers. The parent corporations would ad-
vance all funds necessary for operating costs and would share the production
in proportion to their stockholdings. No open market sales would be made by
the operating company and it would make no net profit. At one time, the IRS
ruled the parent corporations owning such a joint venture captive mining cor-
poration were the true owners of the economic interest and were entitled to
"5 Private Letter Ruling 8038161.
110 231 F.2d at 535.
'1' 1974-2 C.B. 178.
11 1973-1 C.B. 301; see supra note 108 and accompanying text; see also Hudson v. Commis-
sioner, 11 T.C. 1042 (1948), nonacq., 1949-1 C.B. 5 (gas processor that received an assignment of
undivided share of hydrocarbons in place had an economic interest).
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claim the depletion allowance on their respective shares of the production.1 '
In 1977, however, the IRS reversed its position and ruled that the operating
company was the owner of the economic interest, thereby denying the deple-
tion deduction to the parent companies. 120 If, however, the enterprise is not
operated in corporate form, under partnership taxation rules the depletion al-
lowance, computed at the level of the captive operating enterprise, will pass
through to the parent corporations as partners.
E. Miscellaneous Royalty Interests
Frequently different parties own the mineral rights and the surface land
overlying the coal deposit. Even though the surface owner has no ownership in
the coal, he can have an economic interest under the theory of Southwest Ex-
ploration Company.121 In Omer v. United States, 22 the owner of the surface
rights granted to the lessee of the mineral rights the right to use the surface
and land strata overlying the coal for the purpose of strip mining the coal. The
lessor of the surface rights received a royalty of a fixed sum for each ton of coal
mined and sold. The taxpayer reported the royalties as amounts received for
disposition of coal with a retained economic interest under I.R.C. § 631(c). Al-
though the court denied the taxpayer the favorable treatment accorded by
I.R.C. § 631(c), holding the amounts received were ordinary income, the IRS
conceded the taxpayer held an economic interest in the coal under the doctrine
of Southwest Exploration Company and was entitled to the depletion
allowance.' 2"
In Revenue Ruling 77-84, the holder of a royalty interest was held to have
an economic interest supporting a depletion deduction without having any di-
rect interest in the coal deposit.124 The taxpayer received a royalty interest in a
lease in consideration of negotiating the lease for another party. The royalty
interest was held to constitute an economic interest, entitling the taxpayer to
the depletion deduction. However, under the ruling the taxpayer had no eco-
nomic interest when he received a royalty interest in a leasehold in exchange
for negotiating other leases, and in a third situation, no economic interest was
present when the taxpayer received a royalty on all coal sold by the mining
company, regardless of whether it was mined under the negotiated leases or
purchased and resold.
The contrast between the first and third situations in Revenue Ruling 77-
84 is also illustrated by Cline v. Commissioner.25 Herbert and'John Cline re-
ceived a royalty interest on each ton of coal mined from certain leaseholds in
consideration for negotiating the leases on behalf of Wolf Creek Collieries Co.
119 Rev. Rul. 56-542, 1956-2 C.B. 327; Rev. Rul. 68-28, 1968-1 C.B. 5; Rev. Rul. 71-140, 1971-1
C.B. 161.
2 Rev. Rul. 77-1, 1977-1 C.B. 161.
12, See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
122 329 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1964), aff'g 63-1 USTC 9113 (W.D. Ky. 1962).
123 See also Private Letter Ruling 7945006.
124 1977-1 C.B. 173.
125 67 T.C. 889 (1977), aff'd, 617 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1980).
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Subsequently, in connection with the sale of their stock in Wolf Creek, the
Clines' royalty agreement was amended to provide for a lesser royalty, payable
on all coal loaded or processed through Wolf Creek's loading docks or tipping
facilities. The royalty was payable regardless of whether the coal was mined
from the leased mineral property to which the original royalty related, mined
from other properties, or purchased. The Tax Court concluded that although
the Clines' original royalty agreement constituted an economic interest, the re-
negotiated royalty on all the coal handled by Wolf Creek was not dependent on
the extraction of coal from any specific lease or leases and did not give the
taxpayer an economic interest in any coal property.
In Revenue Ruling 73-80, the IRS held that a taxpayer who transferred an
option to purchase mineral property in consideration of royalty to be paid by
the transferee upon operation following purchase of the property had an eco-
nomic interest. Even though the option related to coal property, I.R.C. § 631(c)
was held to be inapplicable and the royalty was ordinary income subject to
depletion.12
F. Licensees and Similar Rights
There are few cases where an economic interest is asserted by a licensee.
In Holbrook v. Commissioner, the Tax Court held that the holder of a nonex-
clusive, nontransferable license to extract coal subject to termination on ten
days notice was not entitled to percentage depletion.1 27 If the license was not
revoked it continued in force until all minable and merchantable coal was ex-
tracted. Under the terms of the agreement, the licensee acquired title to the
coal only upon extraction and paid a fixed royalty to the licensor (subject to a
minimum royalty provision). The licensee expended several thousand dollars
and four weeks efforts in preparing the underground mines for operation. He
then operated the mine for four years and sold coal on the open market. Most
of his equipment was movable.
The court concluded that the licensor did not surrender any capital inter-
est in the mineral in place because the license was nonexclusive, nontransfer-
able, and terminable on short notice. Although the coal belonged to the licen-
see upon extraction, the court was not convinced that the licensee had an
economic interest. Furthermore, the court found no investment because the
licensee's equipment, including roof supports, was found to be movable. The
court expressly distinguished Winters v. Commissioner,128 in which a lessee
under a lease terminable on thirty days notice nevertheless had an economic
interest because he had acquired the surface rights.
Similarly, in Rissler & McMurry Co. v. United States, the Tenth Circuit
denied a depletion deduction to a taxpayer removing gravel from a city-owned
gravel pit under an oral agreement permitting removal in exchange for a roy-
126 1973-1 C.B. 308.
127 65 T.C. 415 (1975).
128 496 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'g 57 T.C. 249 (1971).
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alty.1"' There was no showing of a capital investment in the mineral in place;
the short period which the taxpayer actually operated reflected no intention by
the city to surrender any interest in the gravel.
The exclusivity of rights requirement applied by the Tax Court in Hol-
brook conflicts with the Tax Court's earlier decision in Virginia B Coal Com-
pany v. Commissioner.'" Virginia B Coal Company, which was decided before
Parson and Paragon Jewel Coal Company, involved contract miners. Although
the contract miners operated under agreements terminable without cause on
ninety days notice, the court concluded that the contractors had an economic
interest because their compensation was dependent on the sale of the coal ana
varied with the market. The court specifically noted that, although from the
evidence it was unable to ascertain the quantity of coal the contract miners
were to extract "and whether each independent contractor had exclusive rights
to conduct strip-mining operations on [the lessee's] property during the period
of the agreement,"' 31 the method of compensation was conclusive. However,
because the contract miners had operated successively rather than concur-
rently, there was no direct evidence of nonexclusivity either.
In the recent cases where a licensee has been held to have an economic
interest, the taxpayer has established exclusivity of the ability to exploit the
deposit as a factual matter rather than a legal right. Interestingly, all of the
cases involve sand and gravel deposits. In Oil City Sand & Gravel Co. v. Com-
missioner, the taxpayer dredged sand and'gravel from a riverbed under a per-
mit from the Army Corps of Engineers and Pennsylvania Department of For-
ests and Waters."12 Although the taxpayer did not own the- riverbed, it owned
the only riparian land suitable for marine operations to dredge the sand and
gravel. Neither the Army Corps of Engineers permit nor the Department of
Forests and Waters permit conferred any property rights upon the taxpayer.
The Corps of Engineers permit was expressly nonexclusive and the Deparment
of Forests and Waters permit was nonexclusive by implication. Both permits
were silent regarding revocation. Title to the gravel and sand in the river was
held by the State and the right to remove it was a public right. Upon removal
the sand and gravel became property of the person removing it.
Applying Southwest Exploration Co., the court held that the taxpayer had
an economic interest because it had practical exclusive physical and economic
control over the deposits. The use of its riparian land was essential to removal
of the deposits and the riparian land had special value because of its proximity
to the sand and gravel deposits that were being depleted by the dredging oper-
ation. The same result was reached on similar facts in Victory Sand & Con-
crete, Inc. v. Commissioner.'"
Finally, in Weaver v. Commissioner,'" three agreements were involved
.21 480 F.2d 684 (10th Cir. 1973), af'g 342 F. Supp. 43 (D. Wyo. 1972).
1-0 25 T.C. 899 (1956).
131 Id. at 902.
132 39 T.C. 31 (1959).
.3 61 T.C. 407 (1974).
214 72 T.C. 594 (1979).
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under which the taxpayer extracted gravel. Although one agreement was de-
nominated a lease, and called for "rent," the others were more difficult to so
categorize. A second agreement for a term of two years, granted "the exclusive
right to extract and remove . . . gravel material from [the described prop-
erty]," and required that the taxpayer "shall pay Munroe Twenty Cents
($0.20) for each cubic yard of gravel material extracted and removed." The
agreement provided, however, that "the gravel material removed. . . shall re-
main the property of Munroe . . . until such gravel material is delivered by
Weaver to a job site and Weaver has paid Munroe for such material." Both of
these agreements were found to confer an economic interest on the basis of
exclusivity, absence of short notice terminability (one was terminable on 120
days notice and was held not to be short notice), and the taxpayer's "signifi-
cant related investment.'
35
The third agreement provided as follows:
Beginning Nov. 1, 1971 and expiring June 1, 1972 Hadwen & Verna Coe
agree to sell gravel from their bed at south east portion of their farm located
on Co. Rt. #35, Hastings, N.Y. to Lloyd Weaver Construction Co.
Lloyd Weaver Construction Co. agrees to pay to Hadwen and Verno Coe
fifteen cents per yard for all gravel material taken. All gravel material taken
shall be paid for at the end of each week for material taken preceding week.
Lloyd Weaver to have first option to Renew Contract.1 3
Although the court referred to the Coe agreement as a lease in allowing the
depletion deduction, this agreement is difficult to categorize. Significantly,
however, although the agreement did not discuss exclusivity, the court, in
holding that the taxpayer had an economic interest, construed the "first op-
tion" clause to imply exclusivity because the taxpayer owned the necessary ac-
cess and it was "phraseology seemingly inconsistent with the notion that more
than one exploiter of the mineral resources was contemplated.'
1 7
Looking at these cases together, it is questionable whether a licensee is
absolutely precluded from having an economic interest. If, as a practical mat-
ter, the licensee has had the exclusive ability to exploit the deposit, the Tax
Court has not denied him an economic interest. After United States v. Swank,
that a license is terminable on short notice should not be relevant in determin-
ing whether a licensee has an economic interest, at least if he actually operates
under the license without exercise of the licensor's right to terminate. If actual
continued operation under a lease with a short notice terminability clause is
sufficient to support an economic interest, actual continued operation under a
license should also be sufficient.
Furthermore, the distinction between title to the coal after the extraction
and a surrender of the interest in the unextracted coal made in Holbrook
should not survive Swank. The Supreme Court expressly said in footnote 25
135 Id. at 602.
136 Id. at 599.
137 Id. at 606.
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that the duration of the interest is irrelevant if the taxpayer otherwise has an
economic interest and is dependent on the market to recover his costs.138 Since
Swank also expressly acknowledges that an investment by the taxpayer is irrel-
evant, the "costs" referred to must be operating costs. Therefore, an economic
interest exists not by virtue of an abstract interest in the unextracted mineral
in the ground, but rather when the taxpayer has the right to extract the min-
eral and reduce it to ownership. 139 The IRS, however, interprets the result in
Swank as being based significantly on the fact that the lessee had a legal inter-
est in the coal before extraction.140 Therefore, it is likely that the IRS will
continue to contest the assertion of an economic interest in a licensee.
The nonexclusive nature of a license may present some difficulty in finding
an economic interest in the licensee. If, however, the preceding analysis regard-
ing title to the mineral is correct, nonexclusivity of the license should also be
irrelevant. If depletion is warranted "whether the entire operation is conducted
by one taxpayer over a prolonged period or by a series of taxpayers operating
for successive shorter periods, 14 1 it is equally warranted whether the entire
operation is conducted by one taxpayer over a prolonged period or concur-
rently by several taxpayers over a shorter period. This assumes that the actual
extraction rather than the right to future extraction of an estimatable quantity
of mineral that is the hallmark of an economic interest. 142 If so, a terminable
license confers an economic interest on the licensee.
III. COST DEPLETION
A. Computation
The cost depletion allowable as a deduction for any taxable year is deter-
mined under a formula provided by the regulations.1 4 The adjusted basis of
the mineral property under I.R.C. § 612 is divided by the number of units
remaining as of the taxable year. The result, termed the "depletion unit" is
multiplied by the number of units sold during the taxable year. For coal, the
relevant unit is the ton. The number of units remaining as of the taxable year
is the sum of the units to be recovered at the end of the taxable year (including
units extracted but not sold) and the units sold during the year.14 4 This com-
putation requires the taxpayer to compute each of the three factors: units sold,
basis, and units remaining to be recovered.
Units sold during the taxable year are defined by the regulations with ref-
1 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
See McMahon, Defining the "Economic Interest" in Minerals After United States v.
Swank, 70 Ky. L.J. 23, 67-71 (1982).
140 Private Letter Ruling 8216007.
141 United States v. Swank, 451 U.S. 571, 585 (1981).
12 See Virginia B. Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 899 (1956); Smoot v. Commissioner, 25
B.T.A. 1038 (1932) (holding that the holder of exclusive grant to remove gravel from riverbed
granted by riparian landowner who had nonexclusive, revocable license to remove gravel by opera-
tion of state statute had a right to deplete the value of his contractual right as gravel was dredged).
14I Treas. Reg. § 1.611-2(a)(1) (1973).
144 Treas. Reg. § 1.611-2(a)(3) (1973).
[Vol. 85
30
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 4 [1983], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol85/iss4/5
COAL DEPLETION ALLOWANCE
erence to the taxpayer's accounting method.14 5 Cash basis taxpayers include
units for which payment was received in the year, regardless of the year of
production or the year of sale. Accrual basis taxpayers use their inventory
method to compute the number of units sold.
146
The basis of the mineral deposit under I.R.C. § 612 is the adjusted basis of
the mineral property used for determining gain and loss under I.R.C. § 1011.147
In addition to adjustments to basis otherwise required by I.R.C. § 1016, the
taxpayer must keep a depletion account and record the basis of the property,
which must be reduced by the amount of depletion allowed in prior years.1 4 8
The basis for depletion in a given taxable year is the adjusted basis determined
at the end of the year. All adjustments to basis other than the depletion deduc-
tion must be made prior to computing the depletion deduction.
To calculate cost depletion a taxpayer must first estimate the number of
units "reasonably known, or, on good evidence, believed to have existed in
place" no later than the close of the first taxable year of operation of the prop-
erty. 1 49 That determination must be made "according to the method current in
the industry and in light of the most accurate and reliable information obtain-
able."1 5 ' That, together with sales, enables the taxpayer to compute the units
remaining as of the first taxable year. Thereafter, the number of units remain-
ing for each successive taxable year will be the number of units remaining from
the estimate after subtracting sales in intervening years. 151 If, however, in a
subsequent year the number of remaining recoverable units is substantially
different than the number remaining from the previous estimate, the estimate
must be revised. Thereafter, computations of cost depletion will be based on
the revised estimate.1 52 Revised estimates are not applied retroactively.151
In Revenue Ruling 67-157, the IRS, relying on the language of I.R.C. §
611(a) requiring a revised estimate of the remaining recoverable reserves when
it is "ascertained as a result of operations or development work that the recov-
erable units are greater or less than previously estimated," held that a tax-
payer could not revise an estimate of recoverable reserves downward based on
its analysis of trends in coal prices that indicated that future price changes
would render some of the reserves economically unrecoverable (i.e. the pro-
jected cost of extraction would exceed the projected market price).1 " Revenue
Ruling 67-157 gives an example of the type of information warranting a revised
estimate finding a geologic "fault" or "'pinch out" of the coal seam indicating
,41 Treas. Reg. § 1.611-2(a)(2) (1973).
,40 See Treas. Reg. § 1.471-7 (1958) (regarding special rules for valuing mine inventories).
147 Treas. Reg. § 1.612-1(a) (1960).
1'8 Tress. Reg. § 1.612-2(b) (1960).
Treas. Reg. § 1.611-2(c)(1) (1973).
'.o Id.
Tress. Reg. § 1.611-2(c)(2) (1973).
102 I.R.C. § 611(a) (1976) (last sentence); Tress. Reg. § 1.612-1(c)(2) (1960).
111 Kehota Mining Co. v. Lewellyn, 30 F.2d 817 (3d Cir. 1929); Tressler Coal Mining Co. v.
Commissioner, T 48,266 T.C.M. (P-H) (1946); Trace Fork Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 15 B.T.A.
872 (1929); Sterling Coal Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 8 B.T.A. 549 (1927).
154 1967-1 C.B. 154.
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an absence of coal. 115 The Ruling states any coal reserves classified as mea-
sured, indicated or inferred under Geological Survey Bulletin 1136, "Coal
Reserves of the United States," which is prepared by the United States Geo-
logical Survey, must be included in the estimate of remaining recoverable coal.
Although estimates of recoverable units presumably should be revised if,
due to changes in technology or the market, it were to become economically
feasible to extract coal previously considered unrecoverable or not economical
to extract coal previously considered marketable, changing the estimate of re-
coverable units based on fluctuations of market price may prove difficult. In
West Virginia Coal Co. v. Commissioner,' 6 the Board of Tax Appeals held
that the estimate of recoverable units could not be revised downward when the
taxpayer stopped mining at a fault because the taxpayer was not unable to
extract the coal on the other side of the fault but chose not to mine the coal
because there had been a decrease in the market price of coal. 157 However, in
Trace Fork Mining Co. v. Commissioner,5 the Board of Tax Appeals allowed
a downward revision where a coal seam was thinner and contained more shale
than was previously estimated.15 9
The effect of the decrease in recoverable reserves is to increase the "deple-
tion unit" amount, thus accelerating the aggregate deduction. An increase in
estimated reserves decreases the "depletion unit" which decreases annual cost
depletion per unit, thus deferring the aggregate deduction. Both section 611(a)
and the regulations provide that, notwithstanding a revised estimate of recov-
erable reserves, the adjusted basis for depletion will not be changed. 00
B. Determination of Basis
Section 612 provides that the basis on which depletion is allowed is the
adjusted basis provided in I.R.C. § 1011 for the purpose of determining gain or
loss. The starting point for adjusted basis is usually cost under I.R.C. § 1012,101
but basis is determined under I.R.C. § 1014 if the mineral property was ac-
quired by bequest or inheritance, or under I.R.C. § 1015 if the property was
5 Id.; see also Staub Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 16 B.T.A. 584 (1929); West Virginia Coal Co.
v. Commissioner, 16 B.T.A. 378 (1929).
16 16 B.T.A. 378 (1929).
"' Id. at 383-84.
" 15 B.T.A. 872 (1929).
160 Id. at 879-80.
160 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.611-2(c)(2) (1973), 1.612-2(f) (1960). This rule was applied in Martini v.
Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (C.C.H.) 1028 (1969). The taxpayer allocated $6,000 of the cost basis of
real property to the estimated gravel reserves of 140,000 cubic yards. Subsequently, after the tax-
payer's basis had been exhausted by prior depletion, upon discovery that the gravel reserves were
substantially in excess of 140,000 cubic feet, the taxpayer attempted to reapportion his basis allo-
cation to increase the portion of total basis allocated to the gravel deposit. The court held that
such a reallocation was prohibited by the regulations. See also McCahill v. Helvering, 75 F.2d 725
(8th Cir. 1935) (holding that basis of mineral property for cost depletion originally established
upon predecessor of I.R.C. § 1014 could not be increased upon subsequent discovery of substan-
tially greater reserves than originally estimated).
I" Tress. Reg. § 1.612-1(a) (1960).
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acquired by gift.16 2 Basis may also be determined under I.R.C. § 1031(d) if the
property was acquired in a like-kind exchange. 163 Normal rules for capitaliza-
tion of acquisition expenses under I.R.C. § 263 are applicable, and items such
as commissions paid by a purchaser or lessee and attorneys' fees incurred in
the acquisition of the mineral properly are included in the depletable basis.""
Only that portion of the basis of the property attributable to the mineral
property may be included in the depletable basis under I.R.C. § 612. The regu-
lations provide that the basis for cost depletion does not include amounts rep-
resenting the cost or value of land for purposes other than mineral produc-
tion. 165 Thus, when the surface and coal rights are purchased together, the cost
must be allocated between the two. If the coal is extracted by a method that
does not destroy the surface, depletion is allowed only with respect to the cost
basis allocated to the coal.166 The same principle applies to allocation of basis
determined under I.R.C. § 1014, I.R.C. § 1015 or I.R.C. § 1031(d).
Determination of the basis of the coal is more difficult if surface mining
methods are used. In Manchester Coal Co. v. Commissionerl" the Board of
Tax Appeals included the cost of the surface in the depletable basis because
strip mining the coal deposit would completely destroy the surface area.
In Beaver Dam Coal Co. v. United States,168 the Commissioner conceded
that the allocable cost of the surface overlying coal to be strip mined should be
added to the depletable basis of the coal. At issue was the amount of the sur-
face basis property allocable to the coal deposit. The taxpayer had separately
acquired mineral rights and surface rights. In many instances in order to ac-
quire surface rights overlying coal to be strip mined, the taxpayer was required
to purchase as a unit, tracts that included land under which there was no coal,
paying a premium for the surface that was not overlying the coal and would
not be destroyed by mining. The Commissioner argued that the purchase price
of each tract should simply be allocated ratably to the surface that would be
destroyed. The taxpayer argued that an equitable apportionment required that
the premium be allocated wholly to the surface to be destroyed. For example,
if the taxpayer was compelled td pay $10,000 for a hundred acre farm, having
an agricultural fair market value of $3,000 and only forty acres were to be
mined, the cost would be apportioned as follows. If the agricultural value of
162 See McCahill v. Helvering, 75 F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1935) (basis determined under predeces-
sor of I.R.C. § 1014).
113 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Crichten, 122 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1941) (exchange of undivided
fractional share of mineral rights for improved city lot); Rev. Rul. 68-331, 1968-1 C.B. 352 (ex-
change of leasehold interest in producing oil deposit for improved ranch).
6' See, e.g., Fiore v. Commissioner, 1 79,360 T.C.M. (P-H) (1979) (broker's commissions and
attorney's fees for purchase of land and mineral (coal) rights; rejecting argument that payments
were deductible as development expenses under I.R.C. § 616 (1976) or as advance coal royalties);
Munger v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 1236 (1950) (commission paid by lessor added to lessor's basis);
Rev. Rul. 67-141, 1967-1 C.B. 153 (commissions paid by lessee to acquire oil lease).
166 Treas. Reg. § 1.612-1(b)(1) (1960).
66 Potts Run Coal Co. v. Comm'r, 19 BTA 1 (1930) (deep mining), nonacq., X-2 C.B. 90.
167 24 B.T.A. 577 (1931), nonacq., XI-1 C.B. 10 (1932).
108 370 F.2d 414 (6th Cir. 1966), rev'g 237 F. Supp. 106 (W.D. Ky. 1965).
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the land was thirty dollars per acre, the residual value of the surface would be
$1,800, the amount allocated at thirty dollars per acre to the surface not de-
stroyed by mining. This would be subtracted from the total purchase price of
$10,000 to yield the cost of the surface rights that would be destroyed by min-
ing that should be added to the depletable basis of the coal. 16 9 The court of
appeals held that the taxpayer was entitled to use an equitable apportionment
method, reversing the district court which had allocated the cost ratably. It
remanded the case for proceedings to establish the proportionate cost of each
portion of land destroying by mining. On remand the method of apportion-
ment in the example was applied.170
The regulations provide that depletable basis does not include the residual
value of land and improvements at the end of operations.' 7 ' Present laws gov-
erning surface mining require restoration of the surface' 7 ' and, therefore, there
will be a residual value of the surface at the end of operations. This residual
value, however, is created by expenditures incurred by the operator to restore
the surface property. In Denise Coal Co. v. Commissioner'"3 the Tax Court
relying on Manchester Coal Co., held that the taxpayer could add the cost of
the surface to the cost of the coal to determine depletable basis, despite the
obligation, secured by a bond, to backfill and plant trees, shrubs, or grass. The
court did not discuss the residual value of the land, but in its fact findings, the
court found that the land would not be usable for agricultural purposes for at
least four to eight years after restoration, and if trees were planted, they would
have no value until after a substantial number of years had passed.
A second issue in Denise Coal Co. v. Commissioner concerned the tax-
payer's claim that it could accrue, as a deductible expense, the estimated cost
of reclaiming the surface attributable to the coal extracted each year. The Tax
Court rejected this argument because the taxpayer had neither restored the
surface itself, nor had entered into any contract for restoration giving rise to an
obligation to a third party. The obligation to the State of Pennsylvania to re-
store the surface was not sufficient to support a deduction because it was in
futuro. Therefore, the deduction was disallowed even though the court ac-
knowledged that the creation of a book reserve for the future expense was a
prudent accounting practice.
The Third Circuit reversed the Tax Court on this point and allowed the
reserve based on sound accounting principles and, therefore, good tax law. The
court distinguished the cases on which the Tax Court relied as cases in which
169 Id. at 415-16.
170 70-2 USTC 1 9661 (W.D. Ky. 1970).
171 Treas. Reg. § 1.612-1(b)(1)(ii) (1960).
172 See Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445
(codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328) (Supp. II 1978 & Supp. IV 1980).
173 29 T.C. 528 (1957), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, 271 F.2d 930 (3d Cir. 1959). It is worth
noting that the taxpayer was seeking an immediate loss deduction under the predecessor of I.R.C.
§ 165(a) for the value of the surface destroyed. The taxpayer's depletion deduction was computed
under I.R.C. § 613 not I.R.C. § 611 and I.R.C. § 612, and the addition of the cost basis for the
surface to the basis of the coal did not affect the amount of the percentage depletion claimed.
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the estimates were not reasonable. 174 The Third Circuit affirmed the Tax Court
on the issue of including the basis of the surface in the depletable basis of the
mineral property and the concomitant denial of a loss deduction.
A similar result was reached in Harrold v. Commissioner, 75 in which the
Fourth Circuit allowed the deduction by an accrual basis taxpayer of reasona-
ble estimates for restoring the surface, reversing a Tax Court decision disallow-
ing the deduction.
Recently, in Ohio River Collieries Co. v. Commissioner,'7 the Tax Court
distinguished its earlier decisions, such as Denise Coal Co., in which it had
disallowed the deduction of an accrued reserve for reclamation expenses, and
allowed the deduction. The court found that Ohio River Collieries Company
satisfied the requirement that the estimated expense had been determined
with reasonable accuracy. On the issue of the existence of liability, the court
reversed its prior position in Denise Coal Co. and Harrold v. Commissioner
and held that the event of strip mining gave rise to the measure of cost. Since
the liability arose upon the mining and the amount was estimated with reason-
able accuracy, the reserve was deductible.
This result may be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decisions in the
Automobile Club 77 cases and Schlude v. Commissioner," disallowing reserve
accounting methods in other industries. The IRS continues to rule that the
accrued deduction for the reserve is not allowable. 7 9 Some cases involving de-
ductions for other types of future liabilities, however, have allowed deductions
for reserve accruals where the event fixing liability had occurred and the
amount of the liability could be determined with reasonable certainty.8 0 These
later cases allowing the deduction for reserve accruals distinguish the Automo-
bile Club cases because they involved attempts to accrue a reserve for the cost
of providing services where the obligation was speculative. This logic is persua-
sive, and as to the timing issue, the cases allowing the accrual of the deduction
1' See Commissioner v. Gregory Run Coal Co., 212 F.2d 52 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
828 (1954); Jenkins v. Commissioner, 13 T.C.M. 61 (1954), aff'd per curiam, 217 F.2d 951 (3d Cir.
1955); Patsch v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 189 (1952), aff'd, 208 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1953).
175 192 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1951), rev'g 16 T.C. 134 (1951).
170 77 T.C. 13369 (1981).
177 Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957); American Automobile Ass'n. v.
United States, 367 U.S. 687 (1961).
178 372 U.S. 128 (1963).
179 Private Letter Ruling 7831003.
'"0 See, e.g., Wien Consolidated Airlines, Inc. v. Commissioner, 528 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1976)
(self insurer allowed deduction for accrued reserve for workman's compensation payments to be
made to minor children of employees who had been killed in the course of employment); Crescent
Wharf & Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, 518 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1975) (same, except reserve in-
cluded amounts due to employees who had been injured). Lukens Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 442
F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1971) (allowing deduction for amounts credited to fund for benefit of employees
where existence of a liability was fixed but time of payment and identity of payees were not yet
determined). Compare Gateway Transp. Co. v. United States, 39 A.F.T.R. 2d 77-647 (W.D. Wis.
1976) (deduction for accruals to reserve for common carrier's liability to shipper's for damage to
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of a reserve for reclamation expenses appear to be correctly decided.
There is, however, a different problem with allowing an accrued deduction
for reclamation expenses. It is possible that neither the taxpayers, the Com-
missioner, nor the respective courts have addressed this crucial issue. An ordi-
nary deduction for reclamation expenses may not be the theoretically correct
result. First, because for cost depletion purposes the value of the surface de-
stroyed by strip mining is considered part of the depletable basis of the coal,181
the cost of restoring the surface may be properly described as a capital expen-
diture to obtain the new surface. Thus, contrary to the result in Denise Coal
Company, an operator who owned the surface rights in fee should be required
to capitalize the reclamation expenditures up to an amount equal to the fair
market value of the surface after reclamation.18 2 Alternatively, if a deduction is
allowed, since the surface is to be restored by reclamation expenses, none of
the surface basis should be allocated to the depletable basis of the coal deposit.
Concomitantly, no portion of the reclamation expenses would be allocated to
the basis of the reclaimed surface; its basis would be the basis of the original
surface. ' 3 Although this latter rule may be administratively convenient, it is
not theoretically correct and the Third Circuit in Denise Coal Company failed
to consider the logical inconsistency of allocating surface basis to the deplet-
able basis of the coal deposit and allowing deduction of the full amount of the
reclamation expenses.
Proper characterization of the expense in excess of the amount, if any,
allocated to the basis of the new surface, which is all of the reclamation ex-
penses in the case of an operator who will not own the reclaimed surface,
presents an even more difficult question. On one hand, the amount might be
characterized simply as an additional cost of acquiring the coal, analogous to a
premium value attached to surface rights overlying coal. 8 Viewed as such the
amount would be added to the depletable basis of the coal, and any tax benefit
of a deduction would be lost to the extent that the taxpayer claimed percent-
age depletion rather than cost depletion.18 5 On the other hand, the excess rec-
lamation costs might be viewed as the reverse of stripping the overburden.
Since the surface fee owner operator already owns the surface, any pre-
181 Beaver Dam Coal Co. v. United States, 370 F.2d 414 (6th Cir. 1966); Manchester Coal Co.
v. Commissioner, 24 B.T.A. 577 (1931), nonacq., XI-1 C.B. 10.
182 Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.612-1(b)(1)(ii) (1960) (depletable basis does not include the residual
value of land and improvements remaining after mining). Alternatively, under a tax benefit type
analysis the operator might be required to capitalize only an amount equal to the original surface
basis properly allocated to the depletable basis of the coal for cost depletion purposes.
83 This would also have the administrative virtue of eliminating the need to resolve in every
case the factual issue of the value of the surface to be created. This would be particularly difficult
since the amount to be accrued as a cost of the surface will frequently be accrued in a year prior to
the actual reclamation and thus the proper accrual would require an estimate of what the value of
the surface will be when created.
18 See Beaver Dam Coal Co. v. United States, 370 F.2d 414 (6th Cir. 1966), reo'g, 237 F.
Supp. 106 (W.D. Ky. 1965).
185 Regardless whether the taxpayer claims cost or percentage depletion in any given year, the
basis of the surface destroyed by strip mining should be allocated to the depletable basis of the
coal under I.R.C. § 612.
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mium value should already be reflected in the portion of the surface basis allo-
cated to the coal deposit. The operator who does not own the fee presumably is
paying to the surface owner an amount reflecting the full value of use of the
surface as a surface overlying a coal deposit. Therefore, treating the reclama-
tion expenses as premium cost for the surface rights that should be allocated to
the depletable basis of the coal deposit should be rejected. Rather, the recla-
mation expenses not capitalized as the basis of the reclaimed surface should be
analogized to removal of overburden. Based on this analogy, the expenses
would appear to be deductible, since the removal of overburden enters into the
cost of goods sold.""6 It is worth noting, however, that this result may, never-
theless, be theoretically improper. If depletable basis is analogous to cost of
goods sold, both removal of overburden and reclamation expenses should be
capitalized as part of the depletable basis of the coal deposit. However, since
removal of overburden is currently not capitalized, for the sake of consistency,
it may be appropriate to allow similar treatment for reclamation expenses in
excess of the fair market value of the residual surface.
Further consideration should be given to additional factors, however
before settling on the treatment of reclamation expenses not in excess of the
fair market value of the surface owned by the taxpayer and which was created
by the expenditures. If the operator who does not own the surface is permitted
to expense the entire reclamation expense, but the surface owner operator is
required to allocate a portion of the reclamation expenses to the acquisition of
the fee to the surface, the taxable income of the former under section 63 will
be less than that of the latter, even though they both incur identical expenses
and have identical gross income from mining. This occurs because a surface fee
owner claiming percentage depletion, receives no tax benefit in the form of a
deduction of the basis of the destroyed surface originally allocated to the de-
pletable basis of the coal, and has been denied a deduction for the expenditure
that in effect restores that basis in the surface. However, if the entire reclama-
tion expenses are deducted, but none of the basis of the surface is allocated to
the depletable basis of the coal, both operators will have the same taxable in-
come. However, under this rule the surface owner-operator will have a basis
remaining in his surface that properly should have been consumed by the de-
pletion allowance deductions.
This suggested rule-permitting a deduction of the full reclamation ex-
penses even if the taxpayer acquires a valuable surface as a result-appears
initially to be a fair remedy to an apparently harsh result of a rule requiring.
capitalization of the expenses to the extent that they are attributable to the
fair market value of the reclaimed surface. That seemingly harsh treatment,
however, is the proper result, mandated by the nature of the depletion allow-
ance deduction as an alternative to cost depletion. The fundamental nature of
the relationship between percentage and cost depletion always results in the
appearance of denial of effective tax recovery of the depletable basis of coal
when percentage depletion is claimed. It is not, however, truly a denial of re-
"' See Rev. Rul. 77-308, 1977-2 C.B. 208 (cost of removing overburden in surface coal mine
operation is an operating cost).
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covery, but it can give rise to discriminatory effects between two taxpayers, one
of whom acquires rights by an expenditure that is deductible or excludable and
the other of whom acquires those rights by an expenditure that must be capi-
talized.18 7 Thus, to the extent that the reclamation expenses give rise to a valu-
able surface, it is difficult to justify allowing a current deduction.
Notwithstanding the preceding analysis, at the present time it appears
that all operators may enjoy a deduction for reclamation expenses. The IRS
does not seem ready to accept that any portion of the reclamation expendi-
tures are properly capital expenditures that should be allocated to the surface
fee, and Denise Coal Company apparently permits both allocation of basis of
the surface to the depletable basis of the coal deposit and a deduction for the
full amount of reclamation expenses. If reclamation costs are expensed, how-
ever, they should not generate any additional basis in the surface. 88 Since the
basis of the originally destroyed surface has been allocated to the depletable
basis of the coal, even if percentage depletion was claimed, the basis of the new
surface should be zero. Upon a subsequent sale, therefore, the full amount of
the sale proceeds should be included in income. This gives rise not only to a
timing distortion, which Denise Coal Company ignores, but raises the more
serious problem of whether the gain on the subsequent sale should be ordinary
income or capital gain.
Even though the land is a section 1231 asset, it would appear that the
proper result would be to treat the gain as ordinary income up to an amount
equal to the original basis of the surface that was properly allocable to the
depletable basis of the coal. Only gain in excess of that amount should be
treated as section 1231 gain. This would be consistent with the application of
the tax benefit rule,189 which is a "necessary concomitant of the annual ac-
counting system, to prevent a deduction for a nonexistent cost, contribution or
expenditure."1 90 However, if an analogy is drawn to section 1245 recapture, or-
dinary income is generated by the sale of depreciated real property only if the
cost was recovered under the accelerated method of I.R.C. § 168(a)(2)(A). 1" 1
Since the expenditure in issue is one that has been expensed under I.R.C. §
162, when it more properly should have been capitalized under I.R.C. § 263,
the tax benefit rule analogy is more appropriate, and the subsequent sale of
the surface should generate ordinary income to the extent the sales price does
not exceed the original basis. However, just as with the capitalization of recla-
mation expenses as an additional cost of the coal, there is no indication that
the Commissioner has yet pursued this line of reasoning.
Unlike the expense of acquiring a surface to be destroyed by strip mining,
187 See McMahon, Defining the "Economic Interest" in Minerals After United States v.
Swank, 70 Ky. L.J. 23, 84-87 (1982).
I" See Tennessee-Carolina Transp. Co. v. Commissioner, 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979) (tires expensed by trucking company had zero basis).
188 See Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 103 S. Ct. 1134 (1983); 4 B. BITrMER, FEDERAL
TAxATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AD GirrS, 1 5.7.1-5.7.2 (1981).
190 Feld, The Tax Benefit of Bliss, 62 B.U.L. REv. 443, 450 (1982).
19 I.R.C. § 1245(a)(5) (1981). There are some exceptions to this rule.
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none of the cost of acquiring surface areas to be used to service the mine that
do not overly a coal deposit to be strip mined may be allocated to the deplet-
able basis of the coal. Thus, the cost of acquiring land to be used for a dump-
ing area is not added to the depletable cost basis of the coal deposit bene-
fited.192 A loss deduction may not be taken for diminution in value of such
lands as a result of such mining.19 3 Any diminution in the value of such land
will be deductible as a loss only upon the subsequent sale of the land at a loss.
Where mineral rights are acquired by lease, the cost of the lease is the
basis for cost depletion. A lease bonus paid by the lessee is a capital invest-
ment in the lease, the cost of which is recovered through depletion.19 4 Since
lessees typically compute the depletion allowance under I.R.C. § 613, the cost
is usually never recovered. But when the lessee pays nothing for the lease, only
promising to pay royalties, there is no basis for depletion. 95 Royalties paid to a
lessor are not capital expenditures giving rise to basis in the lease.198 Advance
royalties similarly are not capital expenditures, but are instead deducted from
gross income from the property in the subsequent year to which they relate. 97
Payments received for options have been characterized as analogous to
lease bonus, 98 and option payments should therefore be included by the payor
in the depletable cost basis of the mineral property. This applies both for op-
tions to acquire a fee and options to acquire a lease.
Delay rentals are analogous to option payments, but may be deducted cur-
rently by the lessee. Therefore, they are not added to the depletable basis of
the coal deposit. If, however, the lessee elects to capitalize the delay rental
under I.R.C. § 266, the payment will be added to the depletable basis in the
lease.199 The election may be made separately for each year delay rentals are
paid for a lease of mineral property, and it may be made for some leases held
by the taxpayer, but not for others.200
192 Rev. Rul. 74-282, 1974-1 C.B. 150 (requiring capitalizing and delaying loss recognition until
subsequent sale, but allowing depreciation of premium paid due to preexisting pit into which over-
burden would be dumped); see also Sexton v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 1094 (1964), acq. in result
only, 1970-1 C.B. xvi (taxpayer in rubbish removal business permitted to depreciate premium paid
for land with pits into which rubbish could be dumped); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. United States,
347 F.2d 275 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (per curiam) (treating as deductible expense cost of easement for
dumping area).
193 Denise Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 528, afl'd on this point, 271 F.2d 930 (3d Cir.
1959).
194 Treas. Reg. § 1.612-3(a)(3) (1977).
195 E.M.T. Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 13 B.T.A. 124 (1928); Marsh Fork Coal Co., 11 B.T.A.
685 (1928).
'I" E.M.T. Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 13 B.T.A. 124 (1928); Leechburg Mining Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 15 T.C. 22 (1950) (royalties paid are excluded from gross income of lessee); Rev. Rul. 68-
361, 1968-2 C.B. 264.
197 Treas. Reg. § 1.612-3(b)(3) (1977).
111 Commissioner v. Pickard, 401 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1968).
199 Treas. Reg. § 1.612-3(c) (1977); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.266-1(b) (1960) (other carrying
charges that may be capitalized); § 1.266-1(c) (1960) (method of electing to capitalize items under
I.R.C. § 266).
200 Treas. Reg. § 1.612-3(c) (1977); Rev. Rul. 80-49, 1980-1 C.B. 127.
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Similarly, the owner of an unproductive mineral property may elect to
capitalize interest, real estate taxes and other carrying charges and add them
to the depletable basis of the property under I.R.C. § 266. However, because
otherwise deductible expenses capitalized under I.R.C. § 266 are never recov-
ered as deductible items if the taxpayer subsequently utilizes percentage de-
pletion, such an election is rarely advantageous for a lessee. It is also rarely
advantageous for an owner of the fee claiming cost depletion because the de-
duction is deferred.
The depletable cost basis of the coal deposit does not include amounts
recoverable through depreciation deductions or deferred expenses deduc-
tions.20 1 Therefore, development expenses subject to I.R.C. § 616, although
capitalized in the event of an election under subsection (b), are not included in
the depletable basis, 20 2 and all expenses for machinery and equipment, struc-
tures, tipples, railroad sidings and other supporting structures, such as fan
houses, powder houses, and transformers are capitalized and the cost is recov-
ered under I.R.C. § 168 (Accelerated Cost Recovery System) (ACRS). If such
expenditures are necessary to maintain the normal output of the mine solely
because of the recession of the working faces of the mine, they are expensed.20 3
Expenses incurred to drive shafts, tunnels and galleries in preparation for
deep mining are development expenditures deductable under I.R.C. § 616,204
and are not capitalized as part of the depletable basis. The analogous expenses
of a strip mine, the cost of removing overburden 20 5 and of cutting benches, 200
also are not capitalized. Similarly, roads providing access to a coal mine have
been held to be development expenses subject to I.R.C. § 616, even though the
roads would also be used in the production stage.20 7 Roads constructed on land
owned in fee and on leased land have been treated identically.
The cost of roads providing access to a mine are deductable as develop-
ment expenses because the expense would be depletable rather than deprecia-
ble absent I.R.C. § 616.208 Therefore, the cost of roads constructed during the
production stage must be capitalized as part of the depletable basis of the coal.
Presumably the expense of acquiring an easement on which to construct the
road would be accorded the same treatment. This rule would not seem to ap-
ply, however, to the cost of an easement and road used to service the mine but
'0' Treas. Reg. §§ 1.612-1(b)(1)(i) (1960); 1.612-2(a) (1960).
S02 1.R.C. § 616(c) (1976).
203 Treas. Reg. § 1.612-2(a) (1960).
"" Rev. Rul. 67-35, 1967-1 C.B. 159.
205 Rev. Rul. 67-169, 1967-1 C.B. 159 (limestone deposit; removing overburden is not a devel-
opment expense because it does not benefit the deposit generally, but only a particular increment
of the deposit); Rev. Rul. 77-308, 1977-2 C.B. 208, 209-10 (coal deposit; costs of stripping overbur-
den described as "operating costs").
20 National Lead Co. v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 988 (1955), rev'd on other grounds, 230 F.2d
161 (2d Cir. 1956); afl'd on other grounds, 352 U.S. 313 (1957).
207 Amherst Coal Co. v. United States, 295 F. Supp. 421 (S.D. W. Va. 1969), afl'd per curiam,
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not part of the mine itself.2 0 9 Such expenditures should be capitilized and the
cost recovered under I.R.C. § 167 in the case of easements purchased for a
specific price and under I.R.C. § 168 for roads.2 10 Nevertheless, the Court of
Claims has held that the cost of acquiring an easement over adjacent lands
necessitated by the expansion of a surface mine need not be capitalized and
added to the depletable basis of the coal deposit but may be deducted under
the receding working face doctrine.21 The Tax Court and Sixth Circuit, how-
ever, in Geoghegan & Mathis, Inc. v. Commissioner,1 2 have followed the view
of the IRS requiring capitalization of such expenditures as an addition to the
depletable basis of the mineral deposit.
Particularly difficult problems of determining the depletable basis of a
coal deposit arise when an operating coal mining enterprise is purchased. The
cost must be allocated among all of the acquired assets, including the deplet-
able basis of the mineral deposit, the depreciable basis of the mineral deposit,
the depreciable basis of tangible property such as machinery or equipment,
and property that is neither depletable nor depreciable such as surface rights,
easements and goodwill. 13 Under the regulations when an entire mining enter-
prise is acquired, the cost basis of the interest in the mineral deposit is the
proportion of the total cost of the enterprise that bears the same relationship
to the total cost which the value of the interest in the mineral deposit bears to
the total value of the enterprise at the time of its acquisition.2 4 The value of
the mineral deposit is ordinarily based upon comparative values, considering
the conditions and circumstances known at the time of the acquisition. But if
neither comparative value nor any other reasonable method-such as cost, or,
in the case of equipment, replacement value-can be used, then analytical ap-
praisal methods, such as the present value method may be used.215 The regula-
tions provide detailed rules regarding the factors to be considered in valuing
21 See Denise Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 528, aff'd, 271 F.2d 930 (3d Cir. 1959); Rev.
Rul. 74-282, 1974-1 C.B.
210 Expenditures incurred during the operating stage to acquire an easement over which coal
will be removed from the mine should be capitalized and depreciated over the life of the mine. See,
e.g., Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. v. United States, 408 F.2d 690 (Ct. Cl. 1960) (easement de-
preciable over life of related pipeline). As intangible property the easement is not subject to ACRS
under section 168. The depreciation expense would then be considered a transporation expense.
Wheelage paid currently would be currently deductable or, in some instances, excluded from gross
income under the doctrine of Southwest Exploration Corp. See supra notes 42, 49 and accompa-
nying text. The cost of any road constructed over the easement should be recovered over the pe-
riod of easement (taking into account the principles of § 178) or fifteen years, whichever is less, cf.
I.R.C. § 168(f)(6) (dealing with leasehold improvements); Rev. Rule. 68-281, 1968-1 C.B. 22 (Situa-
tion 5) (logging road depreciable over term of timber contract), unless the taxpayer elects to depre-
ciate the road under a method described in LR.C. § 168(e)(2).
21" Kennecott Copper Corp. v. United States, 347 F.2d 275 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (per curiam); Cush-
ing Stone Co. v. United States, 535 F.2d 27 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
212 55 T.C. 672 (1971), af'd, 453 F.2d 1324 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 842 (1972)
(holding that the expense of relocating an easement held by a power company across the surface
over the deposit was neither a development expense nor deductible under the working face
doctrine).
213 E.g., Copperhead Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 272 F.2d 45 (6th Cir. 1959).
21 Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(d)(4) (1971); Rev. Rul. 69-539, 1969-2 C.B. 141.
215 Treas. Reg. § 1.611-2(d), (e) (1972).
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mineral property by the present value method.
If the interest in the mineral deposit is represented by a lease, then the
lease itself must be valued. Since a lessee generally claims percentage deple-
tion, it is to his advantage to minimize the value attributed to the lease. In two
separate cases entitled Island Creek Coal Co. v. Commissioner,216 which in-
volved separate but similar acquisitions, the taxpayer argued that the leases
themselves had no value aside from nominal consideration ascribed to them in
the purchase contract. In both cases the taxpayer argued that the tangible as-
sets acquired in the transaction had a fair market value equal to or in excess of
the purchase price. Additionally, it was argued that the coal subject to the
leases was worth no more than the royalties payable under the leases. The Tax
Court agreed with the taxpayer in both cases concluding that the tangible
property had a fair market value at least equal to the purchase price and that
the leases had no value because the coal was worth no more than the royalty
obligations.
In Revenue Ruling 69-539, however, specifically responding to the Island
Creek Coal Co. cases, the IRS held that, "[o]nly in rare and extraordinary cir-
cumstances will a taxpayer acquire a going enterprise in which the mineral
leases have no value apart from the royalty that they specify for the lessor.
2 1 7
Even though the depreciable assets may have a value equal to the purchase
price, it will not be presumed that the lease has no value. Accordingly, the
lease should be valued and a basis allocated to it under the method prescribed
by the regulations discussed above. The Ruling cites numerous cases in which
the court held a lease to have value above the royalties paid.2 18 Nevertheless,
the issue remains one of fact. Although the result in the Island Creek Coal Co.
cases is supported by an affirmative fact finding that the leases had no value
based on a comparison of the value of the coal and the royalties paid, this is
not the sole determinative factor in valuing a mineral lease. Utilizing the stan-
dards specified in the regulations requires that consideration be given to the
earning capacity of the enterprise operating the lease, after the purchase based
on the conditions and circumstances known at the time of the purchase. 21 0
C. Exploration Expenses
I.R.C. § 617(a) allows the taxpayer to elect to currently deduct exploration
expenditures incurred before the development stage of the mine is reached.
Any such expenditures not deducted pursuant to a valid election must be capi-
2:1 21 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 727 (1962); 25 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 540 (1966).
217 1969-2 C.B. 140.
218 E.g., Lynch v. Alworth Stephens Co., 267 U.S. 364 (1925); Marsh Fork Coal Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 11 B.T.A. 685 (1928), acq., VII-1 C.B. 29, rev'd on other grounds, 42 F.2d 83 (1930); Milby
& Dow Coal & Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 24 B.T.A. 40 (1931), acq., 12-1 C.B. 8.
219 See, e.g., Taylor v. Commissioner, 9 B.T.A. 442 (1927) (finding lease had 1913 value based
on net operating profits reasonably expected notwithstanding no finding of royalty at less than
prevailing rate); see also Seneca Coal Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 2 B.T.A. 513 (1925) (using
analytical method to discount earnings to present value as of March 1, 1913).
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talized and recovered through depletion.2 0
If the taxpayer has deducted exploration expenditures pursuant to a valid
section 617 election, when the mine reaches the producing stage, the deducted
exploration expenditures are recaptured under one of two methods. The tax-
payer may affirmatively elect to include the amount of the previously deducted
expenditures (termed adjusted exploration expenditures) in income for the
year in which the mine reaches the producing stage.221 If the taxpayer so elects,
the amount of the adjusted exploration expenditures will be added to the de-
pletable basis of the coal deposit.
222
Alternatively, if no such election has been made, any depletion deduction
otherwise allowable with respect to the mine will be disallowed until the cumu-
lative amount of the disallowed depletion deductions attributable to the mine
equals the adjusted exploration expenditures subject to recapture. 223 Under
this method of recapture, since the depletable basis of the property has not
been increased by the exploration expenditures, the basis of the property is not
reduced by the amount of the depletion allowance that has been disallowed.
2 24
Generally, this alternative is preferable because it defers the incidence of tax.
While the first alternative results in increased depletion deductions, it requires
an earlier inclusion in income of an amount equal to the aggregate value of the
future cost depletion deductions attributable to the basis acquired as a result
of the inclusion, without any discounting factor. While this may be desirable if
the taxpayer has large losses in the recapture year, the second alternative de-
fers the impact of the recapture and spreads it over several years.
2 25
IV. PERCENTAGE DEPLETION
A. General Rules of Computation
Under I.R.C. § 613 the percentage depletion deduction for coal is equal to
ten percent of the taxpayer's gross income from the property.26 For purposes
of computing percentage depletion (and for purposes of I.R.C. § 61) gross in-
come from the property does not include any rents or royalties paid to a les-
sor. 227 Percentage depletion may not exceed fifty percent of the taxpayer's tax-
able income from the property (computed without reference to either cost or
percentage depletion).2 28 If the percentage depletion allowance is less than the
cost depletion allowance computed under I.R.C. § 611, a cost depletion deduc-
220 See Rev. Rul. 77-188, 1977-1 C.B. 76.
22, I.R.C. § 617(b)(1)(A) (1982). Any such election must cover all mines reaching the produc-
ing stage during the year and with respect to which exploration expenditures had been deducted.
Tress. Reg. § 1.617-3(a)(2) (1972).
222 Id.
223 I.R.C. § 617(b)(1)(B), (f)(1) (1976); Tress. Reg. §§ 1.617-3(a)(1)(i), 1.617-3(d) (1972).
224 I.R.C. § 617(e)(1) (1976); Tress. Reg. § 1.617-3(d)(ii) (1972).
220 See Trees. Reg. § 1.617-3(a)(1)(i) (1972) (regarding treatment of aggregated properties).
228 I.R.C. §§ 613(a) (1982), (b)(4) (1972); Tress. Reg. §§ 1.613-1, 1.613-2(a)(1)(iv) (1972).
227 I.R.C. § 613(a) (1981).
228 I.R.C. § 613(a) (1981); Tress. Reg. § 1.613-1 (1972).
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tion will be taken for the year.
229
Both cost depletion and percentage depletion require a reduction in the
basis of the property at the end of the year. However, even after the depletable
basis of the property has been reduced to zero, only percentage depletion is
available. 3 In years in which the taxpayer incurs a net operating loss with
respect to the property no percentage depletion deduction is allowed. Also
both cost depletion and percentage depletion deductions may be reduced as a
result of recapture of previously deducted exploration expenses under I.R.C. §
617(b)(1)(B).
I.R.C. § 291(a)(2) requires corporate taxpayers to reduce their percentage
depletion deduction otherwise allowable for the taxable year, by fifteen percent
of the amount by which the percentage depletion allowance computed under
I.R.C. § 613 exceeds the adjusted basis of the property at the close of the year,
before the reduction in basis required as a result of claiming the depletion al-
lowance. 23 ' Thus, after the basis of the property has been reduced to zero, as-
suming there are no further capital expenditures affecting the basis in the
property, the percentage depletion deduction is effectively reduced to eight
and one-half percent. This provision does not, however, affect individuals,
partnerships and Subchapter-S corporations.
There appears to be a lack of coordination between the disallowance of the
otherwise allowable depletion deduction mandated by I.R.C. § 617(b)(1)(B),
relating to recapture of previously deducted exploration expenditures, and the
reduction of the depletion deduction mandated by I.R.C. § 291(a)(2). If the
disallowance under § 617(b)(1)(B) is taken into account first, but the entire
depletion deduction for the year is not disallowed, and the reduction under
I.R.C. § 291(a)(2) is then applied to the depletion allowance as first reduced
under I.R.C. § 617(b)(1)(B), the net allowable deduction is greater than it
would be if the I.R.C. § 291(a)(2) reduction is computed with respect to the
depletion deduction otherwise allowable under I.R.C. § 613 without regard to
the disallowance under I.R.C. § 617(b)(1)(B). Although this must ultimately be
resolved by regulations, the intent of I.R.C. § 291(a)(2) was to effectively re-
duce the percentage depletion allowance to eight and one-half percent from ten
percent after the taxpayer's basis had been recovered.
232 Therefore, the reduc-
tion under I.R.C. § 291(a)(2) should be applied prior to the disallowance under
I.R.C. § 617(b)(1)(B).
Percentage depletion is computed separately for each "property" deter-
mined under I.R.C. § 614.233 The deduction must be separately computed for
each property, unless properties have been properly aggregated. This requires
individual computations of both gross income and taxable income from each
property.
220 Id.
250 Trees. Reg. § 1.611-2(b) (1972).
2 1 See I.R.C. §§ 291(a)(2), (e)(2) (Supp. Dec. 1982).
2 Compare S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 73-119 (1982) with H.R. REP. No. 760, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess., 478-79 (1982).
253 Tres. Reg. §§ 1.613-1(a) (1972), 1.611-1(d)(1)(i) (1973).
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The percentage depletion deduction is properly taken in the year the coal
is sold, not in the year that it was produced.234 This is based on the theory that
depletion follows income. For an accrual basis taxpayer, the proper year of ac-
crual of the income from the sale of coal will determine the year of the deple-
tion deduction for the coal.235 Accordingly, even if nonmining processes are ap-
plied to the coal, requiring that the depletion deduction be computed by
reference to the representative market or field price216 or proportional profits
method,23 7 rather than the sales price of the processed coal, the proper year for
claiming the deduction is the year of sale.
238
Income and depletion from the extraction and sale of coal should be com-
puted on the accrual basis and not on the cash basis. 39 In those few instances
when the holder of a coal royalty with an economic interest is not subject to
I.R.C. § 631(c) and is on the cash method of accounting, the proper year for
deducting depletion is the year of receipt of the royalty payment.2 40 This in-
cludes the following: holders of a royalty interest granted in consideration of
surface rights,2 4 1 holders of a royalty granted as a commission for negotiating
the acquisition of the coal property on which the royalty is based,2' 2 royalties
received by a lessor who does not meet the holding period requirement of
I.R.C. § 631(c), and royalties received in exchange for granting an option. 43
B. Exclusion of Rents or Royalties Paid in Respect of the Property
The purpose of excluding rents and royalties paid by the taxpayer with
respect to the property from gross income received from the property is to
prevent two different taxpayers from claiming depletion for the same in-
come.24 4 In most extractive industries, royalties received by a lessor are gener-
ally subject to depletion by the lessor.24 5 However, for coal, the lessor receives
134 Rev. Rul. 76-533, 1976-2 C.B. 189 (allowing percentage depletion for oil in year of sale
rather than year of production and transfer to a storage tank).
25 See Rev. Rul. 68-565, 1968-2 C.B. 189 (accrual basis lessor not subject to I.R.C. § 631(c)
claims depletion deduction in year right to royalties accrues); Rev. Rul. 76-533, 1976-2 C.B. 189 (oil
producer claims depletion deduction in year sale results in income under Treas. Reg. § 1.446-
1(c)(1)(ii)); Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co. v. Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 1425 (1928).
'3' See Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(c) (1972).
2'7 See Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(d) (1972).
218 Rev. Rul. 76-533, 1976-2 C.B. 189 (requiring percentage depletion of oil in year of sale and
denying taxpayer's deduction in year of transportation from the property for storage based on
Treas. Reg. § 1.613-3(a)) (1981).
2" Treas. Reg. § 1.471-1 (1960) requires the use of inventories whenever the production or sale
of merchandise is an income producing factor and Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(2)(i) (1973) requires
that inventories be computed under the accrual method of accounting.
240 Rev. Rul. 68-565, 1968-2 C.B. 263.
241 Omer v. United States, 329 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1964) (royalty for surface rights); Martin v.
United States, 409 F.2d 13 (6th Cir. 1969) (same); Rev. Rul. 79-144, 1979-1 C.B. 219.
242 See Cline v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 889 (1977), aff'd, 617 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1980) (tax-
payer negotiated coal leases as an agent for principal receiving as consideration a royalty on all
coal produced and sold from the leased premises); Rev. Rul. 77-84, 1977-1 C.B. 173 (same).
2 3 Rev. Rul. 73-80, 1973-1 C.B. 308.
244 See Helvering v. Twin Bell Oil Syndicate, 293 U.S. 312 (1934).
2'4 See, e.g., Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932); Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933);
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section 1231 treatment under I.R.C. § 631(c). This preferential treatment
serves the same function as percentage depletion, while simultaneously al-
lowing the benefits of cost depletion.2 4 8 Therefore, it is appropriate to exclude
from a lessee's gross income royalties paid to a lessor subject to § 631(c).2 4 7
Since the holder of a net profits royalty may deplete only the actual net
amount payable to him,248 the lessee must exclude only that net amount from
gross income from the property, and not the higher gross sales necessary to
generate, after deductions, the net profit royalty.
Advanced royalties paid with respect to a coal property are excluded from
gross income not in the year of payment or accrual, but in the year of sale of
the coal to which the royalties relate.24 9 Advanced royalties paid under a mini-
mum royalty provision are treated in the same manner as other advanced roy-
alties. This rule applies even if the taxpayer elects to deduct the advanced
royalties from gross income for purposes of I.R.C. § 63 in the year of payment
or accrual. The regulations allow such an election only for a minimum royalty
in a substantially uniform amount extending for the lessor for at least twenty
years or the term of the lease, including renewal or extension terms.2 50
Similar treatment is accorded lease bonus payments; the amount excluded
during each year is that portion of the bonus allocable to the mineral sold
during that year.251 The allocation, based on spreading the lease bonus over the
estimated reserves and excluding each year the amount allocated to the num-
ber of tons sold during the year, is much the same as cost depletion.2 5 2 It is
important to remember that although the bonus is excluded from gross income
from the property under I.R.C. § 613(a) for purposes of computing the deple-
tion allowance, for purposes of computing the lessee's taxable income the bo-
nus allocable to the year of production is neither excluded from gross income
under I.R.C. § 61 nor deductible under any section in determining taxable in-
come.253 There is no deduction because the payment of the bonus is a capital
expenditure to be recovered through depletion.2 5 Nevertheless, the bonus pay-
ment must be excluded from the lessee's gross income from the property be-
cause it is depletable to the lessor.2 "5 The effect of these provisions is to deny a
Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 599 (1946).
246 See, H.R. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 32 (1951), reprinted in 1951-2 C.B. 357, 380;
S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 42, 43 (1951), reprinted in 1951-2 C.B. 458, 488-89.
247 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-2(c)(5)(i) (Example) (1977).
248 See Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 599 (1946); Grandview Mines v. Com-
missioner, 282 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1960).
249 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.613-2(c)(5)(iii), 1.612-3(b)(3) (1977); Rev. Rul. 79-386, 1979-2 C.B. 246.
20 Rev. Rul. 79-386, 1979-2 C.B. 246; Tress. Reg. § 1.612-3(b)(3) (1977) (rededuction from
gross income under section 61).
251 Tress. Reg. § 1.613-2(c)(5)(ii) (1977); Rev. Rul. 79-73, 1979-1 C.B. 218.
252 Tress. Reg. § 1.613-2(c)(5)(ii) (Example 1) (1977).
253 Id.; Sunray Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 962 (10th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S.
861 (1945); Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Commissioner, 346 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1965); Rev. Rul. 73,
1979-1 C.B. 218.
254 Treas. Reg. § 1.612-3(a)(3) (1977); see Murphy Corp. v. United States, 337 F.2d 677 (8th
Cir. 1964).
25 Tress. Reg. § 1.612-3(a) (1977); but see Canadian River Gas Co. v. Higgins, 151 F.2d 954,
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lessee effective tax recovery of the expenditure of a lease bonus when the de-
pletion deduction is computed under I.R.C. § 613.
A production payment retained by a lessor is treated by I.R.C. § 636(c) as
a bonus payable in installments.2 5 Accordingly, the lessee must include in
gross income from the property the proceeds from the sale of coal applied to
the production payment.2 57 To determine the lessee's annual gross income from
the property for the purpose of computing the percentage depletion deduction,
the total production payment due is allocated equally to the estimated
reserves. That portion of the total payment due that bears the same relation-
ship to the total production payment as the coal produced and sold during the
year bears to the estimated reserves at the outset of the lease (or the properly
re-estimated amount) is excluded from gross income from the property each
year.25
Delay rentals are not "rents or royalties" within the meaning of I.R.C. §
613 and do not result in any exclusion from gross income259 This usually does
not present an issue unless delay rentals are paid for a portion of a year in
which production commences. Otherwise, there is no gross income from the
property. Delay rentals are deductible by the lessee in computing his overall
taxable income, however, unless the lessee elects to capitalize them under
I.R.C. § 266,260 which is generally not advisable.
Royalties excludable from gross income from the property include not only
royalties paid to a lessor, but also royalties paid to any other holder of an
economic interest. Thus royalties paid to the surface owner 16 or to another
person as compensation for negotiating the acquisition of the coal property
262
must be excluded if the royalties are depletable by the recipient.
Occasionally an issue arises regarding whether an item is a royalty exclud-
able from gross income or an expense deductible in computing taxable income.
In Leechburg Mining Co. v. Commissioner the taxpayer leased completely
equipped coal mining property, including plant and equipment for a royalty of
ten cents per ton of coal extracted and shipped from the premises, expressly
stated in the lease as attributable to the coal deposit, plus an additional roy-
957 (2d Cir. 1945) (Hand, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the lessee should be entitled to exclude
the bonus from gross income for all purposes). If the bonus were excluded from the lessee's gross
income under section 61, the payment of the bonus could not give rise to any depletable basis
under I.R.C. § 612.
216 This is an exception to the general rule of I.R.C. § 636(a) and (b) (1976) treating carved
out production payments and production payments retained in connection with the sale of mineral
property, respectively, as loans to the obligor from the holder of the right to payment. See infra
notes 514-17.
215 Treas. Reg. § 1.636-2(a) (1973).
258 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-2(e)(5)(ii) (Example 2) (1977).
259 Treas. Reg. § 1.612-3(c) (1977); see, e.g., Sneed v. Commissioner, 33 B.T.A. 478 (1935)
(delay rentals not deletable income to lessor).
210 Treas. Reg. § 1.612-3(c)(2) (1977).
261 See Omer v. United States, 329 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1964); see supra Section H.E.
262 See Cline v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 859 (1977), af/'d 617 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1980); Rev. Rul.
77-84, 1977-1 C.B. 173; Rev. Rul. 73-80, 1973-1 C.B. 308 (royalty received in consideration of trans-
fer of option); see supra Section II.E.
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alty of fifteen cents per ton attributable to the rental of the plant, machinery
and equipment." 3 The Tax Court rejected the taxpayer's argument that only
ten cents of the total royalty paid by the taxpayer-lessee was excludable in
computing percentage depletion, concluding that the "'property' here includes
the mineral deposit and also the plant and facilities.
2 4
If, however, the lessor of the equipment is not also the lessor of the coal
deposit, then rental measured as royalties will not be excluded by the lessee
from gross income from the property. In Brown v. Commissioner, the taxpayer
paid siding rentals of the greater of twenty-five dollars per month or seven
cents per ton shipped from the siding to a party who was not a lessor of any of
the mineral properties.28 5 The Tax Court held the Commissioner misapplied
Leechburg Mining Co. in requiring that the lessee exclude siding rentals from
gross income from the property in computing percentage depletion.
Payment of certain obligations of the lessor may also give rise to indirect
royalties that are excludable from the lessee's gross income from the property.
In Churchill Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner, the Tax Court held that the lessor
could include in gross income from the property, and thus claim depletion for
reimbursement from the lessee of the lessor's legal fees incurred in connection
with the lease.2 6 The corollary is the lessee must exclude the reimbursed legal
fees from gross income. The same result should follow, for example, if the
lessee paid broker's commissions with respect to the lease for which the lessor
was primarily liable. The same result does not necessarily follow, however, if
the obligation of the lessor that the lessee pays is unrelated to the mineral
property. In that case the payment would not fall within the court's logic in
Churchill Farms, Inc., which described the payment of the legal fees as part of
the formula for measuring the lessor's share of the total income from
production.
2 87
Payment of various taxes by the lessee is somewhat more complicated.
Several cases have held that the payment by a lessee of ad valorem taxes lev-
ied on minerals in place and imposed on the lessor under state law constituted
additional royalties to the lessor, includable in the lessor's gross income from
the property.18 The IRS asserted that such payments were not royalties be-
cause they were not dependent on production. The various courts, however,
rationalized that in the absence of the lessee's agreement to pay the ad
valorem taxes, the lessor would have demanded and received a higher royalty.
Payment of the taxes by the lessee was, therefore, part of the total production
26. 15 T.C. 22 (1950); see also Rev. Rul. 68-361, 1968-2 C.B. 264 (holding that entire royalty
received by lessor of working interest including plant and equipment is includable by the lessor in
gross income from the property).
26 15 T.C. at 25.
261 22 T.C. 58 (1954).
266 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 990 (1969), modified sub. nom., Bayou Verret Land Co. v. Commissioner,
450 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1971) (modified without discussion of the issue).
267 See Rev. Rul. 77-84, 1977-1 C.B. 173 (Situation 2).
268 E.g., Burt v. United States, 170 F. Supp. 953 (Ct. Cl. 1959); Higgins v. Commissioner, 33
T.C. 161 (1959); McLean v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 569 (1970), nonacq., 1972-2 C.B. 4; Handelman
v. United States, 357 F.2d 694 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
[Vol. 85
48
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 4 [1983], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol85/iss4/5
COAL DEPLETION ALLOWANCE
to which the lessor was entitled.
Consistent with this rule, in United States Steel Corporation v. United
States the court held that the lessee paying such ad valorem taxes was re-
quired to exclude the amount from its gross income from the property in com-
puting percentage depletion.289
In Revenue Ruling 72-165 the IRS abandoned its earlier position that re-
quired apportionment of the ad valorem tax liability between the lessor and
lessee based on the respective values of their interests, and announced that
insofar as ad valorem taxes were imposed on the lessor under state law, the
payment of these taxes by the lessee would constitute a royalty in the full
amount of the payment.270 Revenue Ruling 75-182 applied the same rule to a
lessee's payment of ad valorem taxes imposed on the holder of a net profits
interest. 71 In Revenue Ruling 72-165, however, the IRS ruled that such treat-
ment would be accorded only to the extent of income from production; if there
is no current production or if the amount of the tax exceeds the income from
current production, the IRS asserts that the payment (or the excess of the
taxes paid over the amount of income) constitutes a delay rental. 72 This treat-
ment is advantageous to the lessee and disadvantageous to the lessor.
In McLean v. Commissioner,273 however, the Tax Court did not so limit
the ad valorem taxes that were included in the lessor's gross income from the
property. McLean specifically allowed the lessor depletion on the amount of ad
valorem taxes paid by the lessee for the mineral deposit (but not the ad
valorem taxes imposed with respect to the surface) in years during which there
was no production, drawing various analogies to minimum royalties, lease bo-
nuses and advance royalties .2 7 Although all of these analogous items are de-
pletable to the lessor or, more frequently, subject to I.R.C. § 631(c) in the year
received or accrued, greater care must be devoted to the analogy to determine
the proper treatment of the lessee, particularly because the lessee may not ex-
clude a lease bonus item from gross income. In this case it would appear that
the minimum royalty analogy is most appropriate, and the payment should be
excluded from gross income of the lessee and included in the lessor's gross
income from the property.
Whether ad valorem taxes imposed on the lessor with respect to the sur-
face property but paid by the lessee should be included in the lessor's gross
269 270 F. Supp. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 445 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
917 (1972).
270 1975-1 C.B. 177. For the IRS's earlier position see Rev. Rul. 16, 1953-1 C.B. 173 and Rev.
Rul. 64-91, 1964-1 C.B. 219 (Part 1).
271 1975-1 C.B. 176.
272 1972-1 C.B. 177, 178.
273 54 T.C. 569 (1970).
274 The court noted that if there were no subsequent production the depletion deducted with
respect to the royalties would be recaptured. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.612-3(b)(2) (1977), 1.631-3(c)(2)
(1980). Some of the courts that were not presented with fact patterns in which ad valorem taxes
were actually paid in years in which income from production was less than the amount of the taxes
have suggested that the government's delay rental theory would be applicable if the facts were so
presented. See, e.g., Handelman v. United States, 357 F.2d 694 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
1983]
49
McMahon: The Coal Depletion Allowance Deduction
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1983
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
income from the property and excluded from lessee's gross income is also an
issue. The Tax Court held in Thornton v. Commissioner that such taxes were
includible in the lessor's gross income from the property.2 75 Since it now seems
accepted that royalties paid for equipment rental to the lessor of the mineral
deposit constitute gross income from the property for the lessor, excludable
from the lessee's gross income from the property,276 ad valorem taxes on the
surface paid by the lessee should be treated as additional royalties when the
lessor leases both the surface and the mineral deposit as in Thornton. If, how-
ever, the lessor leases only the surface to the lessee, and the lessee has acquired
the mineral rights from another source, ad valorem taxes imposed on the sur-
face lessor and paid by the lessee should be treated as royalties only if the
underlying rental obligation is expressed as a royalty.
Similar treatment is accorded severance taxes and state taxes measured by
production or gross receipts from mining for which the lessor is liable;277 the
lessee excludes from gross income from mining such taxes paid on the lessor's
behalf. Severance taxes for which the lessee is primarily liable are not excluded
from the lessee's gross income from mining.
27 8
C. Items Includable in Gross Income From Mining
The Code and regulations define gross income from the property as "gross
income from mining,"27 9 which means the "amount of income which is attribu-
table to the extraction of the ores or minerals from the ground and the applica-
tion of mining processes, including mining transportation."28 0
1. Lessors and Other Royalty Holders
For lessor or holder of a royalty interest, gross income from mining is not
generally difficult to compute. It is the amount of the royalty received or ac-
crued, including bonuses and advance royalties. It also includes certain taxes
paid by the lessor on behalf of the lessor, discussed in the preceding section.
Furthermore, in Revenue Ruling 68-361, the IRS held that a lessor's "gross
income from the property" subject to depletion includes royalties measured by
the lessee's production attributable to the leasing together with the mineral
275 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1471 (1970).
2716 See Rev. Rul. 68-361, 1968-2 C.B. 264.
277 Louisiana Land and Exploration Co. v. Donnelly, 394 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1968) (severance
taxes); Callahan Mining Corp. v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 1005 (1969), aff'd, 428 F.2d 721 (2d Cir.)
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 903 (1970) (gross production tax levied on owner of net profits interest);
Rev. Rul. 182, 1975-1 C.B. 176 (gross production tax levied on average net profits interest); see also
Wood v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 528 (1958), rev'd, 274 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1960).
278 See Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co. v. United States, 600 F.2d 1343 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (Tax-
payer unsuccessfully argued in an attempt to increase its gross income from the extraction of oil
for purposes of computing percentage depletion that oil and gas royalties paid to United States
under 43 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(9) (1976), measured by the amount of severance taxes formerly paid to
states, was a severance tax rather than a royalty).
279 I.R.C. § 613(c)(1) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(a) (1972).
280 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(a) (1972); I.R.C. § 613(c)(2) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
[Vol. 85
50
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 4 [1983], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol85/iss4/5
COAL DEPLETION ALLOWANCE
property of plant and equipment.28' This ruling was based on the decision of
Leechburg Mining Co. v. Commissioner, which held the lessee was required to
exclude such rentals from gross income from the property in computing his
depletion deduction." If, however, the lessor of equipment does not concur-
rently lease the coal deposit with respect to which the plant and equipment are
used, the rent for such equipment and plant, even if measured by production,
will not be gross income from mining subject to depletion.
28 3
The treatment accorded by Revenue Ruling 68-361 is highly advantageous
because the lessor is entitled to recover the basis of the equipment and plant
through depreciation under I.R.C. § 167, or for plant and equipment first
placed in service after 1980 through cost recovery under I.R.C. § 168, rather
than through depletion.28 4 Thus, the same income flow is sheltered by both
depreciation or ACRS deductions and either a depletion deduction or, more
often, section 1231 treatment under I.R.C. § 631(c).
Although there are no cases or rulings directly on point, rental for plant
and equipment measured by production and includable as gross income from
the property should be depletable ordinary income rather than produce capital
gains under I.R.C. § 631(c). In Omer v. United States28 5 and Martin v. United
States2s6 the Sixth Circuit held that royalties attributable to surface rights
were not subject to I.R.C. § 631(c). Although in Omer the lessor of the surface
rights did not concurrently lease the coal deposit to the lessee who paid the
royalties, in Martin the lessor leased both the coal deposit and surface rights
to the lessee. The royalty attributable to the surface rights in Martin was,
however, separately stated. In Revenue Ruling 79-144, the IRS followed the
Omer and Martin decisions and held that royalties received under a surface
lease were not eligible for capital gains treatment under I.R.C. § 631(c) when
the lessor concurrently leased the underlying coal deposit in a separate lease
subject to § 631(c).28 7
These authorities indicate that where a royalty for the rental of plant and
equipment is separately stated in the lease, that royalty will be ordinary in-
come subject to depletion rather than proceeds from the disposal of coal eligi-
ble for capital gains treatment under I.R.C. § 631(c). Logically, the result
should not differ if there is only one lease and the royalty attributable to the
coal extracted and the royalty attributable to the use of plant and equipment
are not separately stated. Principles analogous to those that are required to be
used to apportion a cost basis on the purchase of coal property, surface rights
and plant and equipment for a lump sum purchase price should be applied,28 8
281 1968-2 C.B. 264, revoking Rev. Rul. 54-548, 1954-2 C.B. 91.
282 15 T.C. 22 (1950).
2183 See Brown v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 58 (1954), discussed in text supra at note 265.
284 Keystone Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 1008 (1958), acq., 1968-2 C.B. 2; Rev. Rul.
361, 1968-2 C.B. 264; see also Choate v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 1 (1945).
288 329 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1964).
286 409 F.2d 13 (6th Cir. 1969).
287 1979-1 C.B. 219.
288 See supra notes 218-21 and accompanying text.
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and the portion of the royalty allocable to the plant and equipment ascer-
tained. In a recent private letter ruling, however, the IRS held that the lessor
of surface rights and underlying coal rights was not required to make such an
apportionment where a single lease instrument required only a stipulated roy-
alty for each ton of coal mined from the property, unapportioned between the
surface rights and the deposit.289 Accordingly, the lessor treated the entire roy-
alty as proceeds from the disposition of coal eligible for capital gains treatment
under I.R.C. § 631(c).
The logic of the ruling, however, is not applicable to royalties received as
rental for plant and equipment. First, the lease required the lessee to reclaim
the surface after strip mining. Thus, concluded the ruling "the lessor will suffer
no loss due to the use of his asset during mining." Plant and equipment, how-
ever, will depreciate through normal wear and tear. Second, the IRS concluded
where the same person owns both the surface and coal deposit, many of the
surface rights expressly conveyed, would be "conferred by necessary implica-
tion," even absent an express grant. From this, the ruling concludes that the
payment of the royalty represented "a sharing of the mineral when produced,"
and it was "not considered payment for any of the implied rights and privi-
leges obtained by the lessee as a result of the lease." Such logic is not applica-
ble to plant and equipment because the leasing of a coal deposit does not con-
vey any rights in the lessor's plant and equipment by necessary implication.
Therefore, the royalty attributable to plant and equipment, if not separately
stated, should be determined by apportionment.
2. Operators
The computation of gross income from mining for an operator is much
more complex than is the computation for a lessor. Subject to reduction for
trade and cash discounts, gross income from mining means the amount for
which coal is sold by the operator if no nonmining processes or nonmining
transportation is applied to the coal. 290 If nonmining processes or nonmining
transportation is applied to the coal the entire sales price of the coal does not
represent gross income from mining; only a portion of the sales price will be
included in gross income from mining."" Selling expenses such as broker's
commissions, are not excluded from gross income from mining.292 Recapture of
previously deducted mine exploration expenses if the taxpayer elects the in-
come inclusion method of recapture under I.R.C. § 617(b)(1)(A) is excluded
from gross income from mining.
293
a. Miscellaneous receipts and expenses. Various other receipts accrued
289 Private Letter Ruling 7905006.
290 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(b)(1) (1972). For the required adjustments see Treas. Reg. § 1.613-
4(e)(7) (1972). These regulations reverse the result in Montreal Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 2
T.C. 688 (1943), and Rev. Rul. 60-257, 1960-2 C.B. 197 regarding cash discounts.
29 See infra, Section IV. D.
292 Rev. Rul. 60-98, 1960-1 C.B. 252 (applying principle to del credere agency).
29 Treas. Reg. § 1.617-3(a)(2) (1972); see generally H.R. REP. No. 1237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966), reprinted in 1966-2 C.B. 777, 782 (elections shall be in manner prescribed by secretary).
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in the operation of a mining business are excluded from gross income from
mining. Thus if an operator furnishes housing, food, supplies or services to
employees at a price calculated to return its cost or its cost plus a reasonable
profit, the receipts from any such nonmineral producing activity are not in-
cluded in gross income from mining.2 94 Concomitantly, the provision of such
goods and services at an intentional loss, a form of wages to miners, does not
reduce gross income from mining,29 5 although it will reduce the taxable income
from mining, thus having an indirect limiting effect on the amount of the per-
centage depletion deduction.
Similarly, Monroe Coal Mining Co. v. Commissioner held that proceeds
from the sale of discarded mine equipment were not includable in gross income
from mining.2 8 The court reached this result even though it assumed arguendo
that the cost had been deducted in prior years and had reduced the net income
from the property, concluding that such treatment did not compel an inclusion
in gross income from the property. The earlier deduction had not reduced the
gross income from the property-the base on which percentage depletion is
allowed.
Nor does gross income from the property include the cost of using coal on
the mine premises. In Roundup Coal Mining Co. v. Commissioner,2 ' the Tax
Court held that a mine operation may not include in gross income from mining
any amount expressed in dollars attributable to coal consumed on the mine
premises to produce power. The taxpayer had included in gross income from
mining the sales value of the coal so consumed. But the Tax Court concluded
that the taxpayer had neither income nor a business deduction from the use of
the coal and accordingly disallowed the depletion deduction; the cost of the
coal to the taxpayer was adequately reflected in the exclusion of royalties paid.
In Guthrie v. United States,9 8 the Sixth Circuit held that proceeds re-
ceived from a business interruption insurance policy were not includable in
gross income from mining. The taxpayer argued for inclusion because the pro-
ceeds were paid due to the destruction by fire of its tipple and screening facil-
ity. Following the fire the taxpayer constructed a temporary tipple, but it was
able to produce only five grades of coal, as opposed to twenty-seven grades
produced prior to the fire, resulting in diminished sales proceeds from its coal
production because of decreased prices. Thus, the taxpayer argued, gross in-
come from mining included money received as compensation for the inability
to market coal at the higher prices it could obtain from better grading of its
coal. Citing the Supreme Court decision in Helvering v. Mountain Producers
Corp.,299 the Sixth Circuit concluded that it was not free to fashion a theoreti-
294 Repplier Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 140 F.2d 554 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 323 U.S. 736
(1944); Dorothy Glen Coal Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 1154 (1938); Rev. Rul. 56-433,
1956-2 C.B. 332.
219 Rev. Rul. 56-433, 1956-2 C.B. 332.
29 7 T.C. 1334 (1946).
297 20 T.C. 388 (1953), acq. and nonacq. on other issues, 1954-1 C.B. 6.
299 323 F.2d 142 (6th Cir. 1963).
99 303 U.S. 376 (1938) (holding that gross income from the property included only the sales
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cal definition of gross income from the property and excluded the insurance
proceeds from gross income from the property.
However, Amherst Coal Co. v. United States held that damages received
by a mine operator in settlement of a breach of contract claim based on the
refusal of a purchaser to accept delivery under a contract for the purchase of
coal at a fixed price were includable in gross income from mining.300 The dam-
ages were measured by the difference between the contract price and the lower
spot marked prices at which the coal was actually sold. The court distinguished
Guthrie as involving payments in lieu of processing not performed, whereas in
the instant case, the damages were "in legal effect a part of the sale price for
coal actually extracted.
3 0 1
Even if Guthrie is not distinguishable, there is some basis for arguing that
Guthrie is theoretically incorrectly decided and Amherst Coal Co. is correctly
decided. Arguably, in Guthrie the proceeds of the insurance attributable solely
to the lost profits from the unapplied mining processes should be a part of the
sales price as much as breach of contract damages. A major stumbling block,
however, is that the unapplied processes were hypothetical: it could not have
been determined with accuracy what actually would have been received had
the coal been graded, because it was not graded. Thus as a practical matter it
would be impossible for the taxpayer to meet the requisite burden of proof.
The IRS has taken the position in Revenue Ruling 77-57 that Amherst
Coal Company was incorrectly decided and has ruled that damages received by
a mine operator for breach of contract to purchase a mineral are not gross
income from mining.3 2 The Ruling fails to consider the impact of the enact-
ment of former I.R.C. § 1305(b) in 1957,303 and its repeal in 1963 as part of the
enactment of the general income averaging provisions. Under that provision,
which limited the tax on damage awards to the amount of tax that would have
been imposed if the damage award had instead been received in the earlier
year upon performance of the contract, damages received by the seller upon a
purchaser's breach of contract to purchase, less the cost of recovering the dam-
ages, were subject to depletion. 0'
The committee reports accompanying the enactment of former I.R.C. §
1305(b) support the view that Congress thought it was merely codifying then
current law regarding depletion for damage awards rather than enacting a new
substantive rule of law. The reports state, "[s]ubsection (b) of the new section
1305 is intended to make it clear that for the purpose of computing credits
and deductions for depletion and other items the award is to have the same
character as the income which would have been received or accrued except for
price of oil and did not include that part of the production cost defrayed by a refining company
under its contract with the taxpayer to purchase the oil).
300 295 F. Supp. 421 (S.D. W. Va. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 27 A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) 1 71-358 (4th
Cir. 1971).
101 Id. at 445.
302 1977-1 C.B. 168.
:03 Pub. L. No. 85-165 § 1, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 71 Stat. 413.
" S. REP. No. 836, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957), reprinted in 1957-2 C.B. 1071, 1074.
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the breach of contract or duty."3"5 Although there is some weak indication to
the contrary, the clearest authority indicates that for years prior to 1957 dam-
ages for conversion of natural resources were depletable if the taxpayer proved
the amount of damages attributable to the claim for conversion as opposed to
other claims adjudicated in the same action.306
If the 1957 Act was merely a codification of Congress' understanding of
the then existing law, the subsequent repeal of former I.R.C. § 1305(b) as part
of the enactment of the general income averaging provisions in the Revenue
Act of 1964, should not affect the result and Amherst Coal Co. should be good
law. This is the better understanding of the chain of authorities in this area.
The committee reports accompanying the Revenue Act of 1964 are silent re-
garding the intended or expected effect of the changes on depletion for dam-
ages,307 and therefore provide no additional guidance.
Finally, the IRS has ruled that "gross income from the property" includes
the excise tax imposed under the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1977, which is
separately stated on a sales invoice.308 The rationale is that the excise tax lia-
bility is that of the coal mine operator and may not be assessed on the pur-
chaser of the coal. Accordingly, the statement of the excise tax is merely an
increase in salesprice, includable in income under I.R.C. § 61. Because the tax
is the liability of the producer, its payment does not reduce gross income from
the property.
b. Extraction from Waste and Refuse. I.R.C. § 613(c)(3) provides that
the term "mining" includes the extraction by a mine owner or operator of min-
erals from the waste or residue of prior mining or treatment processes consid-
ered as mining.309 The statute also expressly provides that such rule does not
apply to "extraction of the mineral. . . by a purchaser of such waste or resi-
due or of the rights to extract ... minerals therefrom.
3 10
Prior to the enactment of I.R.C. § 613(c)(3) the courts had determined a
taxpayer's right to deplete income derived from the extraction of minerals
from waste or refuse deposits by reference to his rights in the deposit from
305 Id. (emphasis added).
"' Compare Estate of Arnett v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 320 (1958) (allowing depletion of dam-
ages for conversion of oil, but not on interest on judgment) with Alphonzo E. Bell Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 145 F.2d 157 (9th Cir. 1944) (denying depletion where claim for conversion of oil and
other related claims were compromised for a lump sum and the taxpayer failed to prove the
amount of the settlement allocable to the claim for conversion of the oil). In Crossett Timber &
Dev. Co. v. Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 705 (1934) the Board held that damages paid to a lessor for
lessee's breach of contract in failing to extract oil and gas was not depletable. That decision was
clearly correct since there was no depletion of the mineral and the situation in that case is not
analogous to Amherst Coal Co. v. Commissioner.
307 See S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in 1964-1 (part 2) C.B. 505,
643-49; H.R. RE. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), reprinted in 1964-1 (part 2) C.B. 125,
23339, 416-33.
SO Rev. Rul. 79-27, 1979-1 C.B. 217.
3o* See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.613-4(f)(1), -4(i) (1973). If the waste or residue results from a nonmin-
ing process no depletion is available for extraction from the waste. Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(i) (1973).
310 I.R.C. § 613(c)(3) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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which the waste had been produced. In Kohinoor Coal Co. v. Commissioner,31'
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that a lessee having only the right to
extract coal from a culm bank was not entitled to depletion. The deposit was
not natural and therefore not a mine, and the taxpayer had no rights to the
mine from which the waste was produced.
In Turkey Run Fuels, Inc. v. United States,312 however, the lessor to the
taxpayer in Kohinoor Coal Co., was allowed the depletion deduction for the
royalties paid by Kohinoor Coal Co. for the right to extract coal from the culm
bank. The lessor was also the owner of the mine from which the waste had
been produced. It was of no consequence that the mine itself was leased to a
different taxpayer or that the culm banks had accumulated while the tax-
payer's predecessors in interest had owned the mine.
Although in Turkey Run Fuels, Inc. it appears that the taxpayer derived
ownership through a continuous chain of nontaxable transactions (inheritance
and corporate organization and reorganization) back to the opening of the
mine, a different situation was presented in New Idria Quicksilver Mining Co.
v. Commissioner.3 1  The taxpayer acquired by purchase a quicksilver mining
property, including mines and ore dumps which had been previously produced
from the purchased mines. The court allowed the taxpayer's claim for deple-
tion on the income received from working the ore dumps, stating, "[tihere is no
legal distinction between the rights of the successor in interest and the original
owner with respect to the depletion claimed.
3 14
That rule, however, apparently did not survive the enactment of I.R.C. §
613(c). The regulations specifically state the "mining" includes "the extraction
by mine owners or operators of ores or minerals from waste or residue of their
prior mining and by persons who have acquired their right by purchase, even
though such waste or residue is acquired merely as an incidental part of the
entire mineral enterprise. '31 But if the mineral property (including the waste
or refuse) was acquired in a tax-free exchange, such as a corporate reorganiza-
tion, from a person who was entitled to a depletion allowance deduction upon
such ores or minerals produced from such waste or residue, then depletion will
be available to the transferee.3 18 Presumably this rule should apply whenever
both the mines and refuse are transferred in any transaction in which the
transferee's basis is determined with reference to the transferor's basis, such as
corporate organizations, 317 partnership organizations, 318 gifts,319 and to trans-
3,, 171 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1948), afg 6 T.C.M. (CCH) 1078 (1947), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 924
(1949).
3-2 243 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1957), aff'g 139 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (Under present law such
royalty payments would be accorded capital gains treatment rather than be included in ordinary
income and subject to depletion under 631(c).
3.3 144 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1944).
314 Id. at 921.
3,1 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(i) (1973) (emphasis added).
316 Id.
3,7 See I.R.C. §§ 351, 362 (1976 & Supp IV 1980).
318 See I.R.C. §§ 721, 723 (1976).
31 See I.R.C. §§ 102, 1015 (1976).
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fers at death, 20 which are tax free but result in a basis adjustment. Thus, Tur-
key Run Fuels, Inc. should still be good law. Furthermore, if the tax-free na-
ture of the exchange is significant, like kind exchanges under I.R.C. § 1031 may
also qualify even though basis is determined with reference to the property
exchanged by the transferee and not with reference to the transferor's basis.
3 21
The presence of "boot" in such transactions, rendering the transaction par-
tially taxable, may create a problem, but there are no authorities providing any
direct guidance.
In Franciosa v. United States,322 one of the few cases arising under I.R.C.
§ 613(c), the court correctly held that a taxpayer who had acquired rights to
extract coal from silt deposited in the bed and banks of a river as a result of
up-river mining by his grantor and by others was not entitled to depletion. In
doing so, however, the court explained that it denied depletion because it was
not certain all of the coal and refuse was produced by mines operated by the
taxpayer's grantor. The court implied that a different result might be reached
under I.R.C. § 613(c) on facts similar to Kohinoor Coal Co.323 Any such sugges-
tion is unwarranted. Not only is the factual distinction irrelevant, but the prin-
ciple of Kohinoor Coal Co. is even more strongly expressed under I.R.C. §
613(c) and the regulations. No successor in interest by purchase is entitled to
depletion of income derived by the extraction of coal from refuse or culm
banks, even if the refuse is acquired as part of the acquisition of the entire
mine. Although the result may seem harsh, the regulations are not an arbitrary
and unreasonable interpretation of the disjunctive construction of the second
sentence of I.R.C. § 613(c)(3)3 24 and the legislative history of the section2 25
c. Treatment Processes and Transportation. Gross income from mining
includes not only the income attributable to the extraction of the coal, but also
income attributable to treatment processes applied by the mine owner or oper-
ator considered as mining and "mining transportation" not in excess of fifty
miles from the point of extraction to plants or mills where such treatment
320 See I.R.C. §§ 102, 1014 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
2 See I.R.C. § 1031(d) (1976).
322 231 F. Supp. 952 (E.D. Pa. 1964). The court also rejected the argument that because the
coal bearing silt had been in the ground for many years and a great amount of overburden had
settled over it, the coal bearing silt had become a natural deposit. Id. at 954.
23 Id. at 953.
2 "The preceeding sentence shall not apply to any extraction of the mineral or ore by a
purchaser of such waste or residue or of the rights to extract ores or minerals therefrom." I.R.C. §
613(c)(3) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (emphasis added).
2 See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A185, A186 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4017, 4325.
The term "extraction of ores or minerals from the ground ... includes the extrac-
tion by mine owners or operators of ores or minerals from the waste or residue of their
prior mining. Thus a depletion allowance may be permitted when based on the extrac-
tion of minerals or ores from waste or residue of mining, such as a tailings dump or culm
bank, if performed by the mine owner or operators."
Id. (emphasis added). Although the emphasized language in the second sentence standing alone
would support a continued application of the New Idria Quicksilver Mining Co..rule, the empha-
sized language in the first sentence supports the regulations. See also S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 79 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 4621, 4712.
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processes are applied.2
Treatment processes considered as mining with respect to coal are speci-
fied in I.R.C. § 613(c)(4)(A) as cleaning, breaking, sizing, dust allaying, treating
to prevent freezing, and loading for shipment.2 7 A specific definition of each of
these processes is provided in Revenue Procedure 78-19.328 In addition to the
processes specified in I.R.C. § 613(c)(4)(A), because coal is customarily sold in
the form of a crude mineral product, any of the processes specified in I.R.C. §
613(c)(4)(C) may be applied to coal and be treated as mining.
3 29
Under I.R.C. § 613(c)(2) any treatment "necessary or incidental" to the
326 I.R.C. § 613(c)(2) (1976 and Supp. IV 1980); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.613-4(a), (0(1) (1973).
127 I.R.C. § 613(c)(4)(A) (1976 and Supp. IV 1980). See Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(f)(2)(i) (1973).
328 1978-2 C.B. 491. The definitions provided in the Revenue Procedure are as follows:
BREAKING, Sections 613(c)(4)(A) ... , Sections 1.613-4(0(2)(i)(a) and 1.613-
4(f)(2)(i)(b).
Breaking, with respect to coal, is the first stage in preparation subsequent to mining
and prior to cleaning.
Breaker: In anthracite mining, the breaker is the structure in which coal is broken,
sized, and cleaned for market.
Coal Breaker: A coal breaker is a building containing the machinery for breaking
coal with toothed rolls, sizing it with sieves, and cleaning it for market.
Tipple: Originally the tipple was the place where mine cars were tipped and emptied
of their coal. The term is still used in that sense, although it is now more generally
applied to the surface structures of a coal mine, including the preparation plant and
tracks. It also includes the tracks, trestle, screens, etc., used at the entrance of a colliery
where coal is screened and loaded.
CLEANING, Sections 613(c)(4)(A) . . .; Sections 1.613-4(f)(2)(i)(a) and 1.613-
4(f)(2)(i)(b). Also see Section 1.613-4(0(5)(iv).
Cleaning refers to the removal of slate, bone, and other impurities contained in mine
run coal, ....
DUST ALLAYING, Section 613(c)(4)(A); Section 1.613(f)(2)(i)(a).
Dust allaying is the application of a fine oil spray or mist to coal for the purpose of
reducing or subduing in intensity or severity the amount of dust. Dust allaying is used
principally for coal sold on the domestic homeowners' market.
LOADING FOR SHIPMENT, Section 613(c)(4)(A), .. and 613(c)(4)(C); Sections
1.613-4(f)(2)(i)(a), 1.613-4(f)(2)(i)(b), and 1.613-4(f)(2)(i)(c)(2).
Loading for shipment is the allowable mining process of conveying the appropriate
mineral product into vehicles of transporation.
SIZING, Section 613(c)(4)(A); Section 1.613-4(f)(2)(i)(a).
Sizing is the process of separating mixed particles into groups of particles all of the
same size, or into groups in which all particles range between definite maximum and
minimum sizes.
TREATING TO PREVENT FREEZING, Section 613(c)(4)(A); Section 1.613-
4(f)(2)(i)(a).
A treatment to prevent freezing with respect to coal is the application of calcium
chloride or other material to coal to prevent the coal from freezing in the car during
transportation.
Id. at 492-98.
119 See Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(0(2) (1973).
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statutory processes will also be treated as mining.330 This is a factual determi-
nation, but the regulations provide some guidelines:
A process is necessary to another related process if it is prerequisite to the
performance of the other process .... A process is 'incidental' to another re-
lated process if the cost thereof is insubstantial in relation to the cost of the
other process, or if the process is merely the coincidental result of the applica-
tion of the other process. For example, the sprinkling of coal prior to loading
for shipment, with dots of paper to identify the coal for trade name purposes
will be considered incidental to the loading where the cost of that sprinkling is
insubstantial in relation to the cost of the loading process.3 3 1
Pursuant to I.R.C. § 613(c)(4)(I) the regulations specify a limited number
of additional processes that will also be treated as mining.3 32 However, none of
the processes specified in I.R.C. § 613(c)(5) will be treated as mining unless
otherwise provided in the regulations or unless they are necessary or incidental
to any of the treatment processes considered as mining.333 Among the pro-
scribed processes are fine pulverization, blending with other materials, treat-
ment effecting a chemical change and thermal action. For example, coking of
coal is a "thermal action" effecting a chemical change that is not a mining
process.3 3 ' Similarly, liquification or gasification of coal would be a nonmining
process under these standards.
Finally, the regulations provide that the application of any nonmining pro-
cess cuts off the mining phase of operations and the subsequent application of
what would have otherwise been a mining process will not be considered as
such.3 3 5 For example, loading coked coal for shipment is not a mining process.
The treatment processes that may be considered as mining are actually
considered to be mining only if they are applied by the mine owner or opera-
tor. 336 Treatment processes applied by a purchaser are not mining even though
they would have been considered as mining if applied by the mine owner or
operator.3 Presumably the owner or operator must retain title through the
application of the treatment process. However, the owner or operator should
not be required to apply the treatment processes considered as mining with his
own employees; the use of an independent contractor should be permitted.
If, however, that contractor is also the purchaser, the treatment process
may not be considered mining. Revenue Ruling 74-568 involved a mine owner,
X, who leased a coal deposit from y.338 Under a separate agreement X sold
coal to Y at an agreed upon price of 10.75 x dollars per ton for washed coal
30 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(f)(2)(iii) (1972).
331 Id.
33 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(f)(5) (1972).
:33 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(g)(1), (6) (1972).
34 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(g)(6)(viii) (1972).
Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(g)(2) (1972).
I.R.C. § 613(c)(4) (1980); Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(f)(2)(i)(1) (1972).
Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(f)(2)(iv) (1972). Rowe v. United States, 655 F.2d 1065 (Ct. Cl. 1981);
Nicewonder v. United States, 81-2 USTC 9723 (W.D. Va. 1981).
3" 1974-2 C.B. 183.
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(including lx dollars per ton for transportation) or 9.25 x dollars per ton for
unwashed coal (including lx dollars per ton for transportation). A third agree-
ment provided that Y would crush and wash on X's behalf coal mined from the
leased property and sold to Y at the charge of 1.50 x dollars per ton. The
agreement did not provide for crushing and washing coal to be sold to anyone
else. The IRS concluded that notwithstanding the existence of separate con-
tracts, in substance, the actual agreement between the parties was for the sale
of unwashed coal. Therefore, the crushing and washing costs were excluded
from X's gross income from mining. Furthermore, since X did not apply any
mining processes at the point of delivery, the transporation component of the
delivered price was not mining transportation. s39 One could reasonably con-
clude that a different result regarding both the washing and crushing costs and
the transportation costs may have been reached if X had a general contract
with Y for washing substantially all of the coal mined by X, and Y did not
purchase substantially all of the coal washed under the agreement.
If the operator applies any nonmining processes to the coal, percentage
depletion cannot be computed with reference to the sales price of the coal.340
Instead the taxpayer must use an alternative method; generally either the rep-
resentative market or field price method,3 41 or the proportionate profits
method.34 2 Similarly, the sales price of coal may not be used as the base for
computing percentage depletion if the coal has been subjected to nonmining
transportation.
"Mining" includes only transportation of up to fifty miles between the
point of extraction* and the plants or mills in which treatment processes
treated as mining are applied.343 A greater distance may be allowed if the Com-
missioner finds that "physical and other requirements" are such that a greater
transportation distance is necessary.344 Apparently the taxpa:rer must factually
demonstrate that it is physically impossible to locate the processing plant
within fifty miles of the mine. Economic considerations alone will not be suffi-
cient to justify a greater transportation distance being treated as mining 3 5
Thus, the mere fact that the taxpayer already owns a treatment facility located
more than fifty miles from the mine and desires to avoid the expense of con-
structing a duplicate facility will not be sufficient.
Even if the total distance of what would otherwise be mining transporta-
tion is more than fifty miles, the first fifty miles will be allowed as mining
transportation as long as the coal is subjected to a mining process by the oper-
33 See Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(g)(3) (1972).
340 See Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(b) (1972).
" Tress. Reg. § 1.613-4(c) (1972).
342 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(d) (1972).
343 I.R.C. § 613(c)(2) (1980); Tress. Reg. § 1.613-4(f)(1)(iii) (1972). See generally Updegraft &
Zychick, Transportation of Crude Mineral Production By Mine Owners And Its Effect on Hard
Minerals Depletion Allowance, 35 TAx LAW. 367, 369-78 (1982).
Il Tress. Reg. § 1.613-4(h) (1972) (specifies the procedures for filing such an application); see
generally Updegraft & Zychick supra note 343, at 378-81.
'1 Rev. Rul. 73-557, 1973-2 C.B. 205.
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ator at the destination.34 6 But transportation primarily for the purpose of mar-
keting, distribution or delivery for the application of nonmining processes is
not considered mining.347 Thus, "mining transportation" does not include the
following: transportation of a mineral from the point of extraction to a non-
mining facility, from a mining facility to a nonmining facility, from one non-
mining facility to another, and from a nonmining facility to a customer.4 s For
example, the expenses of transportation of coal by slurry pipeline for the pur-
pose of delivery for sale would be nonmining transportation.3 4 9 Since coal is
not generally subjected to any mining process that subsequently requires dry-
ing to remove free water, the separation of the coal from the water at the deliv-
ery end of the slurry pipeline similarly is not a mining process.350 It is impor-
tant to note in this context that mining processes can be applied only by the
operator. If a process that would be "mining" if applied by the operator is
applied by a purchaser, the applicaton of the process is not mining.351 If the
treatment process is applied by or on behalf of a purchaser, the transportation
to the treatment or processing plant, therefore, is not mining transportation
but rather, it is transportation primarily for marketing.
3 52
This principle is illustrated by two recent cases, Rowe v. United States
5
1
and Nicewonder v. United States.354 In Rowe the taxpayer strip mined coal
but did not perform any treatment processes. Rather, he transported the coal
twenty miles or less to the tipple of Virginia Iron Coal and Coke Company,
which inspected the coal and if it was acceptable, bought it and then cleaned,
broke, sized, weighed and shipped it to its own customers to whom it had re-
sold the coal. The court rejected the taxpayer's argument that the statute and
regulations did not require that the process be applied by the mine owner or
operator to be considered mining. Since it was undisputed the coal was sold
prior to the application of the processing, the application of the processing, by
the purchaser, was not mining. Because the processing was not mining, the
transportation to the processing plant could not be mining. The court rejected
the taxpayer's contention that this construction was unreasonable because it
resulted in different tax treatment for the first fifty miles of transportation
from the mine depending on who applied the treatment process, and that Con-
gress could not have intended such a discrimination.
Nicewonder presented a similar factual pattern. The taxpayer delivered
coal in the state in which it had been extracted by strip mining to two of
Clinchfield Coal Company's tipples, where it received a price per ton for the
amount which was accepted. The taxpayer, however, maintained one employee
546 Rev. Rul. 77-457, 1977-2 C.B. 207.
347 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(g)(3) (1972).
348 See Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(d)(3)(i) (1972).
349 See Rev. Rul. 73-474, 1973-2 C.B. 201.
310 Compare this situation with that involving a mineral described in I.R.C. § 613(c)(4)(D)
(1980).
551 I.R.C. § 613(e)(4) (1980); Tress. Reg. § 1.613-4(f)(2)(i)(a), (iv) (1972).
552 Rev. Rul. 74-568, 1974-2 C.B. 183; see supra text accompanying note 339.
"' 655 F.2d 1065 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
3- 81-2 USTC 9723 (W.D. Va. 1981).
1983]
61
McMahon: The Coal Depletion Allowance Deduction
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1983
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
at one of the tipples, who was stationed at the breaker and whose duties in-
cluded manual breaking where necessary to permit coal to pass through the
screen. The employee was stationed there because Clinchfield Coal Company
required either that the coal be delivered in small chunks or that taxpayer
supply the labor at the tipple. The court concluded the transportation was pri-
marily for the purpose of marketing; the taxpayer's employee stationed at the
tipple merely assisted in unloading. This conclusion rested on the finding that
the coal was marketable in its raw state. Furthermore, even if the transporta-
tion was not primarily for marketing, the treatment process was applied by the
purchasser (not by the taxpayer) and was, therefore, a nonmining activity.
Thus, transportation from the mine to the tipple was not mining transporta-
tion. Apparently, the taxpayer's employee's activities were considered too de
minimus to constitute the application of "breaking" by the taxpayer at the
tipple, but the court did not directly address this issue in its alternative basis
for holding that the transportation was not mining transportation.
In both Nicewonder and Rowe, the court rejected on procedural
grounds-the taxpayer's failure to adequately state the claim in the refund ap-
plication-the taxpayer's argument that "bench haul," (the portion of the
transportation from the point of removal to the mine entrance), should be in-
cluded in gross income from mining. The taxpayer anologized this to the move-
ment of coal along headings and haulways of a deep mine, which is included in
the gross income from deep mining even if the transportation from the mouth
of the mine is not mining transportation. The analysis used by the court in
Rowe lends support, however, to the validity of the claim on substantive
grounds. The taxpayer argued that the use of the word "coal haul" in the re-
fund claim included both movement of the coal to the entrance of the mine
and then to the tipple. Equating "coal haul" and "transportation," the court
found that "transportation" has a narrow meaning which does not include any
part of extraction. The court concluded the taxpayer's claim was based on an
asserted extraction cost, not a transportation cost, and it was therefore proce-
durally barred.
D. Computation of Gross Income From Mining Where Nonmining Transpor-
tation or Processes have been Applied
1. Representative Market or Field Price Method
If an operator applies no nonmining processes or nonmining transporta-
tion to coal prior to sale, his gross income from mining is the sales price of the
coal less cash and trade discounts.35 5 If any nonmining process or nonmining
transportation has been applied to the coal prior to sale, the sales price does
not measure the operator's gross income from mining and a reduction is neces-
sary.358 The time at which the first nonmining process occurs is termed the
"cutoff point." This also identifies the point at which mining transportation
ends, but unlike nonmining processes, nonmining transportation does not pre-
I" Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(b) (1972).
... Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(e)(1) (1972).
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clude a subsequent process from being a mining process.
a. Nonmining Transportation. When no nonmining processes have been
applied and the only nonmining transportation that has been applied is "pur-
chased transportation to the customer," gross income from mining is the deliv-
ered sales price (if otherwise representative of market price) minus the cost of
the transportation. 57 If the taxpayer purchased the transportation from an-
other person (other than a person controlled by or controlling the taxpayer),
the cost of transportation is simply the amount the taxpayer paid for the
transportation. The transportation costs may be separately stated or included
in the delivered price. Thus, costs of shipping by common carrier may simply
be deducted from the sales price.
58
If nonmining transportation, including transportation to the customer in
conveyances owned by the operator or leased by him, was applied to the coal,
the operator's gross income from mining is determined with reference to the
representative market or field price received by other producers selling signifi-
cant quantities of coal of like kind and grade to which no nonmining processes
have been applied in the taxpayer's marketing area, reduced by the representa-
tive cost of purchased transportation to the other producers.3 59 Among the sit-
uations covered by this rule is transportation in excess of fifty miles for the
purpose of applying processes treated as mining or self-provided transporta-
tion to the customer.380 This rule applies even if the nonmining transportation
is purchased transportation in excess of fifty miles for the purpose of applying
processes treated as mining. However, the representative market or field price
so determined may not exceed the taxpayer's delivered price minus the actual
cost of the nonmining transportation.3 61
The same set of rules applies if the taxpayer earned a profit on purchased
transportation to the customer,3 2 or if the purchased transportation was pro-
vided by a person controlling or controlled by the taxpayer, unless the price for
such transportation was an arms length charge as determined under I.R.C. §
482.383 The taxpayer has not earned a profit on the transportation if the trans-
portation charged the purchaser, whether separately stated or included in the
sales price, is the same as the arms length charge normally incurred by ship-
pers of the same product in similar circumstances.36 Transportation otherwise
357 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.613-4(e)(2)(i); 1.613-4(c)(1) (1972). "Purchased transportation to the cus-
tomer" means nonmining transportation "performed solely to deliver the [coal] to the customer,
rather than to transport such [coal] for ... additional processing by the taxpayer. . .," that "is
not performed in conveyances owned or leased directly or indirectly, in whole or in part by the
taxpayer," and "with respect to which the [operator] ordinarily does not earn any profit." Treas.
Reg. § 1.613-4(e)(2)(iii) (1972).
Rev. Rul. 75-115, 1975-1 C.B. 178.
Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(e)(2)(i) (1972).
31o Id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(c)(1) (1972).
"8 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(e)(2)(i) (last sentence) (1972).
"' Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(e)(2)(i) (1972).
313 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(e)(2)(iii)(c) (1972).
"'4 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(e)(2)(iii) (1972); see also Rev. Rul. 75-115, 1975-1 C.B. 178 (no profit
earned by taxpayer on shipment by common carrier).
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meeting the definition of "purchased transportation to the customer" but pro-
vided by a person controlling or controlled by the taxpayer (within the mean-
ing of those terms under I.R.C. § 482) will nevertheless be treated as purchased
transportation if the taxpayer can establish that the price charged by the con-
trolled or controlling entity was an arms length charge under the standards of
I.R.C. § 482.
The regulations do not discuss the method of computing gross income
from mining if the taxpayer has applied nonmining transportation other than
purchased transportation to the customer and the only representative price at
which a significant quantity of coal of like kind and grade is sold after the
application of only mining processes is a representative delivered price after
the application of nonmining transportation other than purchased transporta-
tion to the customer. Possibly, this indicates that the determination of a repre-
sentative market or field price is impossible when all sales in the taxpayer's
marketing area are made at a delivered price that includes nonmining trans-
portation other than purchased transportation to the customer. If there is no
representative market or field price for coal in the taxpayer's marketing area
and he has applied nonmining transportation other than purchased transporta-
tion to the customer, then the taxpayer will generally compute gross income
from mining under the proportionate profits method.
b. Nonmining Processes. If nonmining processes other than transporta-
tion have been applied to the coal by the owner or operator prior to sale, gross
income from mining must similarly be reduced below the sales proceeds to re-
flect the increased sales price attributable to such processes. This is normally
done with reference to the representative field or market price of coal of like
kind and grade after the application of mining processes actually applied by
the taxpayer, including mining transportation, but excluding nonmining trans-
portation.3 65 The objective of the representative market or field price of com-
puting gross income from mining is to determine the approximate price at
which the taxpayer could have sold coal to which no nonmining processes or
transportation had been applied. That is his income from mining. His income
in excess of that amount is not gross income from mining. Accordingly, the
determination is made on the basis of actual competitive sales by the taxpayer
and others selling coal of like kind and grade. The representative market or
field price method or one of the alternative methods used where there is no
representative market or field price will always be used by an integrated manu-
facturer incorporating or using coal in the production of its finished product,
such as a steel manufacturer, or a power utility that operates its own mines.0 0
The regulations provide detailed rules for application of the representative
market or field price method to determine the taxpayer's gross income from
mining. 67 As with nonmining transportation, when the taxpayer applies non-
mining processes if other producers in the taxpayer's marketing area sell sig-
311 Treas. Reg. § 1.163-4(c)(1) (1972).
See, e.g., Woodward Iron Co. v. Patterson, 173 F. Supp. 251 (N.D. Ala. 1959) (coking coal
mined by pig iron manufacturer).
S37 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(c) (1972).
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nificant quantities of coal after the application of only mining processes, but
after purchased transportation to the customer, the taxpayer's representative
market price is the representative delivered price of the other producers minus
the representative cost of purchased transportation to the customer incurred
by those other producers.3 88
Under the regulations a mineral is of like kind and grade as the taxpayer's
"if in common commercial practice it is sufficiently similar in chemical, miner-
alogical, or physical characteristics to the taxpayer's . . . mineral that it is
used, or is commercially suitable for use, for essentially the same purposes as
the uses to which the taxpayers. . . mineral is put." However, "the fact that
taxpayer's . . . mineral is suitable for the same general commercial use as an-
other person's. . . mineral will not cause the two. . . minerals to be consid-
ered as like kind and grade if the desirable natural constituants of the two...
minerals are markedly different substances. '369 This is important with respect
to coal. As examples of this distinction the regulations provide that anthracite
coal and bituminous coal are not like kind and that bituminous coal without
coking qualities is not of like kind with bituminous coal with coking qualities.
But if the taxpayer "mines and uses his bituminous coal in the production of
coke, all bituminous coals in the same marketing area will be considered of like
kind, and all bituminous coals having the same or similar coking quality suita-
ble for commercial use by coke producers will be considered to be of like grade
as the coal mined and used by the taxpayer.3 7 0
There is some case authority further developing the principles regarding
coking coal in the preceding sentence of the regulations. In Alabama By-Prod-
ucts Corp. v. Patterson, the Fifth Circuit rejected the taxpayer's argument
that "like grade" of coking coal should be determined with reference to the end
use of the coal.3 7 1 Accordingly, coal used for commercial as well as coking pur-
poses was included in the relevant market. The court held not only that all
bituminous coals were of like kind, but it also affirmed the district court's
holding that all bituminous coking coals in the Alabama coal fields were of the
like grade and were commercially suitable for the manufacture of coke gener-
ally. The court said:
To go further and classify coking coals according to their myriad of actual uses
would lead to an unworkable system of grading coal, since the requirements of
coke vary greatly. There would never be in the case, of coking coal, a mineral
product of like kind and grade; we would have a phrase without meaning.372
When read against the factual findings made by the district court, the import
of this statement seems to be that all coking coals are of like grade. The dis-
trict court did not include in its specific findings of fact the precise classifica-
308 Tress. Reg. § 1.613-4(e)(2)(i) (1972).
-19 Tress. Reg. § 1.613-4(c)(2) (1972).
370 Id.
371 258 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 930 (1959). Accord Kaiser Steel Corp. v.
United States, 66-1 USTC 9457 (W.D. Cal. 1966), rev'd on other issues, 411 F.2d 335 (9th Cir.
1969).
372 258 F.2d at 899.
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tions of coking coal involved, but did find that the agglutinating characteristics
and carbon content of Alabama coking coals varied widely.37 3 The court's defi-
nition of "like grade" seems too broad to comport with the current regulations.
Perhaps the limit is simply that too find a distinction cannot be made.374
Woodward Iron Co. v. Pattersons raised a similar issue. The court ex-
haustively analyzed the classification and use of coking coals in Alabama, in-
cluding the classification of the coking coals in issue, under the Standard Clas-
sification of Coals by Rank promulgated in 1957 by the American Society for
Testing Materials (ASTM). The scale contained five classifications: low vola-
tile, medium volatile, high volatile A, high volatile B, and high volatile C. Low
volatile and high volatile B and C coal are not desirable for coking. Only me-
dium volatile and high volatile A coal was mined in the area where the tax-
payer operated. The court also analyzed classifications based on whether the
coal involved could make a commercially satisfactory coke when used alone or
if it could do so only when blended with certain other coking coals. Coals fall-
ing in both of these categories were mined by the taxpayer and by others in the
area. The court concluced, nevertheless, that coals of both ASTM rankings
were like grade and that coking coals were of like grade notwithstanding the
fact that some would produce a commercially satisfactory coke when coked
alone and others required blending.
A different result was reached, however, in Kaiser Steel Corp. v. United
States.376 The district court in Kaiser Steel Corp. utilized methods similar to
those utilized in Woodward Iron Co., to determine "like kind and grade" of
coking coals. However, the court in Kaiser Steel Corp. utilized a more detailed
approach, comparing volatility under ASTM standards, sulphur content and
plasticity under three tests: agglutinating index, free swelling index and the
Geisler plastometer. When the various coals contended to be of like kind and
grade were subjected to analysis, the results were compared. The court held
that high volatile coal mined by the taxpayer in Utah, Colorado and New Mex-
ico was not of like kind and grade as low volatile coal mined in Oklahoma and
Arkansas, because it was not a complete substitute. However, coals of varying
chemical compositions, each having particular advantages and thus being com-
petitive were held to be of like kind and grade. These findings were affirmed on
appeal. 377 Furthermore, the district court required that the market sales price
for high volatile coal mined in the same area as the taxpayer's coal and suita-
ble for coking but sold for commercial purposes had to be included together
with sales of similar coal for coking purposes in determining the representative
market or field price. This conclusion was also affirmed on appeal.378 Although
the court in Kaiser Steel Corp. was correct in finding that the Utah, Colorado
373 151 F. Supp. 641 (N.D. Ala. 1957).
' ' "Fine distinctions between various grades of minerals are to be avoided unless those dis-
tinctions are clearly shown to have genuine commercial significance." Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(c)(2)
(1972) (last sentence).
315 173 F. Supp. 251 (N.D. Ala. 1959).
376 411 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1969).
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and New Mexico coals were not of like grade as the Oklahoma and Arkansas
coals, its findings that they were not of like kind is not consistent with the
regulations unless they were in different marketing areas.
This is significant because the regulations provide that if there is no repre-
sentative market or field price for minerals of like kind and grade as taxpayer's
minerals, but there is a representative market or field price for minerals of like
kind, but not grade, then the representative market or field price of the like
kind minerals will be used, with appropriate adjustments, if such adjustments
may be readily ascertainable.3 79 There are no authorities expressly applying
this section of the regulations to coal,, but it appears the principle may require
somewhat more precision than was applied in Alabama By-Products Corp. and
Woodward Iron Co. to treat bituminous coals with different coking qualities as
like kind and grade and to then arrive at a rough approximation of representa-
tive market price.
Numerous factors to be considered in determining the representative mar-
ket or field price are specified in the regulations.3 0 The prime factor, although
it is not determinative, is a weighted average of the competitive selling prices
in the relevant market of coal of like kind and grade as the taxpayer's, to
which has been applied only mining processes. This method was applied in
Kaiser Steel Corporation even though some of the market sales, due to market
conditions, were not profitable.3 81 Only sales under competitive conditions will
be taken into account. The regulations provide that sales prices between mem-
bers of a controlled group, whether involving taxpayer or a competitor, will be
deemed competitive where the Commissioner has exercised his authority under
I.R.C. § 482 to reallocate income between controlled taxpayers.382 Exceptional,
insignificant, unusual and other sales out of the ordinary course of business
will not be included in the comparison.
In determining the representative market or field price, cash and trade
discounts allowed by all sellers in transactions upon which the price is based
must be subtracted from the sales price.383 Similarly, if other producers in the
taxpayer's marketing area sell coal only after nonmining purchased transporta-
tion to the customer, the representative costs of the nonmining transportation,
taking into account different modes of transportation and distances, must be
deducted from the representative delivered price to determine the representa-
tive market or field price.38'
The regulations do not expressly prescribe a method for determining a
representative market or field price when other producer's in the taxpayer's
marketing area sell coal only for a delivered price, including nonmining trans-
37' Tress. Reg. § 1.613-4(c)(4) (1972).
280 Tress. Reg. § 1.613-4(c)(3) (1972).
281 411 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1969).
-82 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(c) (1972).
283 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(e)(1) (1972).
1 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(e)(2)(i) (1972); see Kaiser Steel Corp. v. United States, 411 F.2d 335
(9th Cir. 1969) (taxpayer's lower transportation costs resulted in finding of higher value for iron
ore at the mine; specific formula applied to determine adjustment).
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portation other than purchased transportation to the customer. Possibly this
indicates that it is impossible to determine a representative market or field
price under such circumstances, thereby requiring the use of the proportionate
profits method to determine gross income from mining. Arguably, however, a
representative market or field price could be ascertained by subtracting from
the representative delivered price a hypothetical representative fair market
value of the nonmining transportation included in the delivered price.
The identity of the relevant market and the representative market or field
price within the market are factual determinations,38 5 and the scope of review
is therefore limited. In Kaiser Steel Corporation v. United Statess80 the tax-
payer argued that iron ore mined, sold, and consumed in the Great Lakes re-
gion should be included in the relevant market for determining the representa-
tive market or field price of iron ore mined and used in manufacturing by the
taxpayer in California. The district court limited the relevant market to iron
ore. mined in Utah by another miner from whom the taxpayer had purchased
iron ore to meet requirements in excess of its own production. The chemical
composition of the Utah iron ore was very similar to the taxpayer's iron ore.
Furthermore, not only had Kaiser never purchased Great Lakes iron ore for
use in its operations, but there was no evidence of any sales of Great Lakes
iron ore in the western United States. On this basis the district court
concluded:
The sales of iron ore in the Great Lakes region . . . are of no weight in this
case because of the remoteness of the sites of such sales from the area of plain-
tiff's operations and the absence of any sales or shipments of such ore to plain-
tiff's operations. The Great Lakes area was an independent market insofar as
the plaintiff is concerned, and sales within that independent market area had
no economic effect upon plaintiff's market area and did not establish or effect
the representative market price for [taxpayer's] iron ore.
3 17
The Court of Appeals, affirming this finding because it was not "clearly errone-
ous," rejected Kaiser's claim that the Great Lakes market should be considered
because it "had some influence on western . . . ore prices." Such influence, if
there was any, was reflected in the actual prices in the relevant market used by
the district court to determine the representative market or field price.388
There are limits on the representative market or field price that may be
ascertained under the rules prescribed by the regulations. It may never be less
than the taxpayer's delivered price minus the actual cost to the taxpayer of
providing nonmining transportation to the customer.38 0 Furthermore, if when
added to the taxpayer's cost of applying nonmining processes and transporta-
tion, an amount otherwise determined to be the representative market or field
price regularly results in a loss, it will be presumed that the amount so deter-
Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(c)(3) (1972).
386 411 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1969), revug and remanding 66-1 USTC 9457 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
3" 66-1 USTC at 86, 101.
3" 411 F.2d at 339.
"9 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(e)(2)(i) (1972).
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mined is not representative.390 The regulations provide the following example:
[i]f on a regular basis the total of all costs of nonmining processes applied by
the taxpayer to coal for the purpose of making coke is $12 per ton and if the
taxpayer's actual sale price for such coke is $18 per ton, a price of $7 per ton
would not be a representative market or field price for the taxpayer's coal
which is used for making coke. 91
It should be noted that the product sales price used in this test is the tax-
payer's actual product, such as steel in the case of an integrated steel producer,
and not the first commercially marketable product."2 The presumption that
the provisionally determined representative market or field price is too high
can be rebutted by establishing that the loss on nonmining operations is due to
unusual nonrecurring factors, such as fire, flood, explosion, earthquake or
strike.3 93
In Bloomington Limestone Corp. v. United States,394 the Seventh Circuit
described the purpose of the presumption as follows:
The theory of the presumption is that an integrated miner-manufacturer which
shows year after year of profit from its mining operation and year after year of
loss from its manufacturing operation must be overestimating the price of its
raw product, and therefore overestimating the expenses of its manufacturing
phase. The hypothesis is that no business would continue a milling operation
which resulted in actual losses over a number of years. 99
Based on this view the court refused to apply the presumption where the tax-
payer had eighteen consecutive years of mining profits using the representative
market or field price method, but only six years of manufacturing profits in
those years. The taxpayer introduced evidence that manufacturing losses were
due to a depressed market for its finished product, that it had taken steps to
modify its operations in light of the depressed market, and that it did not
believe that the depressed market was permanent. Accordingly, the Seventh
Circuit concluded that the case did not involve the "sort of inflated or manipu-
lated calculation" at which the presumption of the regulation was aimed."
Furthermore, because there were intermittent profitable years, the losses were
not regular enough to activate the presumption. This interpretation empha-
sizes the necessity for "regularity" of the manufacturing loss and rejects any
interpretation that would treat the exceptions provided in the regulations as
the exclusive causes of manufacturing losses that may avoid the presumption.
However, in Gray Knox Marble Co. v. United States,39 7 the court applied
the presumption where the taxpayer, utilizing the asserted representative mar-
390 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(c)(6) (1972). See also Rev. Rul. 77-296, 1977-2 C.B. 207.
191 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(c)(6) (1972).
392 Rev. Rul. 77-33, 1977-1 C.B. 165.
31 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(c)(6) (1972).
394 445 F.2d 1105 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'g and remanding on other grounds 315 F. Supp. 1255
(S.D. Ind. 1970).
895 Id. at 1109.
8" Id. at 1110.
19 257 F. Supp. 632 (E.D. Tenn. 1966).
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ket or field price, showed substantial mining profits for eight consecutive years
while simultaneously showing manufacturing losses that ranged from seventy
three percent to one hundred and eight percent of the mining profits, except
for the first of the eight years, when the loss was only twenty-five percent of
mining profits. Under this rule taxpayers are, in effect, presumed to be willing
to operate regularly their mining operations at break even costs or at a loss,
but unwilling to operate regularly nonmining operations at a loss. For example,
competitive prices for raw coal have been held to be evidence of representative
market or field price for an integrated steel producer even though those prices
were not profitable to the other miners.398
If a taxpayer computes his gross income from mining using the representa-
tive market or field price, he must attach a statement to his tax return indicat-
ing the comparable prices used in determining the representative market or
field price and the source of his information. Relevant supporting data must be
readily available at his principal place of business.3s If there are no competi-
tive sales in the relevant market (including sales by the taxpayer) of coal of
like kind and grade to which no nonmining processes have been applied, the
representative market or field price method may not be used. But if there are
such sales, it cannot be avoided.40 0
2. Proportionate Profits Method and Alternative Methods
If it is impossible to determine a representative market or field price, gross
income from mining will be computed under the proportionate profits method,
unless the use of an alternative method is more appropriate than the propor-
tionate profits method.40 1 The standard for determining the appropriateness of
an alternative method is whether, considering all of the facts and circum-
stances, the proportionate profits method or the proposed alternative method
will more clearly reject gross income from mining for the taxable year in ques-
tion.0 2 If an alternative method is more appropriate, it can be required at the
initiative of the IRS or upon application by the taxpayer to the Office of the
Assistant Commissioner (Technical).403 A taxpayer is not required, however, to
obtain advance approval before reporting on an alternative method, but the
method must be approved before it will be allowed. 40 ' Although other alterna-
398 Kaiser Steel Corp. v. United States, 411 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1969).
'" Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(c)(5) (1972).
41 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(c)(1) (1972); Alabama By-Products Corp. v. Patterson, 258 F.2d 892
(5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 930 (1959), affg 151 F. Supp. 641 (N.D. Ala. 1957).
40' Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(d)(1) (1972).
402 Tress. Regs. §§ 1.613-4(d)(1)(ii)(b) and (c) (1972). However, once a particular alternative
has been determined by the Office of the Assistant Commissioner (Technical) to be more appropri-
ate than either the proportionate profits method or the method used by the taxpayer, that method
will continue to be used unless it (a) consistently fails to clearly reflect gross income from mining
and (b) the proportionate profits method or alternate method prepared by the taxpayer more
clearly reflects gross income from mining for the taxable year. Id. The method of computation is
subject to review and change on an annual basis. Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(d)(1)(iii) (1972).
4"3 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(d)(1)(ii)(a) (1972). See Rev. Proc. 74-43, 1974-2 C.B. 496, for the
procedures to obtain approval of the use of an alternative method.
4" Rev. Proc. 74-43 § 4.02, 1974-2 C.B. 496.
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tive methods may be used, 0 5 the regulations specifically refer to the represen-
tative schedule method,40 6 using prices outside the taxpayer's market to estab-
lish a representative market or field price,40 7 and the rate of return on
investment method. °8 If a representative market or field price can be ascer-
tained, neither the proportionate profits method nor any alternative method
may be used to determine gross income from mining. 0 9
The proportionate profits method determines gross income from mining
on the principle that each dollar of the total cost to produce and sell the first
marketable product earns the same percentage of profit.410 Under that assump-
tion the following formula is applied to determine gross income from mining:
Mining CostsX Gross Sales = Gross Income From Mining 11
Total Costs
"The purpose of the proportionate profits formula is to separate the sales price
of a product into its mining and nonmining components."4 2 To apply this
formula, three factors must be ascertained; gross sales of the first marketable
product, mining costs and total costs of the first marketable product.
"Gross sales" are the taxpayer's aggregate competitive sales of his first
marketable product,413 reduced by trade and cash discounts4 4 and the cost of
purchased transportation for delivery to customers.41 5 If the taxpayer applies
additional manufacturing processes to the first marketable product, then the
actual sales price of the taxpayer's actual product is not used; gross sales are
determined by reference to a "constructive sale" price for that portion of the
first marketable product used or retained for the taxpayer's operations.4' 8 The
dollar value of constructive sales is determined under the principles of the rep-
400 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(d)(1)(ii)(e) (1972).
400 Tress. Reg. § 1.613-4(d)(5) (1972).
407 Tress. Reg. § 1.613-4(d)(6) (1972).
408 Trees. Reg. § 1.613-4(d)(7) (1972). This subsection of the Regulations is "Reserved" and
the specifics for use of the method have not yet been promulgated.
409 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(d)(7) (1972); United States v. Cannelton Sewer Pipe Co., 364 U.S. 76
(1960); Woodward Iron Co. v. Patterson, 173 F. Supp. 251 (N.D. Ala. 1959) (taxpayer could not use
proportionate profits method); Warner Co. v. United States, 504 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 930 (1975) (same); Rev. Proc. 73-43, 1974-2 C.B. 496 (taxpayer cannot obtain
approval of alternative method if there is a representative market or fixed price).
420 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(d)(4)(i) (1972).
412 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(d)(4)(ii) (1972).
M" North Carolina Granite Corp. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1281, 1291 (1971); see also Com-
missioner v. Portland Cement Co. of Utah, 450 U.S. 156 (1981).
423 Tress. Reg. § 1.613-4(d)(4)(v)(a) (1972).
414 Tress. Reg. § 1.613-4(e)(1) (1972).
425 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(e)(2)(ii) (1972). The determination of what constitutes purchased
transportation and the method for determining the cost of transportation purchased from another
taxpayer controlling or controlled by the taxpayer computing his gross income from mining is de-
termined under Tress. Reg. § 1.613-4(e)(2)(iii) (1972) in the same manner as applies to the repre-
sentative market or field price method, which is discussed in the text accompaning notes 359-61
supra.
410 Tress. Reg. § 1.613-4(d)(4)(v)(a) (1972); see, e.g., Standard Lime & Cement Co. v. United
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resentative market or field price method,417 but if there is an actual representa-
tive market or field price it will be used. If, however, the first marketable prod-
uct has been sold between members of a controlled group and the district
director has reallocated income with respect to such sales between members of
the controlled group under I.R.C. § 482, then the price determined under
I.R.C. § 482 will be used to determine gross sales. 41 1
The first marketable product is defined as the "product. . .produced by
the taxpayer as a result of the application of nonmining processes, in the form
or condition in which such product or products are first marketed in significant
quantities by the taxpayer or by others in the taxpayer's marketing area.' '419
The first marketable product does not include any product resulting from ad-
ditional manufacturing or other nonmining processes applied to the product
first marketed in significant quantities by the taxpayer or others in the tax-
payer's marketing area. 20
For example, if the taxpayer were an integrated steel producer and in the
taxpayer's marketing area all coal was consumed by either integrated steel pro-
ducers or coke producers, there might be no representative market or field
price for coal. However, if coke was sold in significant quantities by other man-
ufacturers in the taxpayer's marketing area, then coke and not steel would be
the taxpayer's first marketable product. This would be true even if the tax-
payer itself sold only steel. Accordingly, the taxpayer's gross sales under the
proportionate profits method would be the constructive sales price of the colie
consumed in the manufacture of the steel. This price would be determined by
applying the principles of the representative field or market price method to
sales of coke in the taxpayer's marketing area. Consistent with this method,
the constructive price would not include cash or trade discounts or the cost of
transportation of delivered coke.421 If a taxpayer owns an integrated operation
which mines coal and converts it to oil or gas, the determination of the first
marketable product may be substantially more difficult. However, it only ap-
plies where it is impossible to ascertain a representative market or field price
for the coal.
Determination of the cost inputs for the proportionate profits method is
complex. The numerator of the fraction is "the sum of all the costs allocable to
those mining processes which are applied to produce, sell, and transport the
first marketable product; ' 422 the denominator is "the total of all the mining
and nonmining costs paid or incurred to produce, sell and transport the first
marketable product.' 423 This requires several allocations.
First, direct costs attributable to manufacturing applied after the first
marketable product has been produced are not taken into account in the com-
417 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(d)(4)(v)(b) (1972).
418 Id.
410 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(d)(4)(iv) (1972).
420 Id.
421 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(e)(1) (1972).
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putation. 42 Furthermore, cash and trade discounts, which are excluded from
gross sales, are also excluded from the denominator of the fraction.42 The
same rule applies to the cost of purchased transportation to the customer if the
taxpayer makes no profit on the transportation. This does not exclude pur-
chased nonmining transportation relating to shipment for additional nonmin-
ing processing necessary to produce the taxpayer's first marketable product.4 2
The purpose of this exclusion is to prevent the allocation of any profits to pur-
chased transportation.
Costs which are directly allocable to mining, including treatment processes
considered as mining under I.R.C. § 613(c)(4) and mining transportation, are
allocated to the numerator. Costs which are directly allocable to nonmining
processes, including nonmining transportation, are excluded from the numera-
tor. No ranking of costs which results in excluding or minimizing the effect of
any costs incurred to produce, sell and transport the first marketable product
is permissible.427 Only actual costs, including depreciation and cost recovery
under I.R.C. § 168, are included in the computation. Generally the amount of
any item to be included as a cost is the amount for purposes of computing the
taxpayer's federal income tax, including depreciation and cost recovery.428 In
computing mining costs, however, the taxpayer should include the amount of
cost depletion that would be allowable for the year without regard to the I.R.C.
§ 613 allowance for percentage depletion, even though that amount will not
actually be used to compute the taxpayer's federal income tax.
Costs attributable to nonmining transportation (other than the purchased
transportation for delivery to customers which is excluded entirely) are in-
cluded in total costs. 429 Thus, the profits attributable to mining transportation
are attributed to mining, but the profits attributable to nonmining transporta-
tion are not. If actual costs for mining and nonmining transportation, respec-
tively, can be ascertained, those costs will be used. Otherwise mining transpor-
tation costs will be that portion of total transportation costs that bears the
same ratio to total transportation costs as miles of mining transportation bear
to the total miles of mining and nonmining transportation.430 Such an alloca-
tion would be used, for example, where the tipple was located more than fifty
miles from the mine and the operator had not received permission to treat as
412 See North Carolina Granite Corp. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1281 (1971), acq. in result,
1974-2 C.B. 3, acq., clarified Rev. Rul. 77-179, 1977-1 C.B. 168.
421 Tress. Reg. § 1.613-4(e)(1) (1972).
420 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(e)(2)(ii), (iii)(b). Rev. Rul. 75-115, 1975-1 C.B. 178.
'17 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(d)(4)(i) (1972).
"I Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(d)(2) (1972). If, however, a taxpayer was using a reasonable method
of computing costs for financial accounting purposes at variance from its method for computing
deductions on its federal income tax return and it used that method to determine gross income
from mining under the proportionate profits method for taxable years beginning prior to December
1, 1968, it may continue to use that method if it has been used consistently and is applied to the
determination of all costs. Id.
420 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(d)(3)(i) (1972); see generally Updegraft and Zychick, Transporta-
tion of Crude Mineral Production by Mine Owners and Its Effect on Hard Minerals Depletion
Allowance, 35 TAx. LAW. 367, 381-83 (1982).
420 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(d)(3)(i) (1972).
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mining transportation more than fifty miles of transportation for the purpose
of treatment processes considered as mining.
Sales costs also require special consideration. Under the regulations the
cost for packaging and containers is a nonmining cost, as is the cost of ware-
housing and bulk loading manufactured goods. 31 The regulations also require
that "a reasonable portion" of the selling expenses of a manufactured product
be allocated to mining costs; 43 2 the balance of selling expenses are allocated to
nonmining costs. The "reasonable portion" is equal to "typical selling expenses
which are incurred by unintegrated miners or producers."' 3 3 No selling costs
will be allocated to mining costs if unintegrated operators typically incur no
selling costs. 3 4 Selling expenses are broadly defined in the regulations and in-
clude salaries, commissions and other direct costs as well as overhead attribu-
table to sales personnel.4
33
All other costs incurred to produce, sell and transport the first marketable
product which cannot be directly attributed to a particular mining process or
nonmining process must be apportioned between mining and nonmining costs
by a method which is "reasonable under the circumstances.' '43 6 This may re-
quire a different method of allocation to be used for different costs incurred
within the same year. For example, indirect costs, such as the salary of a corpo-
rate officer overseeing all of the taxpayer's processes or trade association dues
of an integrated manufacturer, may reasonably be apportioned on the ratio of
direct mining costs to direct nonmining costs. 43 7 Workman's compensation pre-
miums, however, should be apportioned on the basis of direct labor costs,'43 as
should other employee benefits not clearly allocable only to employees engaged
either in mining or nonmining processes. The principles used to allocate indi-
rect costs in determining taxable income from the property for purposes of
applying the "fifty percent of the taxable income from the property limitation"
may be helpful in arriving at a reasonable allocation under the proportionate
profits method.439
E. Fifty Percent of Taxable Income Limitation
1. Generally
Regardless of the method used to compute gross income from mining sub-
ject to the percentage depletion allowance, the deduction for percentage deple-
431 Tress. Reg. § 1.613-4(d)(3)(iii) (1972).
432 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-5(c)(4)(ii) (1972).
433 Id.
43' Treas. Reg. 1.613-4(d)(3)(iii) (1972).
411 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-5(c)(4)(iv) (1972).
43" Tress. Reg. § 1.613-4(d)(4)(iii) (1972).
417 Id.; Tress. Reg. § 1.613-5(c)(6) (1972). The activities of the trade association must relate to
the production, treatment and marketing of raw materials, but will be allowed even though one of
the principal purposes of the association is to promote the production, marketing and sale of a
manufactured product. Id.
"4 Tress. Reg. § 1.613-4(d)(4)(iii) (1972).
4" See Arvonia-Buckingham Slate Co. v. United States, 426 F.2d 484 (4th Cir. 1970).
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tion may not exceed the fifty percent of the taxable income from the property
(identified under I.R.C. § 614), (hereinafter "fifty percent of taxable income
limitation") computed without considering any depletion allowance deduc-
tion.4 40 Cost depletion, however, is not subject to any such limitation.
The regulations define taxable income from the property as follows:
The term taxable income from the property ... means 'gross income from
the property' . .. , less all allowable deductions (excluding any deduction for
depletion) which are attributable to mining processes, including mining trans-
portation, with respect to which depletion is claimed. These deductible items
include operating expenses, certain selling expenses, administrative and
financial overhead, depreciation, taxes deductible under section 162 or 164,
losses sustained,. . . exploration and development expenditures, etc .... Ex-
penditures which may be attributable both to the mineral property upon which
depletion is claimed and to other activities shall be properly apportioned to the
mineral property and to such other activities. Furthermore, where a taxpayer
has more than one mineral property, deductions which are not directly attribu-
table to a specific mineral property shall be properly apportioned among the
several properties .... 41
The starting point for computing "taxable income from the property," is "gross
income from the property," not gross income under I.R.C. § 61. A taxpayer
holding a nonoperating economic interest in coal property subject to depletion
(rather than subject to section 1231 treatment under I.R.C. § 631(c)) has little
difficulty in computing taxable income from the property. Generally, gross in-
come from the property and taxable income from the property will be identi-
cal. The same rule will apply to a royalty computed on a net profits basis be-
cause the holder of a net profits interest includes only the net amounts
received in gross income from the property.442 If the holder of a royalty interest
then pays royalties to another taxpayer, the royalties paid are excluded from
his gross income from the property and thus are excluded from taxable income
from the property.
Because taxable income from the property is computed with reference to
"gross income from the property" and not gross income under I.R.C. § 61,
holders of both operating interests and nonoperating interests must exclude
lease bonus payments made by them in years to which they are properly allo-
cable,44 3 even though the amount of any such payment is includable in gross
income of the payor under I.R.C. § 61 and is not deductible in determining
taxable income under I.R.C. § 63. 44 Royalty payments made by the taxpayer
are, of course, excluded from gross income from the property.
445
440 I.R.C. § 613(a) (1980); Treas. Reg. § 1.613-1 (1972).
44 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-5(a) (1972).
442 See Grandview Mines, 32 T.C. 759 (1959), aff'd, 282 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1960).
41 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-2(c)(5)(ii) (1977); Rev. Rul. 79-73, 1979-1 C.B. 218.
444 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-2(e)(5)(ii) (1977). (Example 1).
445 See Section IV.B. supra.
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2. Deductible items
The regulations require that all allocable deductions attributable to the
mining processes, including mining transportation, be deducted from gross in-
come from the property in computing taxable income from the property. Items
which are capitalized, rather than deducted in computing taxable income
under I.R.C. § 63, are not deducted in computing taxable income from the
property. Thus, the cost of all improvements, buildings and equipment serving
a mine, and replacements of such items, is not deducted.44 6 Subsequent ACRS
deductions under I.R.C. § 168 to recover the cost of such property are deducti-
ble in the year in which the deduction is properly taken. Deductible expenses
which relate both to mining and nonmining activities must be apportioned be-
tween the two activities and only the portion of the expenses attributable to
mining activities is deducted. Furthermore, if a deduction item is attributable
to two or more mineral properties, it must be allocated between them. Gross
income from the property and taxable income from the property are both com-
puted on each property separately. In addition to the items specified as deduc-
tions in computing taxable income from the property in the regulations quoted
supra, several other items are specifically mentioned.
Selling expenses incurred by a producer of coal must be subtracted from
gross income from the property in computing taxable income from the prop-
erty.4 4 7 Because the fifty percent of taxable income limitation is computed on a
property-by-property basis, selling expenses which benefit more than one prop-
erty must be apportioned between the properties.4 s If the taxpayer is an inte-
grated manufacturer, only an amount equal to the typical selling expenses in-
curred by unintegrated miners must be subtracted; if integrated miners
typically incur no selling expenses, no deduction is necessary. 449 Selling ex-
penses include sales management salaries, rent of sales offices, clerical ex-
penses, salesmen's salaries, sales commissions and bonuses, advertising ex-
penses, sales traveling expenses, and any similar expenses, including an
allocable share of overhead for supporting services, but not delivery costs."50
Similarly, indirect expenses benefiting more than one property, such as
officers' and general administrative employees' salaries, office supply expenses,
and depreciation or ACRS deductions, that are deductible in computing taxa-
ble income from mining must be apportioned between the properties. 4" 1 Fur-
thermore, if such expenses are incurred by an integrated producer, any ex-
penses not directly attributable to mining must be apportioned between
mining and nonmining activities.
2
441 See Treas. Reg. § 1.612-2(a) (1977); Harman Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 200 F.2d 415 (4th
Cir. 1952).
4'7 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-5(c)(4)(i) (1972).
448 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-5(a) (1972); Occidental Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 115
(1970), acq. 1971-1 C.B. 2.
4" Treas. Reg. § 1.613-5(c)(4)(ii) (1972).
411 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-5(c)(4)(iii) (1972).
41 Id.; G.C.M. 22956, 1941-2 C.B. 103.
452 See Treas. Regs. §§ 1.613-5(a) (apportionment); and 1.613-5(c)(4)(ii) (1972) (selling
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Trade association dues paid by a coal producer are also deductible in com-
puting taxable income from mining and are subject to the apportionment
rules.4 5 3 If an integrated manufacturer incurs trade association dues, "a reason-
able portion" of the dues must be subtracted from gross income from mining in
determining taxable income from mining. This applies if the activities of the
association relate to the production, treatment and marketing of raw materials.
Some deduction must be made, however, even if one of the primary purposes
of the trade association is to promote the production, marketing or sale of a
finished product. The regulations suggest that one reasonable method of ap-
portionment is based on the proportion that the direct costs of mining
processes and nonmining processes bear to each other.
Although the regulations provide that operating expenses attributable to
mining are deductible, numerous questions regarding identification of operat-
ing expenses have arisen. Miner's wages and employer's payments to pension
funds for miners are clearly deductible.4 4 Similarly, expenses of a receiver for
an insolvent oil and gas company have been held to be deductible where the
company had substantially no other business.
455
On occasion, however, a question arises regarding how to compute wages.
In Mallary v. United States45s a partner's guaranteed share, payable as a sal-
ary without regard to profits of the partnership for his services in connection
with the partnership's mining activities, was not deductible in computing taxa-
ble income from the property. This treatment is consistent with the purpose of
I.R.C. § 707(c) which governs such payments for purposes of partnership
taxation.
In Repplier Coal Co. v. Commissioner 57 the taxpayer furnished miners
with dynamite and supplies, for which it charged them a price that produced a
profit. The taxpayer also rented mine lamps to the miners. Charges for the
items were deducted from the wages owed to the employees. The court upheld
the Commissioner's position requiring the gross amount of wages, unreduced
by the charges for the supplies and lamp rental, to be deducted from gross
income. Under the taxpayer's method, which would have deducted only the net
wages payable plus the cost of supplies, the ceiling of the fifty percent of taxa-
ble income limitation would have been increased by the amount of profits de-
rived from providing the supplies.
However, when the taxpayer receives a trade or cash discount upon the
purchase of mining supplies or services that are deductible, only the net
amount payable is deducted.458 Similarly, the income tax credit or refund
expenses).
45 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-5(c)(6) (1972).
44 Occidental Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 115 (1970).
455 C.A. Hughes & Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C.M. (CCH) 20,893(M) (1955).
4 238 F. Supp. 87 (M.D. Ga. 1965).
457 140 F.2d 554 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 736 (1944), aff'g 1 T.C.M. (CCH) 12-903-J
(1942).
458 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-5(c)(1) (1972); Rev. Ru. 68-214, 1968-1 C.B. 299; see also Monroe Coal
Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 1334 (1946).
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under I.R.C. §§ 39 and 6421(a) for federal gasoline excise taxes is treated as a
reduction in the price of the gasoline.5 9
Taxes deductible under I.R.C. §§ 162 or 164 are deducted to the extent
allocable to mining. Thus, state income and franchise taxes, federal social se-
curity and unemployment taxes, and state and local real and personal ad
valorem property taxes must be deducted.4 60 Ad valorem property taxes paid
by a lessee on behalf of a lessor are not deducted. Because such taxes are
treated as additional royalties and are excluded from the lessee's gross income,
a deduction in computing taxable income would result in taking such taxes
into account twice.
If, however, any taxes have been capitalized under I.R.C. § 266, then the
amount of such taxes will not be deducted.461 Similar treatment should be ac-
corded delay rentals that the taxpayer has elected to capitalize.4 62 Generally,
there is no good reason for a coal operator to capitalize real property taxes or
delay rentals, so this provision should not often be applicable.
Interest incurred in a mining operation is deductible, whether incurred to
obtain funds for mine development, to purchase equipment, to purchase the
mine or to provide operating capital.46 3 This includes interest on corporate
bonds, discounts on issuance of bonds, premiums on redemption of bonds, and
amortizable costs of issuing the bonds. 46 4 Interest on corporate bonds must be
allocated between mining and nonmining activities and then between separate
mining properties.4 6 5 Interest on a federal income tax deficiency is deducted if
the deficiency relates to income from mining.46 If, however, the deficiency re-
sults from an adjustment to any item that must be allocated between mining
and nonmining activities, then only a portion of the interest on the deficiency
will be deducted. When the taxpayer has more than one property, interest not
411 Rev. Rul. 66-226, 1966-2 C.B. 239. For an accrual basis taxpayer the credit or refund gener-
ally reduces the price of gasoline purchased during the year in which the right to the credit or
refund accrues. If, however, a taxpayer has consistently taken such refunds or credits into account
in the following year, that method will be permitted so long as it does not materially distort
income.
Gasoline taxes that are refundable or for which a credit is allowed are not deductible. I.R.C. §
280D. If no credit or refund is available, however, the taxes including state taxes, are deductible
under I.R.C. § 162.
460 Commissioner v. Montreal Mining Co., 2 T.C. 688 (1944), affd, 44-2 USTC 1 9490 (6th Cir.
1944); Grison Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 1117 (1940).
161 Treas. Reg. § 1.-613-5(c)(5) (1972).
42 In Rev. Rul. 55-118, 1955-1 C.B. 320, declared obsolete in Rev. Rul. 76-566, 1976-2 C.B.
450, the IRS ruled that delay rentals were carrying charges on unproductive property subject to
capitalization under I.R.C. § 266 at the taxpayer's election.
463 Guanacevi Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 49 (9th Cir. 1942), aftg 43 B.T.A. 517
(1941) (development expenses); St. Mdry's Oil & Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 270 (1940)
(mineral property purchase money); Central State Collieries, Inc. v. Commissioner, B.T.A.M. (P-
H) 1 41,251 (1941) (equipment); Lumaghi Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 645 (8th Cir. 1942).
'" Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co., v. Helvering, 125 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1941); St. Louis, Rocky
Mountain & Pacific Co. v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 28 (1957).
485 St. Louis Rocky Mountain & Pacific Co. v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 28 (1957).
466 Holly Development Co. v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 51 (1941) (only activity was production
of oil and gas).
658 [Vol. 85
78
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 4 [1983], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol85/iss4/5
COAL DEPLETION ALLOWANCE
directly attributable to a particular property must be fairly apportioned be-
tween them.
467
Under the regulations losses sustained in mining must be deducted. This
generally refers to loss deductions under I.R.C. § 165, not net operating loss
carryovers under I.R.C. § 172, which are not deducted in computing taxable
income from the property.468 The IRS has ruled that deductible losses include
losses intentionally incurred on the sale of goods and services, such as housing,
goods, and supplies provided to workers.469 This view has been accepted by the
Tax Court.47 0 In effect, the loss is treated as additional wages paid to the min-
ers and attributable to mining. If however, the taxpayer has operated with the
intent to provide such goods or services to workers at a profit, the activity will
be segregated, treated as a nonmining activity, and its losses, if any, uninten-
tionally incurred will not be deductible in computing taxable income from min-
ing, but will be deductible by the taxpayer in computing taxable income under
I.R.C. § 63.
Losses occasioned by abandonment or damage to mine equipment must be
deducted in computing taxable income from the property.471 This is consistent
with the requirement that depreciation under I.R.C. § 167 and cost recovery
under I.R.C. § 168 be deducted.47 2 Similarly, expenditures for equipment nec-
essary to maintain normal output solely because of recession of the working
forces of the mine that qualify under Treasury Regulation § 1.612-2(a) for de-
duction as ordinary and necessary business expenses must also be deducted in
computing taxable income from the property.
47 3
In Montreal Mining Co. v. Commissioner,'47 4 the Tax Court held that
amounts paid in settlement of former employees' occupational disease claims
were deductible in the year of the settlement rather than for the prior years in
which the workers were engaged in mining. This result is consistent with the
general application of the taxpayer's method of accounting to the determina-
tion of taxable income from the property. Similarly, wage awards representing
back pay are deducted in the year of the award, not in the prior year to which
the claims relate.7 5
Exploration and development expenses are taken into account in comput-
ing taxable income from the property in the year in which they are deducted
under I.R.C. § 617 or § 616, respectively.476 Because an election to defer devel-
opment expenses deductions during the development stage applies only to the
467 G.C.M. 22956, 1941-2 C.B. 103.
,66 Rev. Rul. 60-164, 1960-1 C.B. 254.
169 Rev. Rul. 56-433, 1956-2 C.B. 332.
470 American Gilsonite Co. v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 194 (1957), afj'd on this point, 259 F.2d
654 (10th Cir. 1958).
471 Elk Lick Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 585 (1954).
472 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-5(a) (1972).
473 Commissioner v. Harman Coal Corp., 200 F.2d 415 (4th Cir. 1952).
474 41 B.T.A. 399 (1940).
471 Rialto Mining Co. v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (P-H) 1 46,148 (N.L.R.B. award).
476 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-5(c)(2) (1972).
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excess of development expenses over net receipts from the mine,477 an election
to defer the deduction cannot be used to accelerate the year in which a deple-
tion deduction may be taken by raising the taxable income ceiling in the year
the expense is incurred with the concomitant reduction in a future year in
which the expenses is deducted. However, since net operating loss carryovers
are not considered in computing taxable income from the property,478 a tax-
payer who does not elect to defer excess development expenses receives the
benefit of the deduction under I.R.C. § 63 in the year to which the net operat-
ing loss is carried. The taxpayer does not suffer the burden of reducing the
fifty percent of taxable income limitation on percentage depletion in that year.
Because exploration expenses are deductible under I.R.C. § 617(a)(1) only
if incurred prior to the beginning of the development stage of the mine, the
deduction of such expenses in computing the limit on percentage depletion will
be taken into account only in a taxable year in which the mine passes from
exploration to production. If, however, exploration expenditures have all been
deducted in a taxable year prior to the first production, then the fifty percent
of taxable income limitation will never be affected by exploration expenses. If
the taxpayer elects to recapture the deducted exploration expenses under the
method specified in I.R.C. § 617(b)(1), taxable income under I.R.C. § 63 for the
year of the election is increased by the amount of the previously deducted ex-
ploration expenditures, but gross income from the property-the starting point
for computing taxable income from the property-is not affected.4 9 Thus, the
taxpayer has taxable income, against which the percentage depletion deduction
is not allowable, equal to the previously deducted exploration expenses.
Alternatively, the taxpayer may recapture the previously deducted explo-
ration expenses under I.R.C. § 617(b)(1)(B) by reducing the otherwise allowa-
ble depletion deduction for the property by the amount of the previously de-
ducted exploration expenses on a dollar-for-dollar basis once the mine reaches
the producing stage. Although recapture may be spread over two or more
years, the effect on income is the same; aggregate taxable income over the re-
capture period is increased by the amount of the previously deducted explora-
tion expenditures. In neither case have the exploration expenditures also re-
duced taxable income from mining, unless some exploration expenditures were
incurred in the year the mine reached the production stage.
If a mine reaches the production stage in the same year that mine explora-
tion expenses have been deducted pursuant to an election, however, aggregate
depletion deductions allowable for property will be less than what they would
have been either absent the election or if identical expenses had been incurred
in a taxable year prior to the first year of production. However, this disadvan-
tage may be offset by the advantage of having had the current deduction for
exploration expenses in earlier years, which will not be recaptured in income
until a future year. This advantage can exist, however, only when the deducted
4-" I.R.C. § 616(b) (1981).
418 Rev. Rul. 60-164, 1960-1 C.B. 254.
479 Treas. Reg. § 1.617-3(a)(2) (1972).
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exploration expenditures exceed ten percent of the gross income from the mine
in the year in question. Even then, whether an advantage exists depends on
the magnitude of the excess and the number of years for which the exploration
expenses will offset the depletion allowance. Furthermore, in making this anal-
ysis, consideration must be given to the effect of aggregating properties under
I.R.C. § 614.
3. Offset of Recapture Income
Although profits from the sale of mining equipment are not included in
gross income from mining, the sum of the deductions that are taken into ac-
count in computing taxable income from mining is reduced by any income
from the sale of property treated as ordinary income under I.R.C. § 1245, that
is properly allocable to the property.480 Thus, the ceiling on the depletion al-
lowance is increased by the amount of recapture income. This reflects the prior
deducton of depreciation or cost recovery that reduced taxable income from
mining and hence the ceiling on the depletion deduction in a prior year.
4 1
Although this previously took into account only depreciation recapture on per-
sonal property, under I.R.C. § 1245(a)(5), added by the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981, it now encompasses recapture on improvements to real estate
subject to ACRS, the cost of which has not been recovered under the straight
line method.8 2 There is no additional offset of recapture income against the
allowance of these deductions in computing taxable income under I.R.C. § 63,
however, where the full benefit of the deductions remains available. The inclu-
sion of I.R.C. § 1245 recapture income in gross income under I.R.C. § 61 effects
the appropriate offset for purposes of computing taxable income.
The determination of the amount of recapture income allocable to a spe-
cific mineral property is complex; the regulations are detailed and include nu-
merous examples. Absent aggregation of mineral properties, the basic rule is
that the portion of recapture gain allocable to a specific mineral property is
that portion of the total recapture gain that bears the same ratio to the total
recapture gain as the depreciation or cost recovery deductions taken for the
depreciable asset and previously deducted from gross income from mining in a
prior year,483 or if cost depletion had been taken in a prior year, which would
411 I.R.C. § 613(a) (1976); Treas. Reg. § 1.613-5(b) (1972). Section 1245 also recaptures as
ordinary income amounts deducted under I.R.C. § 179, see I.R.C. § 1245(a)(2) and the basis reduc-
tion of one half of the amount of the investment tax credit required by I.R.C. § 48(q)(9) (1976).
481 See S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong. 2d Sess. 100 (1962), reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. 707, 806.
Prior reductions in the taxable income ceiling attributable to expenditures for machinery and
equipment deducted under the recession of the working face doctrine, however, are not so reflected
in an offset against deductions in computing taxable income from the property equal to the gain
realized upon the subsequent sale of such property. Because such equipment was expensed and not
a depreciable capital expenditures, the gain upon the subsequent sale of such property is not sub-
ject to recapture as ordinary income under section 1245. See I.R.C. §§ 1245(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(E)
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
482 If improvements to real estate are depreciated under the unit of production method pursu-
ant to an election under section 168(e), section 1245 recapture does not apply.
483 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-5(b)(1), (2) (1972).
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have been taken into account if percentage depletion had been claimed in the
prior year, bears to the total depreciation or cost recovery allowed with respect
to the depreciable asset.4 84 The original allocation of the depreciation or cost
recovery deduction between properties is to be made on the basis of the num-
ber of hours in the year the asset was utilized for the benefit of the respective
properties. 18 5 If the asset was used to benefit different properties in different
years, the recapture income is allocated between the properties in the same
ratio that deductions originally taken were allocated.486
If the I.R.C. § 1245 recapture attributable to a particular mineral property
in a certain year exceeds the sum of the deductions from gross income from the
property taken into account in computing taxable income from the property,
the excess is not carried forward or back and the tax benefit is lost.487 Further-
more, if the taxpayer disposes of the mineral property in a taxable year prior
to the sale of the depreciable asset giving rise to the depreciation recapture,
the recapture income may not be used to offset deductions taken into account
in computing taxable income from mining for any other mineral property of
the taxpayer; the tax benefit is lost. However, if the depreciable asset was used
in connection with a mineral property, part of which the taxpayer no longer
owns and part of which he still owns, the entire amount of the depreciation
recapture may offset deductions in computing taxable income from the prop-
erty which the taxpayer still owns. 488
If the depreciable asset was used in both mining and nonmining activities,
for example, a truck hauling coal more than fifty miles for application of a
mining process, only a portion of the recaptured income reduces expenses
taken into account in determining taxable income from mining. Since the origi-
nal apportionment was based on hours of use in mining and nonmining activi-
ties respectively, the same ratio is applied to allocate recaptured income be-
tween mining and nonmining.489
If the depreciable asset was used with respect to properties which were
subsequently aggregated, the entire recaptured gain will be allocated to the
aggregated property. If one of the aggregated properties is sold prior to the
disposition of the depreciable asset, recapture attributable to the use of the
asset, to benefit the property no longer owned during the period of aggregation,
is allocated to the remaining property previously aggregated with the property
no longer owned.410 When the depreciable asset was used to benefit previously
aggregated properties that have been disaggregated, the depreciation recapture
allocable to the period of aggregation is allocated among the properties in the
same ratio as the basis of the aggregated properties was apportioned among
484 Id.
411 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-5(b)(7) (Example 1) (1972).
48 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-5(b)(7) (Example 3) (1972).
4'7 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-5(b)(3) (1972).
488 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-5(b)(4) (1972).
489 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-5(b)(7) (Example 2) (1972).
480 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-5(b)(7) (Example 4) (1972).
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the properties upon disaggregation.9 1
A situation not explained in the regulations is the allocation of recaptured
income upon the sale of a depreciable asset used in connection with aggregated
properties upon the prior disposition of one of the aggregated properties, when
the depreciable asset was used prior to aggregation in conjunction with the
property that has been sold prior to the sale of the asset. Presumably, in such a
case none of the recapture allocated to the preaggregation period should offset
any of the expenses deducted from gross income from the aggregated proper-
ties to determine the fifty percent of taxable income limitation on the aggre-
gated properties, even though the full recapture is included in gross income
under I.R.C. § 61.
The same logic underlying the offsetting of recapture income against de-
ductions in computing the fifty percent of taxable income limitation should
also be applicable to any gain that is treated as ordinary income recognized as
a result of the sale of an item of property the cost of which was previously
expensed. Such an adjustment would, for example, be particularly appropriate
with regard to any gain from property properly expensed under the receding
face doctrine. 92 To the extent the amount realized on the sale does not exceed
the previously deducted amount, the amount realized should be treated as or-
dinary income under the tax benefit rule. 41 3 The analogy to section 1245 recap-
ture income is particularly apt. There is, however, no authority supporting
such an adjustment. Because expensed equipment is not capitalized and its
cost recovered under I.R.C. § 167 or § 168, the income from the sale of such
equipment, although ordinary income under the tax benefit doctrine, is not
section 1245 recapture income494 and, in light of the fact that the adjustment
for section 1245 recapture income is specifically and narrowly sanctioned by'
statute, claiming such an adjustment for expensed equipment has no basis in
law.
4. Apportionment of Indirect Costs
Proper allocation of indirect costs is primarily an accounting problem. The
leading case dealing with the apportionment of indirect costs is Occidental Pe-
troleum Co. v. Commissioner.49 5 At issue was the proper allocation among nu-
merous coal mines operated by the taxpayer of payments by the employer to
the United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund equal to
forty-cents per-ton of coal produced for use or sale; selling expenses; and gen-
eral administrative and overhead costs, including officers' compensation, cleri-
491 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.613-5(b)(4)(ii); 1.613-5(b)(7) (Example 5); see Treas. Reg. § 1.614-6(a)(2)
(1972) (allocation of basis among properties upon disaggregation).
402 See Treas. Reg. § 1.612-2(a) (1960) for deductions under the receding face doctrine.
493 See, e.g., Tennessee.Carolina Transportation, Inc. v. Commissioner, 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979) (corporation had ordinary income on sale of previously
expensed truck tires and tubes).
"4' See I.R.C. § 1245(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(E) (the gain on equipment expensed under I.R.C. § 179,
however, is section 1245 recapture income).
495 55 T.C. 115 (1970), acq., 1971-1 C.B. 2..
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cal and support wages and salaries, rents, repairs, taxes, interest, pension plan
contributions, insurance benefits, and depreciation.
The court grouped the mines into the following three categories: those that
produced high grade (metallurgical) coal; those that produced low grade
(steam) coal; and those that produced both. Based on the evidence, the court
also concluded that the direct expenses of producing high grade coal were
greater than the direct expenses of producing low grade coal. A similar conclu-
sion was reached regarding the expenses of selling the respective coals. The
court also found that general administrative personnel tended to give less at-
tention to efficient mines than they gave to inefficient mines.
4 6
First, the court concluded that the UMW pension payments were direct
rather than indirect costs. The taxpayer argued that since fifty-five percent of
the employees who benefited from the payments were employed away from the
mine face, including those who were employed at idle mines and who worked
in the central machine shop, the expenses should be treated as indirect ex-
penses and allocated among the mines in proportion to direct costs. Since the
payments were based on total tonnage produced, irrespective of means or cost
of production, the court concluded that they could be traced to a particular
"cost center" and were, therefore, direct expenses. Because the payments were
based solely on tonnage, that was the proper factor to be used to allocate the
cost among the various mines.
49 7
The court likewise concluded that selling expenses were direct expenses.
However, because the court was persuaded by the evidence that the additional
expertise necessary to sell high quality coal generally resulted in higher selling
costs than were incurred for low quality coal, it employed a different appor-
tionment formula. Sales expenses were then allocated among the three groups
into which the court had divided the mines relative to other direct expenses.
However, since there was no persuasive evidence regarding the relative varia-
tions of sales effort expended for the various mines in each group, within each
group the portion of total selling expenses allocated to the group was further
allocated relative to tonnage.4 9 8 Because the decision of the Tax Court was so
heavily based on the evidence, it would appear that records showing time ex-
pended in selling the output of various mines might result in a different
method of allocation. However, when the owner of two or more mines treats
the coal produced as fungible in making sales, then an allocation based on ton-
nage appears to be most reasonable.
Finally, the court considered general administrative and mine overhead,
which are indirect expenses, and concluded that there are defects in adopting
any uniform allocation formula for all such expenses. Nevertheless, it rejected
the Commissioner's argument that the expenses should be allocated among the
mines based on respective tonnage produced. Emphasizing that the method of
apportionment was based on the particular facts, the court adopted the tax-
491 Id. at 118-20.
497 Id. at 124-26.
498 Id. at 126-27.
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payer's method of allocation based on direct costs, including the pension bene-
fit payments and selling expenses. The prime reasons for adopting the "propor-
tionate to direct costs" method of allocating indirect costs appear to have been
the persuasive evidence that the taxpayer's administrative personnel devoted
to inefficient mines rather than to efficient mines, that inefficient mines having
had a higher per unit direct cost than did efficient mines, and that the tax-
payer's method reflected industry accounting practices.4 9
Although rejecting the Commissioner's argument, the court acknowledged
there is merit to allocating different expenses by different methods. For exam-
ple, bad debts are clearly unrelated to direct expenses and would be better
allocated by a different method. Indirect supervisory personnel expenses
should be allocated based on time expended for each separate property, while
workman's compensation and mine safety expenses should be allocated on the
basis of accident records and time actually expended. Depreciation and inter-
est would be better allocated based upon the respective investment in each
separate property. This final category needs even further refinement. For ex-
ample, interest and depreciation on general administrative offices seem to be
better allocated relative to direct costs; while general bond interest might be
better allocated relative to investment. However, the court indicated that such
refinements in allocation should be generally determined by rule-making
rather than in judicial proceedings. 500
An integrated manufacturer must allocate indirect costs between mining
and nonmining activities.50 1 The proper allocation of indirect expenses between
mining and nonmining activities is also primarily an accounting problem. The
method of allocation of selling costs and trade association dues has been dis-
cussed above, in regard to identifying expenses deductible in computing taxa-
ble income from the property. The allocation of transportation expenses is
properly made in the manner described in the discussion of the representative
market or field price and proportionate profits methods of computing gross
income from mining.50 Only the cost of the mining transportation included in
gross income from mining is to be deducted in computing taxable income from
the property.
50 3
In Tennessee Consolidated Coal Co. v. Commissioner,0 4 the Tax Court
rejected the Commissioner's argument that indirect costs should be universally
allocated between mining and nonmining activities in proportion to direct
costs. Instead, based on evidence presented by the taxpayer, the court ap-
proved allocation to mining of varying percentages of the deductible expenses
for power purchased, superintendent's salary, building repairs, officers' salaries,
state franchise taxes, state and county taxes, office salaries, stationary and
printing and certain payroll taxes. However, since the taxpayer introduced no
'9 Id. at 128-29.
800 Id. at 130-32.
101 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-5(a) (1972).
502 See supra notes 345-56, 359-66 and accompanying text.
1o0 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-5(a) (1972).
504 15 T.C. 424 (1950).
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evidence probative that any allocation other than relative to direct cost was
proper for vacation pay, general office expense, certain depreciation expenses,
clerks, contributions, office expense, insurance, miscellaneous expense, certain
bonuses and legal expenses, the Commissioner's allocation for these items was
sustained. 05
5. Expenses Not Deducted in Computing Taxable Income from the Property
A number of expenses are not deductible from gross income from the
property in computing the fifty percent of taxable income limitation. The ex-
clusion of these items from the computation is advantageous to the taxpayer
because the items remain, nevertheless, deductible in computing taxable in-
come under I.R.C. § 61. As noted above, net operating loss carrybacks and
carryforwards are not deducted.506 This treatment, to the extent that the net
operating loss is attributable to expenses deductible in computing taxable in-
come from the property in the year in which the net operating loss was in-
curred, is overly generous. Perhaps the rationale for the ruling is the adminis-
trative complexity in apportioning the net operating loss when the taxpayer is
involved in both mining and nonmining activities, but considering the com-
plexity and detail of computations already required, it would actually be only a
minor burden. More likely, since percentage depletion is an incentive provi-
sion, carrying over losses to reduce depletion in prior or future years would be
antithetical to the purposes of I.R.C. § 613.507
As discussed previously selling expenses attributable to the manufactured
product are also nondeductible. These expenses do not contribute to gross in-
come from mining and are, therefore, not deducted in computing taxable in-
come from mining.508 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit held in Island Creek Coal
Co. v. Commissioner509 that business interruption fire insurance premiums are
not deductible. Likewise, in North Carolina Granite Corporation v. Commis-
sioner,5 10 the court held that legal fees incurred to determine the proper deple-
tion deduction for federal income tax purposes are not deductible in comput-
ing taxable income from the property. The IRS, however, asserts that such
expenses are indirect administrative expenses which must be allocated between
mining and nonmining income.511 If a taxpayer had only income from mining,
the view of the IRS would require all of the legal and accounting expenses
incurred in connection with the determination of the taxpayer's income tax
liability be deducted in computing taxable income from mining.
505 Id. at 434-35.
" Rev. Rul. 60-164, 1960-1 C.B. 254.
507 Percentage depletion is very clearly a tax expenditure designed to encourage exploration,
development and extraction of natural resources. See McMahon, Defining the "Economic Inter-
est" in Minerals after United States v. Swank, 70 Ky. L.J. 23, 30-33 (1982).
558 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-5(c)(4)(ii) (1982).
09 382 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1967), rev'g 43 T.C. 234 (1964).
510 56 T.C. 1281 (1974) nonacq., 1972-2 C.B. 5, nonacquiescence explained Rev. Rul. 77-179,
1977-1 C.B. 168.
"' Rev. Rul. 77-179, 1977-1 C.B. 168, 170.
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Charitable contributions by a taxpayer engaged in mining are not attribu-
table to mining and are therefore not deducted in computing taxable income
from mining. 1 2 Not every payment to a charitable organization is a contribu-
tion, however, and if the payment is actually in consideration of services it
must be deducted. For example, if a hospital renders medical services having a
value of $2,000 to an injured miner and the employer pays the hospital $3,000,
the $1,000 for which no consideration was received is a contribution, but the
$2,000 for medical services must be deducted in computing taxable income
from mining.51 3 Within the limits of I.R.C. § 170, however, charitable contribu-
tions remain fully deductible in computing taxable income under I.R.C. § 63.
Revenue Ruling 80-317 held that damages payable by a mineral producer
for failure to deliver the amount of mineral required under a contract were not
deductible in computing taxable income from mining.5' 4 The damages payment
was not a cost of producing the mineral; rather it was the result of not produc-
ing the mineral.
6. Production Payments-Payor's Treatment
The proper treatment of production payments is governed by I.R.C. § 636.
Whether or not the payor of a production payment must reduce gross income
from the property by a portion of the payment in computing taxable income
from the property depends upon the treatment accorded to the payment under
I.R.C. § 636.
If the production payment was retained by the payee in a transaction in-
volving the sale of the coal property to the operator, the payment is treated as
a purchase money mortgage loan.515 The portion of each payment representing
interest is deducted from gross income from the property in computing taxable
income from the property. In determining the allocation of interest, the provi-
sions of I.R.C. § 483 are applicable. 16 Thus, if inadequate interest is stated,
interest will be imputed at the then currently applicable rate.5 1 7 The entire
amount of the production payment, including the interest portion, and the op-
erating expenses attributable to the production payment, is included in the
payor's gross income from the property. The operating expenses attributable to
the production payment are deductible in computing taxable income from the
property and in computing taxable income under I.R.C. § 63.518
A production payment retained by a lessor, however, is treated by the
lessee as a lease bonus payable in installments.5 19 The amount of the payments,
5,, United States Potash Co. v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 1071 (1958), acq.; 1960-1 C.B. 6; Island
Creek Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 370 (1958); Rev. Rul. 60-74, 1960-1 C.B. 253.
5,3 Rev. Rul. 60-74, 1960-1 C.B. 253, 254.
114 1980-2 C.B. 202.
5 I.R.C. § 636(b) (1976).
51' Tress. Reg. § 1.636-1(a)(ii) (1973).
517 See generally Trees. Reg. § 1.483-1 (1981).
6,8 See Brooks v. Commissioner, 424 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1970) rev'g 50 T.C. 927 (1968); Rev.
Rul. 35, 1971-1 C.B. 51.
511 I.R.C. § 636(c) (1976); Tress. Reg. § 1.636-2(a) (1973).
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are included in the lessee's gross income under I.R.C. § 61,520 but not in gross
income from the property. 21 The interest portion of the production payment is
capitalized as part of the bonus along with the principal portion,522 and since
no part of the production payment was included in gross income from the
property, the interest portion is not deducted in computing taxable income
from the property or in computing taxable income under I.R.C. § 63.
A production payment carved out to finance development or exploration
transfers an economic interest in the property.523 Thus, the production pay-
ment is excluded from the operator's gross income from the property and from
his gross income under I.R.C. § 61. Because the entire payment is excluded
from gross income from the property, and is thus excluded from the base on
which depletion is computed, no deduction from gross income is appropriate.
Such treatment is accorded, however, only to production payments for
which the consideration is pledged for use in the exploration and development
of the burdened property; if there is any other permissible use, the carved out
production payment will be treated as a mortgage loan.52 4 Thus, a production
payment for which the consideration is to be used for producton, is treated as
a loan, the consequences of which are described above in connection with pro-
duction payments treated as purchase money mortgages. In Revenue Ruling
74-549, the IRS held that a carved out production payment, the proceeds of
which were used to purchase equipment and to finance the removal of overbur-
den, was to be treated as a loan.52 5
V. IDENTIFICATION OF THE "PROPERTY" FOR COMPUTING THE DEPLETION
DEDUCTION
A. Separate Properties
Both cost and percentage depletion are computed with references to indi-
vidual mineral "properties," rather than with reference to all of the taxpayer's
properties taken together. The identification of each "property" with respect
to which a separate depletion computation is necessary is governed by I.R.C. §
614. It is possible, however, under certain circumstances for the taxpayer to
elect to aggregate separate properties and compute depletion on the aggregated
properties as if they were one property.
52 s
Section 614(a) defines the "property" as "each separate interest owned by
the taxpayer in each mineral deposit in each separate tract or parcel of
land. 5 21 7 An "interest" is an "economic interest in a mineral deposit. '528 If a
520 Treas. Reg. § 1.636-2(a) (1973).
521 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-2(c)(5)(ii) (1973).
522 Tress. Reg. § 1.636-2(a) (1973).
523 I.R.C. § 636(a) (1976) (last sentence).
"I I.R.C. § 636(a) (1976); Treas. Reg. § 636-1(b)(7) (1973).
525 1974-1 C.B. 186; see also Rev. Rul. 77-308, 1977-2 C.B. 208 (removal of overburden not
development expense); Rev. Rul. 67-169, 1967-1 C.B. 159 (same).
25 See I.R.C. § 614(c) (Supp. 1980).
527 The same definition appears in Tress. Reg. § 1.611-1(d)(7) (1973) and § 1.614-1(a)(3)
(1973). This definition is based on the definition promulgated by the IRS in G.C.M. 22106, 1941-1
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taxpayer has both an operating interest and a nonoperating interest in a par-
ticular mineral deposit, they are treated as separate interests. 2 9 Thus, for ex-
ample, if the taxpayer leases a coal deposit to a partnership, the partners of
which are the taxpayer and another person, and the partnership operates the
deposit, 530 the taxpayer has two separate interests, a royalty interest subject to
I.R.C. § 631(c) and an operating economic interest subject to depletion. This
rule can be very advantageous for taxpayers.
A taxpayer owning the fee or holding a lease into a coal deposit and desir-
ing to operate the deposit will frequently find it to his advantage to split his
interests through the use of a wholly owned corporation to serve either as the
lessor or operator, thus securing for the lessor entity the advantages of I.R.C. §
631(c) treatment permitting effective recovery of the depletable basis of the
coal deposit and capital gains treatment of the royalties in excess of basis,
while the lessee operator claims percentage depletion on the operating in-
come. 31 For the operator who so arranges the structure of his business, this is
truly a case of "having your cake and eating it too," since cost depletion and
percentage depletion are effectively claimed against substantially the same
income.
A separate "tract or parcel of land" is identified by the manner of acquisi-
tion. The regulations provide as follows:
All contiguous areas (even though separately described) included in a sin-
gle conveyance or grant or in separate conveyances or grants at the same time
from the same owner constitute a single separate tract or parcel of land. Areas
included in separate conveyances or grants (whether or not at the same time)
from separate owners are separate tracts or parcels of land even though the
areas described may be contiguous.
32
The regulations provide numerous examples of the operation of these rules.
533
Under the regulations neither the taxpayer's operating unit nor the fact that
C.B. 245, declared obsolete, Rev. Rul. 66-661, 1968-2 C.B. 607 and G.C.M. 24094, 1944 C.B. 250,
declared obsolete, Rev. Rul. 70-277, 1970-1 C.B. 280. Prior to the enactment of I.R.C. § 614(a) the
courts generally rejected this definition in favor of one based on the operating unit concept. See,
e.g., Helvering v. Jewel Mining Co., 126 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1942), rev'g 43 'B.T.A. 1123 (1941);
Black Mountain Corp. v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 1117 (1945), non acq., 1942-2 C.B. 6; Amherst Coal
Co. v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 209 (1948).
028 Treas. Reg. § 1.614-1(a)(2) (1973). See supra Section II regarding the meaning of "eco-
nomic interest."
51 See Treas. Reg. § 1.614-1(a)(3) (1973); § 1.614-1(a)(5) (Ex. 3) (1973); Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v.
Riddell, 347 F.2d 455 (9th Cir. 1965) (taxpayer who owned one-half interest in fee and entire
interest in lease had two separate interests); Helvering v. Jewel Mining Co., 126 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir.
1942), rev'g 43 B.T.A. 1123 (1941) (lessee operated coal mine on portion of tract and subleased
another portion of tract); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.614-3(a)(1) (1978) (prohibiting the aggregation of
an operating interest and a nonoperating interest).
530 The facts of this hypothetical are adapted from Rev. Rul. 73-32, 1973-1 C.B. 301; see supra
notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
521 See Whiteside & Jackson, Tax Shelters in the Mineral Industry, On, & GAs/NATURAL RE-
SOURCES TAXES (P-H) 2039 (1983).
532 Treas. Reg. § 1.614-1(a)(3) (1973).
522 Treas. Reg. § 1.614-1(a)(5) (Ex. 1)-(Ex. 9) (1973).
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only one coal deposit underlies several different tracts of land are significant in
identifying the property, absent an election under I.R.C. § 614(c) to aggregate
separate properties or fragment one property. Thus, if the taxpayer conducts
mining operations as a single operating unit on eight contiguous tracts overly-
ing one coal deposit, but his interest in each tract was acquired from a differ-
ent transferor, he is operating eight separate properties . 3 Whether the inter-
ests are in fee or leasehold is irrelevant. Similarly, three noncontiguous tracts
overlying the same deposit acquired from a single transferor in one transaction
are treated as three separate properties. 53 5 If, however, the taxpayer acquires
contiguous tracts overlying a single deposit in one transaction, he has a single
property even if his transferor had two separate properties because the trans-
feror had acquired his interest in each tract from different transferors.5 30 This
rule applies, however, only if the transferor held the fee.537 The regulations,
distinguish between a lease from the fee owner, which can effect the unification
of what were two separate properties for the lessor and an assignment of the
leases to two contiguous tracts leased from different fee owners. In the latter
case the tracts remain separate properties for the assignee of the leases.538
There is one important exception to the aggregation of properties effected
by a transfer as described in the preceding paragraph. If the properties' bases
in the hands of the transferee are determined by reference to their bases in the
hands of the transferor, then the properties must be treated as separate
properties by the transferee if they were so treated by the transferor.530 This
rule is of particular importance when the holder of separate, but contiguous,
properties overlying a single deposit contributes them to a partnership in ex-
change for a partnership interest or to a corporation in a transaction in which
no gain is recognized under I.R.C. § 351. In either case the properties remain
separate properties in the hands of the partnership or corporation due to the
carryover basis rules.
5 40
Even though one coal deposit is often divided among several properties,
identification of mineral deposits is not irrelevant in defining separate proper-
ties. Each separate deposit must be treated as a separate property, even if the
deposits underlie a single tract or parcel of land.5 1 Thus, each separate coal
seam underlying one surface tract is a separate property. A culm bank or waste
deposit is not treated as a separate coal deposit, however, but is part of the




"' Treas. Reg. § 1.614-1(a)(5) (Ex. 2), (Ex. 5), (Ex. 8) (1973). For the definition of an "operat-
ing unit," see Treas. Reg. § 1.614-2(c) (1965).
5 Treas. Reg. § 1.614-1(a)(5) (Ex. 4) (1973).
536 Id., (Ex. 7).
117 Id., (Ex. 6).
.. Id., (Ex. 9).
539 Treas. Reg. § 1.614-1(a)(4) (1973).
"0 I.R.C. §§ 723 (partnership); 358 (corporations) (1976).
5" Treas. Reg. § 1.614-1(a)(3) (last sentence); § 1.614-1(a)(5) (Ex. 7) (1973).
842 Treas. Reg. § 1.614-1(c) (1973). See supra notes 309-24 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of the circumstances under which extraction from waste deposits is treated as mining for
the purposes of the depletion deduction.
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B. Elective Aggregation of Properties
The tendency of I.R.C. § 614(a) to multiply the number of properties is
counterweighed by the provisons of I.R.C. § 614(b) permitting the elective ag-
gregation of operating interests in mines. 5,1 Aggregation is limited, however, to
interests which constitute all or part of an "operating unit" of the taxpayer.
Separate operating units are identified with reference to the taxpayer's own
method of mining operations. Sharing common supply, maintenance, process-
ing, treatment and storage facilities and common field personnel are indicia
that separate mineral interests or mines are part of a single operating unit.
Geographically separated operating interests merely sharing a single set of ac-
counting records, a single exclusive organization and sales or processing facility
are not part of the same operating unit.5 " As long as the operating unit re-
quirement has been met, it is not necessary that the separate interests to be
aggregated be included in a single parcel or tract of land or that they be con-
tained in contiguous tracts or parcels of land.
54 5
The number of aggregated properties within any operating unit may de-
pend on the number of mines in the unit. If the taxpayer elects to aggregate
interests, all interests comprising a single mine, including interests subse-
quently becoming part of the mine, must be aggregated.5 " If, however, two or
more mines are contained within a single operating unit, the taxpayer may ag-
gregate the interests comprising each mine separately or the taxpayer may
elect to aggregate all mines within the unit as one property." 7 Under the regu-
lations a "mine" is defined as "any excavation or other workings or series of
related excavations or related workings . .."548 The particular facts and cir-
cumstances of the case determine the number of "excavations" or "workings"
that constitute a single mine. Among the factors to be considered are the na-
ture and position of the deposit or deposits; the method of mining; the location
of the excavations or other workings in relation to the deposit or deposits; and
the topography of the area.5 9 The taxpayer's determination of the composition
of a mine is accepted unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the con-
"s I.R.C. § 614(b) refers to "operating mineral interests." This term is defined by I.R.C. §
614(d) to include:
only an interest in respect of which the costs of production of the mineral are required to
be taken into account by the taxpayer for the purposes of computing the 50 percent
limitation provided for in section 613, or would be so required if the mine, well, o1" other
natural deposit were in the production stage.
See also Treas. Reg. § 1.614-3(e) (1978) (mine defined); § 1.614-2(b) (1965) (operating mineral
interest defined). Under certain more limited circumstances nonoperating interests are also subject
to aggregation under I.R.C. § 614(e). See Treas. Reg. § 1.614-5 (1961).
I" See Treas. Reg. § 1.614-3(d) (1978); § 1.614-2(c)(1) (1965). See also Rev. Proc. 64-23, 1964-
1 C.B. 689.
"5 Tress. Reg. § 1.614-3(a)(1) (1978).
546 Id. See also Tress. Reg. § 1.614-3(a)(2) (1978) (aggregation in subsequent taxable years).
M' Tress. Reg. § 1.614-3(a)(1) (1978).
58 Tress. Reg. § 1.614-3(e) (1978). "Excations" or "workings" include "quarries, pits, shafts,
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trary. The operation of these rules is illustrated by Revenue Ruling 74-215.o
In Revenue Ruling 74-215 the taxpayer operated an open pit mine and an
underground mine both of which extracted ore from a single deposit as a single
operating unit. The operating unit consisted of eighteen separate tracts of land
and thus eighteen interests. The taxpayer was permitted to separately aggre-
gate the interests operated as an open pit mine and an underground mine.
Among the reasons two different "mines" existed were that the ore quality dif-
fered and the operation of each mine required different techniques, personnel
and equipment.
Nevertheless, a strip mine and a deep mine that are in fact treated as a
single operating unit by the taxpayer may be aggregated as one property if the
taxpayer so elects.5 51 The taxpayer has the freedom to choose whether two
mines, each consisting of separate interests but included in one operating unit,
will be aggregated as one property or two properties.
When two or more properties have been aggregated, the unadjusted basis
of the aggregated property is the sum of the unadjusted bases of the separate
interests that have been aggregated. The adjusted basis of the aggregated
property is its unadjusted basis, adjusted for all prior adjustments to basis,
including those required by prior depletion deductions claimed for each inter-
est.5 52 After aggregation, all adjustments to bases are computed on the ad-
justed basis of the aggregated property. 53
Because the "depletion unit" for cost depletion is determined by dividing
the adjusted basis of the mineral property at the beginning of the taxable year
by what is essentially equivalent to the number of tons of coal remaining to be
recovered at the beginning of the year,55' aggregation can significantly affect
the cost depletion deduction available in any given year. If only cost depletion
is claimed, however, this is merely a timing difference. Total depletion over the
lives of the aggregated properties will always be equal to the sum of the ad-
justed bases of the separate properties regardless whether they are
aggregated. 555
On the other hand, when percentage depletion is claimed (either alone or
intermixed with cost depletion), aggregation of properties can affect the total
amount of depletion deductions claimed over the life of the deposit or deposits
to be extracted. This result arises primarily from the effect of aggregation on
the computation of the fifty percent limitation. But it may also occur if a prop-
erty on which cost depletion would exceed percentage depletion is aggregated
with one or more other properties, and percentage depletion is claimed on the
aggregate property. It is impossible to determine definitely, in advance,
50 1974-1 C.B. 149.
"5 See Douglas Coal Co. v. United States, 429 F. Supp. 322 (N.D. W. Va. 1977).
52 Tress. Reg. § 614-6(a)(1) (1980).
553 Id.
'"See supra notes 143-51 and accompanying text.
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whether aggregation will increase or reduce the aggregate amount of percent-
age depletion allowable. The result depends on the relative gross and taxable
incomes from each of the properties. Total percentage depletion deductions
will generally be increased if allowable percentage depletion on some of the
separate properties will be significantly limited by the fifty percent limitation
but fifty percent of the combined taxable income of the aggregated properties
will near or exceed ten percent (in the case of coal) of the gross income from
the combined properties. Aggregating a more profitable property with less
profitable properties may increase the depletion deduction. However, aggrega-
tion of a property that is operating at a loss or at a very low profit margin, and
thus claiming cost depletion, with other properties that have not been subject
to the fifty percent limitation may result in a reduction of the taxable income
from the aggregated property to the point where the fifty percent limitation
limits the depletion allowance deduction for the aggregated property to less
than the sum of the allowable depletion deductions computed for the proper-
ties separately. 5 6
The rules regarding aggregation of separate properties discussed in the
preceding paragraphs are only a summary of the complex provisions governing
aggregation. Particular problems not discussed in this article arise with respect
to the requirements of a timely election,5 5 aggregation of additional interests
following the initial election, 558 invalid aggregations, 559 and computation of ba-
sis, holding period and abandonment losses for aggregated properties.5 60 The
regulations provided detailed rules for most of these problems.
C. Election to Separate A Single Property
If the owner of an operating interest is or will be extracting the deposit in
a single property by operating two or more mines, the taxpayer may elect
under to I.R.C. § 614(c)(2) to have each mine treated as a separate property.
56 1
Following the election, depletion deductions will be separately computed for
each mine. Thus, the taxpayer may elect to separate a mine in the develop-
ment stage from an already operating mine to avoid a reduction in the fifty
percent limitation that would be caused by the deduction of development ex-
penses. However, if the mine is part of a property previously aggregated under
I.R.C. § 614(c)(1), an election to treat the mine as a separate property may be
made only with the consent of the commissioner; and such consent will not be
11" For several examples of divergent results based on differing relationships of gross income
from the properties to taxable income from the properties, see id. at A-49, B-101 to B-301.
57 I.R.C. § 614(c)(3) (1982); see Treas. Reg. § 1.614-3(0 (1978).
"5 See Treas. Reg. § 1.614-3(a)(2) (1978).
559 See Treas. Reg. § 1.614-3(f)(8) (1978).
500 See Treas. Reg. § 1.614-6 (1980).
6O1 I.R.C. § 614(c)(2). For the election to be made the taxpayer must have made expenditures
for development or operation of each of two mines. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.614-3(b)(1) (1978).
The regulations provide that if there is more than one mineral deposit in a particular tract or
parcel of land, an election under I.R.C. § 614(c)(2) regarding one deposit has no application to the
other deposit. This is because the existence of two deposits gives rise to two properties despite
their convergence in one tract or parcel of land. See supra note 538 and accompanying text.
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granted where the purpose of the election is based on the tax consequences .5 2
If an election to separate mines in a single property is made, all of the coal
deposit and tract or parcel of land to which it relates must be allocated among
the separate properties created by the election.563 The adjusted basis of the
property with respect to which the election was made must be apportioned
among the properties created by the electon proportionate to the relative fair
market values of the separate properties created by the election.
5 64
Since a property is treated as a separate property for all purposes once it
has been validly separated under I.R.C. § 614(c)(2), the taxpayer may subse-
quently aggregate the mine with other separate properties in the same operat-
ing unit, or, if the facts warrant, because the mine itself has developed into two
or more separate mines, the taxpayer may elect under I.R.C. § 614(c)(2) to
separate the property again, into two properties, each with a separate mine or
mines.565 The rules relating to the time for filing an election to aggregate and
separate properties will prevent a mine, which has been separated from other
mines in the same original property, from being aggregated with such mines in
a subsequent year without the consent of the Commissioner.6 This, together
with the requirement that the Commissioner's consent be obtained for any
separation of previously aggregated properties, prevents manipulation of the
identity of properties from year to year for tax avoidance purposes.
56 7
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to provide a detailed view of the substantive
rules regarding entitlement to the coal depletion allowance deduction and the
elements that enter into the computation of the deduction. Despite efforts to
be complete, however, there are many remaining questions, and in the case of
aggregation of properties, a substantial number of detailed administrative rules
have not been addressed. Many of these questions relate to proper accounting
methods in allocating income and expenses between properties and between
mining and nonmining activities for purposes of computing the gross income
from the property and fifty percent of the taxable income from the property,
both of which are necessary elements of computing the percentage depletion
allowance deduction.
Most of the substantive questions left unanswered are in that posture,
however, not because the applicable rules are unstated, but because the ques-
tion relates to effect of application of the rule on the depletion deduction cal-
culation. Will taking a particular item into account increase or decrease the
depletion deduction? Furthermore, when will the effect be felt, now or later?
This is particularly true with items subject to elective treatment, such as re-
52 Treas. Reg. § 1.614-3(b)(1) (1978).
'e' Tress. Reg. § 1.614-3(b)(2) (1978).
"' Treas. Reg. § 1.614-3(b)(3) (1978).
"' Treas. Reg. § 1.614-3(b)(1) (1978).
56 I.R.C. § 614(c)(3) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); Treas. Reg. § 1.614-3(0 (1978).
' Contra Day Mines, Inc. v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 337, 352-53 (1964) (aggregation made for
purpose of reducing taxes is valid).
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capture of exploration expenses under I.R.C. § 617, deferral of development
expenses under I.R.C. § 616, and aggregation and separation of properties
under I.R.C. § 614. Many of these questions cannot be answered in the ab-
stract, but only may be answered with examples. If any rules of thumb exist,
they would be too numerous to be useful. I hope, however, that the discussion
in this article will be of assistance in analyzing depletion allowance problems
and computations.
Some other questions raised in this article are more troubling. They relate
to the proper-that is, theoretically correct-treatment of items in computing
depletion allowance deductions. This is a difficult issue to address in coal taxa-
tion, and indeed, in all of natural resources taxation because many of the sub-
stantive rules are artificial. They often deviate from normative rules of taxa-
tion applicable to other industries. For example, I.R.C. § 613(a) provides that
I.R.C. § 1245 recapture income attributable to a property should be offset
against deductions in computing the fifty percent limitation on percentage de-
pletion. This is eminently logical since the depletion deduction previously
taken reduced the fifty percent limitation in a prior year, and the existence of
recapture income in a subsequent year indicates that in the earlier years depre-
ciation was overstated. However, gains on the sale of equipment which was
expensed under the receding face doctrine are not offset in the same manner,
despite the gain, equal to the amount realized, being treated as ordinary in-
come under the tax benefit rule to the extent that it does not exceed the previ-
ously deducted cost. Logically, this gain should be treated in the same manner
as I.R.C. § 1245 gain. Why is there a difference? There is a difference because
I.R.C. § 613 specifically refers to I.R.C. § 1245 recapture and to nothing else,
and the receding face doctrine is an artificial rule, deviating from the general
rule requiring capitalization and cost recovery under I.R.C. § 168. Neither the
accelerated deduction under the receding face doctrine, nor the concomitant
denial of any offset of subsequent gains against taxable income from the prop-
erty is totally logical, but perhaps rough justice is done. The price of the accel-
erated deduction today means less depletion in the future.
Another and more troubling example of an unresolved problem-also in-
volving a capitalization versus expensing issue-is the treatment of reclama-
tion expenses for strip mines. Neither the IRS nor the courts have yet viewed
these as capital expenditures. Indeed, the analogy to deductable stripping of
overburden is too appealing. But the answer is not that reclamation is properly
deductible because stripping overburden is deductible. Correctly treated, both
items should be both capitalized and added to the depletable basis of the coal
deposit. But proper treatment of reclamation expenditures would create the
appearance of inconsistency because stripping overburden is already errone-
ously accorded treatment as a currently deductible operating expense. Further-
more, from the viewpoint of most operators, proper treatment of reclamation
expenses would be highly disadvantageous. They are deducting percentage de-
pletion, and would probably be doing so even if the reclamation costs were
capitalized. In such event the issue of whether to capitalize or currently deduct
the reclamation expense does not present a question of whether the amount
will be deducted now or later, but rather a queston of whether it will ever be
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deducted. Furthermore, even if the taxpayer switches to cost depletion as a
result of the capitalization of the reclamation expenses, he does so at the ex-
pense of losing the benefit of percentage depletion. He may gain one deduction
but he has lost another.
The reclamation expenses issue is merely one facet of the exacerbation of
the tension between current deduction and capitalization of expenses adding to
the value of the deposit that is caused by treating percentage depletion as an
alternative to cost depletion. The purpose of percentage depletion is to provide
an incentive for exploration, development and extraction of natural resources,
including coal. 68 However, since percentage depletion and cost depletion are
mutually exclusive, the greater the taxpayer's capital investment in the min-
eral deposit, the less the benefit received from claiming a percentage depletion
deduction. There is something internally inconsistent in this structure. Cost
depletion, because of its function analogous to the cost of goods sold, should be
allowed in all events. The incentive provision, percentage depletion, should be
separately applied, not mutually exclusive. In addition to the illogic of the mu-
tually exclusive alternative availability of cost and percentage depletion deduc-
tions, the present regime exerts undue pressure on taxpayers to seek, and Con-
gress to grant, current deductions for capital expenditures that would
otherwise be added to the depletable basis of the mineral deposit.5 9 The solu-
tion to this problem is to separate cost and percentage depletion and allow cost
depletion deductions in all events. The incentive purpose of percentage deple-
tion, if Congress continues to believe it is warranted, should be provided by an
additional deduction of a percentage of either the gross or taxable income de-
rived from the extraction of natural resources. Such a system would not only
be substantially more equitable but, if properly constructed, it would be more
easily administered because it would significantly relieve the pressure to per-
mit current deductions for items properly capitalized as part of the depletable
basis of the mineral deposit and the complexity that results from responding to
that pressure.
See supra notes 11-24 and accompanying text; McMahon, Defining the "Economic Inter-
est" in Minerals After United States v. Swank, 70 Ky. L.J. 23, 30-33, 84-87 (1982).
"' See, e.g., LR.C. § 616 (1982) (deduction of development expenditures for natural resources
other than oil and gas); I.R.C. § 617 (1982) (deduction of exploration expenditures for any deposit
of ore or other mineral); I.R.C. § 263(c) (1982) (deduction of intangible drilling and development
costs for oil, gas and geothermal wells).
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